

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT  
OF FLORIDA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DADE

FALL TERM A.D. 1985

FINAL REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY

FILED

MAY 13, 1986

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DADE COUNTY'S DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Government is responsible for insuring the health safety and welfare of its residents. One essential responsibility that government has assumed is to provide safe, sanitary and decent housing for low-income residents. Dade County owns and manages over 12,000 units housing approximately 40,000 residents. The present poor condition of many of these units makes Dade County one of the largest slumlords in Dade County. The majority of these public housing units are located within Dade's inner-city neighborhoods. Problems in public housing contribute significantly to the blight and deterioration in these neighborhoods.

In the last six years, the community has suffered from civil unrest and high crime rates. Much of this unrest and crime has occurred in our inner-city neighborhoods where despair and frustration breed. During this time countless government reports, independent studies, editorials and individual accounts have characterized public housing in Dade County, for the most part, as deplorable and have cited sub-standard housing conditions as a major cause of our civil unrest and crime. For instance, in 1980 subsequent to the May riots, the Governor created a Citizen's Committee to identify the major causes contributing to the civil disturbances. The committee in its report identified housing as one of the eight major causes and stated:

Public housing... in the black areas of our community fall [s] far below the minimum standards of decency. Disrepair is pervasive: Holes in walls and ceilings, broken plumbing, and vermin infestation are the rule rather than the exception. There can be no doubt that such surroundings create an atmosphere where apathy, frustration, hopelessness, unrest and crime breed...

there is a direct correlation between high-density housing and high crime rates. This vicious reality is made even more unpalatable by the insensitivity displayed by government employees... who own buildings in the ghetto area. This committee heard that no preventative maintenance program exists for government project housing and, as a consequence, virtually no repairs are made. In fact, this committee heard testimony that monies allocated for repairs and refurbishing of public housing projects are dissipated in the running of the governmental agency that administers these funds... [There is a] myriad of problems beleaguering (sic) public housing projects.

In June of 1982, the United States Commission on Civil Rights issued its report on Confronting Racial Isolation in Miami. The report characterized low-income housing in Dade County as breeding despair and violence.

Much like a family, school, or work place, a neighborhood can either nourish or restrict its residences. In neighborhoods where Dade County's black population reside, the buildings are deteriorating. Many are squalid. Overcrowding, severe rodent infestation, and dilapidation characterize [the] black enclaves in Dade County. For most people these conditions engender apathy, hopelessness, frustration and anger. Public agencies subsidized the construction of much of the housing that exists today in Dade County's black neighborhoods. These agencies, while continuing to subsidize or manage the housing, have allowed it to deteriorate. Improving the housing stock in black neighborhoods would require a massive rehabilitative effort.

The Dade County Department of Housing and Urban Development (DCHUD) is the arm of government which locally owns and manages public housing. As DCHUD utilizes federal monies as well as local monies, it must comply with federal policies and regulations. The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (USHUD) conducts periodic audits or reviews to determine compliance with these conditions. In 1980 and 1984, USHUD criticized DCHUD for its failure to maintain decent housing. In 1985, two critical reports were issued, one of which officially designated DCHUD as "operationally troubled".

Both reports again criticized its failure to properly maintain public housing. These reports are the Occupancy Audit issued in May 1985, and the Comprehensive Management Review (CMR) issued in November of 1985. We utilized these reports in our attempts to focus on the key problems facing DCHUD. Additionally we toured several public housing complexes and surrounding neighborhoods, received testimony from local and federal housing experts, building inspectors, tenants, department staff and the County Manager's Office. DCHUD and the County Manager's Office cooperated fully with us in our efforts.

Despite all these numerous reports factually demonstrating a need for corrective measures and affirmative action by DCHUD, the deterioration and dilapidation of Dade's public housing complexes and surrounding neighborhoods continues. Action must be taken now if we are to reverse the blight suffered in the inner-city and other low-income areas.

The purpose of this Report is to provide insight into the weaknesses of the public housing program in Dade County. This Report focuses on key areas such as accountability for and monitoring of performance, the organization and operation of the department, lack of effective maintenance, poor rent management and funding. While this Report stresses the problems of multi-family housing, we also recognize that similar problems exist in many elderly housing complexes. We hope that this Report will be useful to those who need to turn the system around.

## II. DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEMS

### (A) PUBLIC HOUSING BACKGROUND

Dade County assumed responsibility for public housing in 1968 from the City of Miami. At that time, there were approximately 4,500 public housing units. These consisted of approximately 3,350 multi-family units and approximately 1,150 elderly

units. The multi-family units existed almost exclusively in the distressed complexes known as Edison Court, Liberty Square, Scott-Carver, Victory Homes and Larchmont Gardens. These complexes are located in our inner-city neighborhoods, all within an eight square-mile area.

During the late 1960's, additional federal monies became available. As a result, a building boom of public housing occurred in Dade County as it did around the nation. During the 1970's, approximately 5,500 units consisting of approximately 2,476 multi-family units and 3,056 units for the elderly were built. These multi-family units included such developments as Modello, Culmer Place, Carol City Townhouses and Goulds. These were not built in a concentrated area as were the older units.

From 1980 to 1985 approximately 2,200 units were built consisting of approximately 1,200 multi-family units and 1,000 units for the elderly. These multi-family units exist in complexes scattered throughout the County such as Singer Plaza, Culmer Gardens and Pine Island I and II.

Today, in light of recent federal fiscal policies, construction funds have disappeared. For instance, in the last three years only 500 units have been constructed. The building boom of the 1960's and 1970's has been replaced by the maintenance crisis of the 1980's. Today, we have approximately 2,600 multi-family units that are over 25 years old, most of which suffer from known deterioration.

#### (B) DILAPIDATION OF BUILDINGS

It is apparent to anyone, as it was to us, that many of Dade's public housing units are dilapidated and deteriorating rapidly. Over the years we had read numerous accounts of falling ceilings, collapsing floors, rodent infestation, leaking roofs and general squalor. We toured several complexes to see for ourselves whether or not those accounts are true. They are

true. We toured the older, troubled complexes such as Larchmont, Victory Homes and Liberty Square. It was our purpose, however, to examine for ourselves the deplorable conditions of which we had heard. We observed the following conditions:

Defective plumbing lines in second floor bathrooms that leaked directly over the kitchen area and onto food counters; recently installed kitchen cabinets which were falling away from the wall; collapsing stairways; leaky roofs; holes in walls and ceilings, exposed roof beams where the plaster had fallen; exposed electrical wiring and non-functioning space heaters; broken and leaking toilets.

One tenant told us of her broken toilet which had been removed but left in her bathtub for some unknown further action. Other tenants, as they would point to items of disrepair, described DCHUD's continuing failure to respond. Mothers described to us how their children were exposed to raw sewage, rodent and vermin infestation. We felt the despair and frustration that these residents experience daily.

Once we made our observations, we then heard from the experts. During the last several years inspections of some of the distressed complexes were conducted by agencies such as the Health Department, Dade County's Chief Building Inspectors and DCHUD's Division of Neighborhood Rehabilitation (Minimum Housing). We reviewed many of these reports dating back to 1980, and took testimony from many of the inspectors. In doing so, it became glaringly clear that DCHUD has been totally unresponsive and unsuccessful in meeting the maintenance need. A following brief summary paints the sad picture of neglect.

#### Liberty Square

1981	Division of Minimum Housing inspected all units and reported: hazardous electrical wiring; defective cooking facilities; deteriorating walls, floors, ceilings, cabinets, and stair handrails; deteriorated and leaking roofs; broken and inoperative toilets; broken windows; sewage problems; peeling paint; and inoperable windows.
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- 1983 As part of its overall rodent survey, the Department of Health found serious deficiencies which ranged from: sewage leaks; defective gas lines; leaking gas stoves; missing railings on stairs; leaking bathroom sinks; leaking toilets; holes in walls; deteriorated kitchen cabinets; broken windows and screens; defective refrigerators and light switches.
- 1986 Chief building inspectors for Dade County and inspectors for the Health Department while inspecting ten percent of the units reported: life threatening gas leaks in water heaters; leaking and deteriorated roofs; cracked plaster; leaking plumbing which was rotting kitchen cabinets; holes in ceilings and walls; severe problems of exposed garbage due to inadequate number of dumpsters. Additionally, 85 percent of the units inspected had water damage and 100 percent were roach and mice infested.

#### Larchmont Gardens

- 1982-1983 The Health Department reported that 100% of the units were mice and roach infested. More critically, the worst rat infestation was found in the Day Care Center.
- 1985 The Health Department returned to Larchmont and found the same conditions existing, and reported DCHUD had not taken any action.
- 1985 Inspections conducted by County chief building inspectors described conditions as "deplorable", and cited examples such as: defective and leaking plumbing in second floor bathrooms; deteriorated floor supports, kitchen ceilings and walls; falling kitchen cabinets; collapsing floors; holes in ceilings, floors and walls; leaking roofs; termite, mice and roach infestation; structural deterioration; exposed wires; and abandoned appliances. Exposed overhead pipes leaked directly into kitchens.

#### Scott Carver

- June 1981 The problems here had reached such magnitude that the State Attorney's Office (SAO) requested inspection by Minimum Housing and the Health Department who reported: sewage overflows; rat and roach infestations in all units; the complex was a natural rodent breeding ground and a source of reinfestation for the surrounding area; no extermination program; deteriorated floors, ceilings, walls, cabinets, windows, exterior roof overhang vents, stairway handrails; and sinking foundations.

October 1983 After modernization, the Health Department reinspected and reported: ceiling soffit leaks created interior leaks; holes in walls and ceilings; gas leaks from heaters and ovens; cabinets rotted by leaks; exposed electrical wiring; leaking plumbing; and cracked ceilings.

Modello

1982 All units were inspected by Minimum Housing, at the request of the SAO. Findings included: severe roof leaks; deteriorated cabinets; two documented fires resulting from faulty electrical wiring; inoperative toilets, clogged waste lines; uncollected trash and garbage; and rodent infestation.

1985 Media attention generated an additional inspection by DCHUD. Although numerous repairs had taken place, findings still included the conditions observed in 1982 as well as eroding pipes which were causing walls to deteriorate. Poor quality maintenance, or lack thereof aggravated the situation, according to the manager.

Carol City  
Townhouses

1982 Minimum Housing, at the request of the SAO, inspected all units and concluded that: 36 vacated units were in reprehensible condition, open and vandalized; 15 occupied units were unfit for occupancy; 5 occupied units were so deplorable that vacating was recommended; and most remaining units were sub-standard.

1985 After total renovation occurred, tenant council reports indicated a continued maintenance problem and cited examples including: deteriorating wood frames; windows deteriorating; unsafe doors closed on two children's hands and caused partial loss of fingers.

It should be noted that these inspections were generated by agencies other than DCHUD, such as the State Attorney's Office or the Health Department. DCHUD units are not regularly inspected for code violations by Minimum Housing as are privately owned rental units.

We reviewed correspondence between these agencies and DCHUD wherein immediate corrective action was requested. DCHUD's responses ranged from: we do not have the money; we have applied

for the money; or we will do something soon. The correspondence reflects months to years before repairs would take place, if at all. We are not suggesting that DCHUD has not done any work on these complexes. Based on what we saw, heard and read, we can only conclude that its actions were totally inept. This ineptitude had perpetuated the deterioration of these units and the neighborhoods where they are located.

(C) EXCESSIVE VACANCY RATE

We are deeply concerned about the excessive vacancy rate that USHUD reported. We are concerned for three obvious reasons: (1) there are a reported 27,000 individuals in need of public housing; (2) vacant units translate into reduction of revenues; and (3) extended vacancies usually result in a greater cost of repair.

A housing crisis exists in Dade County as it does across the nation. There is a desperate need for affordable low-income housing. In Dade County there is a less than a one percent vacancy rate in the private sector for low-income renters. It is reported that 27,000 people are on the waiting list for public housing, many for seven years. There is a critical need to maximize the use of all existing public housing units.

We heard numerous accounts from inspectors and tenants of public housing units that remained vacant for months to years. Many of these vacant units have been used as dope houses and freebase houses. Additionally, the units have been badly damaged and stripped by vandals. DCHUD claims these are police problems. We believe they are police problems primarily because of DCHUD's neglect.

Finally, these vacant units result in loss of revenues that could be spent on maintenance. USHUD reports that the excessive vacancy rate is a result of lack of coordination

between the Divisions of Management and Maintenance. We urge that one individual be held accountable for insuring that the units are rented.

(D) TENANT SELECTION AND RENT MANAGEMENT

There is no effective waiting list for public housing in Dade County. How disconcerting this must be for the 27,000 some odd persons who believe they are on it. DCHUD has bins of files, some active, some inactive, with no information that could be useful in placing tenants. For instance, the list contains applicants who have already been housed. The USHUD review team in May of 1985 best describes the list when it found:

The application and tenant selection process is extremely disorganized, inefficient and operates contrary to DCHUD policies and federal regulations. [This] is one of the weakest areas of the organization. ...Approximately 75% of move-ins during the period of 6/84 to 12/84 were selected from outside the printed waiting list. ...Elderly applicants walking in off the street were offered units. No income ranges are used and there is no screening of applicants.

No file is really active or inactive and therefore we can only conclude that favoritism must be employed in the placement of tenants. Corrective measures have been proposed by DCHUD to address this problem. We urge that they be comprehensive and immediate, because this problem has continued since the 1980 USHUD audit.

According to USHUD, approximately forty percent of all accounts were delinquent in 1984, which netted a loss close to \$300,000. This problem was also noted in the 1980 audit.

It also appears that since 1982, DCHUD rent calculations have not complied with federal regulations. The August 1982 federal revisions required that rents be calculated on 30% of tenants' income. From 1982-85 DCHUD utilized improper rules and applied improper deductions for rent calculations which resulted in a loss of revenues.

DCHUD's haphazard approach of family income verification also deprived the agency of its due rents. Files replete with self contradictory information and tenant supplied information indicate DCHUD's lack of interest in proper follow-up. Quarterly informational reviews and third party (employer/agency) income verification are essential components of a just rent assessment system.

Rent collection, verification of tenant income and an appropriate rent calculation formula are absolutely fundamental for success in operating a public housing program. DCHUD is doing a disservice to its many good tenants, by allowing defrauding or chronically delinquent tenants to remain in the units. We realize the overall need to house the homeless, but at the same time, there is a need to encourage tenant responsibility. DCHUD needs to strike a balance between these needs. The County should explore implementing more stringent guidelines in tenant selection and tenant retention. Greater tenant involvement and tenant peer pressure may result in eliminating the tenants who are troublemakers.

The whole system involving placement of tenants, keeping units rented and collection of rents needs to be a primary focus for improvement. Failure to effectively generate revenues results in less monies available to finance maintenance. It is absolutely critical that DCHUD take all the necessary action it can to become a financially sound operation. Only then can DCHUD provide the services it is required to provide.

### III. CAUSES

#### (A) LACK OF FEDERAL SUPERVISION

DCHUD, as a condition of receiving its federal subsidy and modernization funds (CIAP), is required to comply with its annual contributions contract with the federal government and comply with all related federal laws and regulations. The area

office staff has not enforced compliance with these requirements effectively. It appears that the area office reviews, writes reports, receives responses and does little, if anything, to see that the real problems are corrected. The 1985 reports by USHUD cite various violations of federal regulations which they admit have existed since 1980. USHUD noted that many of the major 1980 findings had worsened.

According to USHUD, it penalized DCHUD by limiting modernization funds in 1984 and 1985 due to DCHUD's "floundering performance". However, it appears USHUD has done nothing else to ensure that DCHUD implements its recommended actions and in a timely fashion. USHUD has conducted impressive reviews but it needs to provide greater follow-up on its recommended actions. The federal area office advised us that the operation of DCHUD is a local responsibility. We believe that requiring residents to continue to survive in deteriorating units is not an effective sanction.

(B) LACK OF SUPERVISION BY COUNTY ADMINISTRATION

In Dade County, the County Commission is the "Public Housing Authority". As such, it is ultimately responsible for developing and maintaining decent housing, and a suitable living environment for persons of low-income. The County Commission establishes the policies, priorities and budget for DCHUD.

The County Manager's Office is responsible for the direct supervision of DCHUD and is ultimately accountable to the County Commission. Copies of the USHUD reports dating between 1980 and 1985 were provided to the County Manager's Office. Deficiencies in public housing were regularly called to the Manager's attention by other agencies. Many of the deplorable conditions we observed have existed for years. We can only conclude that there had been totally inadequate supervision of DCHUD by the previous County Manager. He appears to have too willingly accepted DCHUD's excuse that more money was needed to correct

deficiencies. County government must do a better job of developing innovative ways of managing and maintaining public housing with limited resources.

DCHUD seems only able to respond to a crisis, particularly a media generated crisis. The Miami Herald has proven to be the most effective local accountability mechanism. If sufficient public attention is focused on a particularly deplorable housing complex, repairs have been miraculously initiated. Examples include repairs at Scott-Carver just subsequent to the 1980 riots; ongoing repairs at Larchmont in 1985, and anticipated repairs at Liberty Square in 1986. Management by crisis is unacceptable.

Although there exists a Dade County Housing Advisory Board answerable to the County Commission, it has not proved to be an advocate for the agency nor for the residents. The unanimous consensus is that the board in its present form has no powers and is meaningless. It has become a rubber stamp for the agency and does not therefore serve as an effective check and balance. The board, to be useful, should be comprised of housing experts and technicians and have powers to make policy decisions.

We noted during our review that in Florida, Dade County and Jacksonville are the only jurisdictions in which the public housing authorities are one and the same as the County or City governing body. The other jurisdictions maintain autonomous public housing authorities, of which there are eighty statewide. These authorities are boards comprised of appointed officials. These officials are housing experts who are advocates and possess the necessary decision-making powers to properly supervise a public housing agency. Although we did not concentrate on this issue sufficiently to draw any conclusions, we suggest it would be worthwhile for the County

to study in detail whether or not an autonomous public housing authority could more cost effectively manage public housing.

(C) LACK OF LEADERSHIP IN DCHUD

The success of any organization or business depends primarily on its direction and its leadership. DCHUD appears to lack both. It is inconceivable that an organization comprised of approximately 771 staff has no overall established organizational missions, goals and objectives, policies, standards or guidelines. This lack of goals has contributed to a floundering organization to the detriment of the residents.

As in any large organization, management must be held accountable. The buck stops with the chief operating officer of the organization. Unfortunately, the common theme of the data we reviewed, and of the testimony we received, is that there is a lack of leadership, motivation, determination and innovation at that level.

When the Director assumed his present position fifteen years ago he had a vision for planning, developing and building new units to meet the increasing need for housing. Over the years he doubled the number of units, much to his credit. However, it appears to us that he lost sight of his responsibility to maintain all the already existing units in a livable condition. The needs of public housing and of DCHUD have changed. DCHUD is now faced with the need to maintain older units with limited dollars. Based on all we have considered, we can only conclude that the Director lost touch with those needs.

The Director of DCHUD today must focus on the deplorable conditions and do everything possible to eliminate them. A chief operating officer must assess organizational needs, set goals accordingly and implement specifically defined ways to achieve those goals.



(D) LACK OF AN EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

DCHUD is not operating effectively or efficiently. The inefficiency of the present structure appears to have resulted in reduced productivity, excessive costs and overruns, deterioration of units, increased tenant dissatisfaction and decreased employee morale. We are convinced that many of the budgetary constraints plaguing DCHUD are the results of the operational deficiencies due to the lack of coordination between various divisions. The results convincingly support the need for a total re-organization of DCHUD from top to bottom.

We agree with the CMR's conclusion that the organization needs to be restructured. USHUD concluded that, "Much of the disorganization, lack of effective internal control, lack of coordination between departments are a result of the present organizational structure." We do not, however, agree that the CMR's suggested reorganization is necessarily the right one.

We question the need for so many Divisions. It appears to us that many divisional functions overlap. It also appears that there is an unequal distribution of responsibilities among the divisions. For instance, it might be worthwhile to consider merging the Planning and Urban Development Division with the Special Housing Programs Division and marrying the Management and Maintenance Divisions.

DCHUD is responsible for many divergent activities. DCHUD's total suggested budget is approximately one hundred four million dollars, which includes the administration of a number of federal and local programs and grants, separate from the conventional public housing operating budget of approximately twenty-two million dollars. Perhaps, the data suggests that there should be a Director responsible for public

housing separate and distinct from all the other areas of DCHUD. Perhaps also the CMR is correct when it states that, "There are simply too many functions reporting to the Director's Office... Almost everyone reports directly to the Director's Office... [which] is not big enough to cope with this flow, nor is it necessary that it should."

(E) LACK OF FUNDING

Federal - The availability of federal monies has decreased over the years and it appears this trend will continue. Nonetheless, the USHUD regional and area offices need to make substantial monies available to renovate many of the older distressed units in Dade County. Dade County operates one of the nation's largest agencies in number of units. Geographically, it is the largest. Nearly twenty-seven percent of the units are 25 years old or older. The distressed complexes, mostly multi-family units including those over 25 years old, are concentrated in one eight-square mile area. Dade County has a demonstrated need to improve the quality of life in our inner-city neighborhoods to avoid further civil unrest and decrease crime and violence. USHUD should be more responsive to the needs of these public housing residents, while forcing DCHUD to reform. The regional and area offices must make every effort to provide funding for the complexes that have had a long standing need for basic renovations.

County - An overall decrease in federal funding to local governments has been anticipated for several years. DCHUD recently lost additional federal CIAP monies due to its ineptitude in management of previous CIAP funds, according to USHUD. The demand for DCHUD's services has increased and will continue to do so. In order to compensate for these funding constraints, the County and DCHUD need to maximize the utilization of local resources and DCHUD should take the lead in this effort.

Like any business, the operating budget depends largely on the organization's ability to generate revenues and limit expenditures. Strictly speaking, DCHUD is a landlord. It is in the business of renting units, collecting rent and maintaining its units. DCHUD receives a federal operating subsidy to address the difference between rental income and operating expenses. DCHUD can make applications to USHUD for renovation and modernization monies (CIAP) based on a demonstrated need. However, as USHUD cautioned in its 1985 report, "agencies with good track records and capable management and maintenance programs receive special consideration in granting of modernization monies."

However, budgeting for maintenance is the responsibility of DCHUD not that of USHUD. Budgeting money for routine, preventative and non-routine maintenance is primarily DCHUD's responsibility. We believe that DCHUD's operating inefficiencies have necessarily resulted in less operating monies for maintenance. As pointed out in the 1985 USHUD report, "The majority of weaknesses noted in this report relate directly to financial losses due to inefficiency of staff and misallocation of resources." The examples cited included the excessive vacancy rate and tenants accounts receivable; uncollected vacated tenant balances; wasted and useless computer reports; and lack of control over inventory of materials.

In addition to maximizing its present financial resources, DCHUD needs to re-prioritize its budget allocations. An example is in the allocation of monies for social services. DCHUD is in the housing business not in the social service business. Its primary responsibility is to provide safe, sanitary and decent housing. Until the rotted floors, collapsing ceilings, rodent infestation and general squalor is eliminated, DCHUD should not finance social services or community

organizers with its operating monies. Tenants, USHUD and even DCHUD staff agree with this conclusion. We agree totally with USHUD when it says:

It becomes difficult to justify the current level of tenant services expense when so many of the projects have pressing physical needs. How can the agency justify this... to the residents of Liberty Square, Edison Courts, Larchmont and Coleman Gardens? It is not effective to spend a sizeable sum of money on social services when non-routine maintenance expenditures have to be curtailed. Tenant unrest and dissatisfaction will continue to mount if the projects are not maintained in a decent and safe condition.

The County must make a commitment to initiate means of providing more money for the rehabilitation of public housing units, beginning with the older units. One means of responding to Dade's housing crisis is by employing greater utilization of local monies. Here we focus on two potential sources, the Documentary Surtax Program, and Community Development Block Grant (CD) monies.

The Documentary Surtax Program was designed to meet the need to provide affordable low-income housing in Dade County. The monies generated by the program are used primarily to improve existing low-income housing, and provide new housing for low-income residents. These program monies have been made available to the private sector and not to Dade's public housing program. Public housing has a large existing stock of low-income housing and we believe it would be a good investment to utilize some of these monies to rehabilitate these units. The previous County Manager in his farewell word to the County, suggested that a percentage of the monies collected by this program be utilized to rehabilitate public housing units. We think the Manager's recommendation is sound and we urge that immediate action be taken by the County to secure a reasonable percentage of these monies for the rehabilitation of its units.

The federal government provides CD monies to local communities comprised of 100,000 residents or more. One of the major criteria utilized in determining the amount of the grant is the number of low-income residents within the jurisdiction. These CD monies are granted to Dade County and to municipalities such as the City of Miami. These monies may be utilized for a number of community developmental needs, including the rehabilitation of public and private housing.

Annually, since 1984 Dade County has received approximately \$18 million in CD monies. Each year approximately thirty-five percent of those monies are distributed for the rehabilitation of privately-owned housing. However, only a meager amount of CD monies have been utilized for the rehabilitation of public housing. For instance, the County's CD budget has annually allocated approximately \$500,000 for the rehabilitation of public housing units. This pitifully low amount represents less than three percent of CD's overall annual grant.

Since 1984, the City of Miami has received approximately \$14 million annually in CD block grants. Annually, approximately fifty percent of the City's grant monies have gone to the rehabilitation of privately-owned rentals. No City of Miami CD monies have been allocated to the rehabilitation of public housing. Yet, over sixty percent of Dade's public housing is located within the City of Miami. Additionally, over fifty percent of the older troubled units are located within the City. Public housing residents located within the City are utilized in the City's formula to obtain its CD monies. However, the City feels it has no responsibility to directly contribute to the improvement of these residents' units. Recently, it was announced that the City of Miami is creating a Housing Division consisting of 40 staff. If housing

is to be a priority of the City, could it not allocate monies for the improvement of public housing? The improvement of public housing has a direct impact on private housing and businesses within the City's neighborhoods.

We recognize that other community needs drain these CD resources and we also recognize that federal funds will probably be substantially cut in this coming fiscal year. Nonetheless, other than food, we cannot think of any other more pressing need than the need for decent shelter. The City of Miami advised us that DCHUD has never submitted an application for CD monies to rehabilitate public housing units. The County should explore greater utilization of CD monies from both the County and the City.

(F) LACK OF AN EFFECTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

The deplorable conditions existing in public housing today are caused by the lack of an effective maintenance program. The program is deficient in the following respects:

1. There has never been an overall analysis of the maintenance needs of all the housing units. No procedure exists for regularly inspecting all public housing units to assess repair needs. DCHUD has no idea of existing conditions in all its units. We believe that DCHUD should conduct a unit-by-unit inspection of all its public housing, as well as utilizing the work orders to assess the total picture of needed repair.

2. Routine maintenance is not carried out in a timely and orderly manner. Preventive maintenance is the only sensible cost-effective solution to the continuing cycle of disrepair. Lack of routine repairs results in the need for non-routine maintenance. For instance, a neglected roof leak may result in structural deterioration which may require a totally new roof.

3. DCHUD has no procedure for planning for non-routine long range maintenance. Failure to conduct non-routine repairs

results in emergencies, which makes DCHUD dependent on receiving CIAP monies to correct those emergencies.

4. DCHUD does not have a staff sufficiently qualified to do the quality of repairs necessary to properly maintain the units. Not only did we observe the poor workmanship involved in repairs, but we also heard testimony from expert inspectors who confirmed our observations. The experts have observed repairs that are usually of sub-standard quality and frequently not in compliance with code specifications. The maintenance staff consists of approximately 300 of which we are told only twelve are licensed including three masters and four journeymen. The remainder of the maintenance staff consists of laborers and repairmen. We were also informed that DCHUD pays its staff at a rate comparable to union scale wages for licensed journeymen. A cost-effective analysis should be conducted to determine whether or not DCHUD is getting the quality of staff for the dollars it is spending.

5. DCHUD is exempt from requirements for building permits and inspections for repairs from Dade County. The public purpose of pulling a permit is to ensure that repairs, such as those involving electrical and plumbing, are done to code specifications. Chief County building inspectors advised us that many of DCHUD repairs are not performed pursuant to a permit and are therefore not inspected for compliance with the South Florida Building Code. Again, to insure quality control, permits should be pulled, and repairs should be inspected to insure compliance with code specifications.

6. DCHUD is exempt from Minimum Housing inspections. DCHUD is probably the largest landlord of low-income housing in Dade County. Dade County requires a minimum standard of conditions from private landlords. Private landlords who do not maintain their units in compliance with Dade County's code for minimum standards are subject to civil and criminal penalties.

As a matter of policy, DCHUD's housing is not inspected to insure compliance with the basic minimum standards of the Dade County Code. Government should be held to a higher standard. In this case, it has been held to no standard.

There appears to be absolutely no legal or moral justification for this lack of policing. We can only conclude that it is a result of the Division of Minimum Housing being directly answerable to the Director of DCHUD. We do not believe that one agency can effectively police itself.

In answer to criticism of its maintenance program, DCHUD says it lacks the funds to properly maintain public housing in Dade County. This is simply not a responsible answer. Budgeting for maintenance is DCHUD's responsibility. As we have pointed out DCHUD has caused its own reduction of federal modernization monies (according to USHUD), because of its poor performance.

We believe the County must implement an effective and continuing inspection process for public housing that is autonomous from DCHUD. To date, it is the only proven system for identifying needed repairs and capable of sufficient follow-up to insure that repairs are made in a workmanlike manner.

(G) LACK OF INNOVATION AND LOCAL INITIATIVES

Dade County needs a new approach to resolve the slum and blight that plagues many of our inner-city neighborhoods, if we are ever to succeed in preventing further civil unrest and decrease the incidence of crime and violence. Public housing is the nucleus from which much of the decay evolves. In order to overcome the years of neglect, and restore faith in the system, innovative technology needs to be utilized. Techniques are being developed nationwide to improve the conventional operation of public housing programs. These techniques recognize Government's responsibility to neighborhoods and the



community as a whole and not just to the isolated function of attempting to provide shelter.

We are impressed with an approach that was implemented in Fort Lauderdale twelve years ago. Endorsed by USHUD, it has been applauded by leaders and communities across the nation. Called the Oasis Technique, it has continued to be an exemplary program and has continued so despite federal cutbacks. Seventy cities, including Los Angeles and Houston, have requested the implementation of this program in their troubled neighborhoods. City Commissioners in Dania and Deerfield Beach have asked the Oasis Institute to straighten out their "operationally troubled" housing authorities. These cities have recognized that a public housing authority has the responsibility to maintain the quality of life in both public housing and in the surrounding neighborhoods.

The Oasis Technique is a wholistic attempt to unite the local residents and local agencies in a collaborative effort to: 1) reduce crime; 2) improve sub-standard housing; 3) implement self-sufficiency programs; 4) secure public investment and attract private reinvestment. In a targeted distressed area, the Oasis Technique creates a pocket of clean, safe, public housing around which private owners and developers are motivated to rebuild their own dilapidated buildings. The Oasis Technique implements self-sufficiency programs for residents as opposed to promoting institutional dependence. These programs include academic and social coping skills programs, job skills training and placement. Tenant landscaping and food growing programs have been implemented, improving the visual appearance of the neighborhood. These "focal points" of the program use no public housing monies but rather utilize existing agencies and existing funding to eliminate common problems. Additionally, the active participation of both the

tenants and the police has led to a reduction of crime, the fear of crime and increased feelings of safety for the residents. The results of the Oasis Technique in Fort Lauderdale have proven that public housing can be a good community investment in its direct reclaiming of distressed neighborhoods.

Dade County in 1983-84 sought the technical assistance of the Oasis Institute. A neighborhood had been selected as a pilot project and monies had been approved for the implementation. We were advised that the Director of DCHUD rejected it and the project died. The Director claims that the program employs questionable tenant selection techniques, which may violate federal policies. Apparently USHUD does not agree, and has encouraged major cities to implement the program. The seventy cities who have sought out this technical assistance do not agree, and based on what we heard we do not agree.

DCHUD needs to depart from the traditional concept of managing a federal program and concentrate on local initiatives involving other areas of government and private industry. We read that numerous housing authorities are implementing tenant maintenance programs or emphasizing home ownership programs in an attempt to decrease management demands and cut costs. Other jurisdictions are contracting out their maintenance and management crew to private owners to generate revenues.

Another program with which we are favorably impressed is the Schools and Neighborhood Consortium. The Consortium brings together the City of Miami, Dade County, the School Board and DCHUD to create a master plan coordinating efforts attacking the problems of crime, housing, education, economic development and family deterioration. Through self-sufficiency programs, including the acquisition of light maintenance and

entrepreneurial skills, a reduction of institutional dependency has resulted. In a short period of time, the program has already lead to participants leaving the welfare rolls (resulting in a \$100,000 governmental saving) and increased public housing revenues by \$21,000. This program is presently being implemented in Larchmont Gardens and Liberty Square.

We would encourage Dade County to further explore utilizing programs of these types.

#### IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on our study, we make the following recommendations:

1. The County Manager needs to perform an indepth study of the entire public housing program. Towards the end of our Term, we learned that the new County Manager and his deputy established an assessment team to review the operational strengths and weaknesses of DCHUD. We applaud the County Manager for this action and urge that it be comprehensive and swift.
2. The County Manager needs to review the leadership of DCHUD.
3. The County Manager needs to study and plan for a structural reorganization of DCHUD.
4. The County Manager and DCHUD must insure that the specific inefficiencies charged by USHUD are immediately remedied and effective corrective measures are implemented.
5. USHUD needs to follow through with the enforcement of its recommended corrective actions by (1) meeting with local County officials, (2) requiring specifically responsive detailed work-out plans from DCHUD, (3) on site visits to ensure implementation of corrective measures and (4) instituting long range plans for DCHUD to improve its operating efficiency and maintenance operation.

6. Short-term and long-term organizational goals and objectives need to be established, and a system for monitoring them implemented.

7. A system of performance accountability and a monitoring mechanism for frequent management and operation assessments must be established in DCHUD. DCHUD should consider hiring an internal auditor for this purpose directly answerable to the Director and the County Manager.

8. The County Manager and DCHUD need to review the priorities of the operating budget. Public housing money should not be used to fund social services until the maintenance operation is improved. More money needs to be budgeted for routine and non-routine maintenance.

9. Aggressive, long-range plans need to be developed to fund and improve the maintenance operation. These plans should specifically include:

(a) Conducting a total repair needs-assessment inspection for each public housing unit, beginning with the known troubled units.

(b) Establishing an inspection team independent of DCHUD to regularly inspect public housing units to insure code compliance of minimum standards.

(c) Establishing a program to insure quality control of repairs and to insure that all repairs are done in a workman-like manner and comply with the South Florida Building Code. This program must also be autonomous from DCHUD.

(d) Conducting a review and re-examination of all maintenance staff's qualifications to insure that DCHUD is getting the most qualified crew for the price it is paying.

10. The County Manager needs to develop a greater utilization of local resources, including Documentary Surtax Program monies and Community Development Block Grant monies

(including the City of Miami's Block Grant).

11. DCHUD must create a waiting list for public housing units that is active and accurate.

12. DCHUD must reduce its turnover rate for vacated units and improve its management of rent calculation and collection.

INCREASE

13. The County needs to expand its public housing program by utilizing new approaches. The techniques referred to herein identify positive directions which merit serious review.

14. Finally, subsequent Grand Juries should continue to monitor DCHUD until they are confident that the department is operating efficiently, its performance level has improved, and the quality of life standards have been reestablished in our inner-city neighborhoods. We urge the Spring Term 1986 Grand Jury to utilize the USHUD 1985 reports and this Report as tools in its review.

### MINORITY SET-ASIDES

In the Spring Term of 1983 the Dade County Grand Jury issued a report dealing with the overwhelming need for the development of businesses in the inner cities of our community. The report it published stated that:

"The development of a Black entrepreneurial class in Dade County is of vital importance and represents an absolutely essential prerequisite to the solution of interrelated problems of poverty, crime, inadequate education and family disintegration which plague our inner cities and which detract from the quality of life of an entire community."

The Spring Term of 1983 Grand Jury went on to endorse race-conscious set asides "as laudible vehicles for the enhancement of Black economic vitalization."

Since that time federal, state and local governments have enacted guidelines for the implementation of set aside programs. Various minority business and set aside programs have been implemented nationwide. In Dade County those programs which do exist have only been operating for approximately one year, and other programs are being developed. The applicable laws vary to some degree in criteria and focus, and therefore the programs which have been implemented also vary. However, the laws and programs have a common purpose which is to allocate governmental monies in the area of construction and procurement for disadvantaged minorities.

As our Term began, the Dade County School Board had just awarded a \$24 million dollar set aside contract to 3W Corporation for the construction of the long awaited Booker T. Washington Junior High School (BTW). This award was beset with problems for two primary reasons: (1) the bidder did not appear to be the minority contractor it purported to be since there existed a side agreement with two majority contractors and (2) the \$24

million dollar ward was approximately \$8 million dollars above the School Board's initial estimate. For these reasons we began looking at the topic of set-asides since so called "fronts" and "increased costs" appear to be an ongoing threat to the success of these programs.

We looked at various programs implemented to grant and monitor set asides and we discovered that the issues surrounding set-aside programs are numerous and complex. Additionally, we learned that with the exception of Dade County, few programs have been fully developed and implemented. Therefore, we were not sufficiently equipped with information to address some of the major issues confronting set-asides as a whole, such as, the long-term social benefit to minorities and the community as a whole or the cost effectiveness of these programs. However, we were able, after analyzing various programs and specific set aside contracts, including BTW, to identify two basic safeguards that need to be completed prior to the awarding of set-aside contracts.

#### 1. FEASIBILITY

The very first thing that should be done by any governmental body prior to bidding a set-aside project is a feasibility study. An analysis of the cost of the contract must be conducted and a determination made as to whether or not a minority company exists which is both available to and capable of doing the job.

The Dade County School Board voted to make the construction of BTW a set aside for a black general contractor. It also required that 75% of the sub-contracts be given collectively to blacks, hispanics and females. The School Board set aside the contract and established the 75% goal without ever seriously addressing the question of feasibility. The School Board's staff took a cursory look at available black contractors and found a total of seven black contractors nationally who they

believed were capable of completing the project. Of those seven the staff found only one contractor that had local connections which were required by the School Board for this particular project. Nonetheless, the project was put out for bids. In response to the first bid, the one black contractor identified by the staff submitted a bid \$5 million dollars in excess of the School Board's budget. It was rejected. The project was put out for bids a second time. This time the contract was awarded to 3W Corporation, a relatively newly formed corporation. This award was \$8 million dollars above the School Board's budget.

## 2. CERTIFICATION PROCESS

A complete and thorough certification is essential to every set aside program. Certification should consist of the following:

- a. An application should be filled out which should include extensive information about the company applying for Minority Status.
- b. There should be field visits to the applicant's place of employment.
- c. Documents, including papers of incorporation, or limited partnerships should be obtained and reviewed.
- d. The financial capability of the applicant should be investigated both through extensive dialogue with the applicant and independent means.

Had the School Board utilized a comprehensive certification process at the time BTW was set aside, it would have known at the outset that the entity to whom it awarded the contract was not 51% black owned and controlled. The only thing the School Board required was that the firms submit an affidavit and a completed form titled, Minority Business Enterprise Certification Statement in their bid package. Thus, no investigation whatsoever was done to determine whether in fact



the minority firms submitting the bids were 51% black owned and controlled companies. The School Board staff had provided for a compliance meeting which was to occur after the award to discuss whether or not the firm had met the 75% goal or at least made a good faith effort to do so. No meeting or any other attempt was made to make certain the firms were in compliance prior to the award.

We are aware that the Dade County School Board is presently in the process of establishing a set aside program. We urge them to consult with other established set-aside programs locally and nationally to aid them in developing these and other safeguards.

In conclusion, due to the fact that set aside programs are in the developmental stage, we as a Grand Jury urge the School Board and other governmental agencies to proceed with great caution. These programs are very vulnerable to abuse and thus it is crucial that safeguards be employed to guard the integrity of these programs and prevent the unnecessary expenditure of public monies. Future Grand Juries should continue to monitor these programs as they continue to develop.

#### NUMBER OF GRAND JURORS, QUORUMS, AND REIMBURSEMENT

Since 1977, Grand Juries have been urging the State Legislature to increase the number of Grand Jurors selected or decrease the required quorum and increase the rate of compensation. We echo the sentiments expressed in their reports.

We as Grand Jurors willingly undertake our duties because we feel that the Grand Jury is very important to our community. But day long service every week has imposed hardship on some and, during our Term, we experienced difficulty in acquiring the necessary quorum. Many of the jurors became ill, family members of three jurors died, one got married, and another suffered extreme financial difficulty each day she served. Many of us attended despite illness and other commitments so that the necessary quorum could be obtained. Regularly, we were delayed in beginning our weekly meetings, awaiting sufficient members to form the quorum.

Additionally, we implore our Legislators to address the meager compensation paid to Grand Jurors. Contributing to the difficulty in ensuring the weekly quorum is the meager ten dollars a day we receive for our participation. Some jurors faced a real financial hardship as a result of their service. For instance, one juror is a single parent of four dependent children whose employer would not compensate her for the days she served. Despite her desire to attend, jury duty jeopardized her employment and caused financial hardship to her and her family. Due to the volume of business before us, we have extended our Term for three additional months. Although we are willing to accept this responsibility, it also aggravates the problems we and our predecessors have outlined.

For these reasons, we strongly urge the Legislature:

- (1) Increase the number of Grand Jurors from eighteen (18) to twenty-one (21) (the additional three (3) jurors could serve on a stand-by if needed basis)

OR

- (2) Alternatively, if the number of Grand Jurors remains at eighteen (18) then decrease the presently required quorum of fifteen (15) to thirteen (13) members

AND

- (3) Increase the present per diem rate of ten dollars to thirty dollars (\$30) per diem per Grand Juror or at the very least authorize the County to supplement the per diem up to the thirty dollars per day.

DISTRICT 11 OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND  
REHABILITATIVE SERVICES DEVELOPMENTAL  
SERVICES PROGRAM BUDGET DEFICIT

Towards the end of our Term, we were asked to look into the circumstances surrounding the overwhelming deficit presently plaguing the Developmental Services Program for District 11 of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS).

Although we are deeply concerned about the HRS budget deficit and the limitation of developmental services, we had already begun numerous other investigations which did not allow us to pursue these issues fully. Furthermore, the State Attorney's Office is continuing to pursue allegations of wrong doing.

In the interim, however, we urge the Auditor General to work closely with HRS to ensure that proper controls are implemented and followed to prevent the reoccurrence of such deficits.

CAPITAL AND OTHER CRIMINAL CASES PRESENTED TO THE GRAND JURY

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
UREL LADLER, also known as "EUROPE"	First Degree Murder	True Bill
ALBERTO JOSE PEREZ, and TIMOTHY IAN MAIZE	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery Use of a Firearm in the Commission of a Felony	True Bill
CLARENCE WILLIAM CURRY	First Degree Murder	True Bill
FREDDIE CECIL JONES	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery Armed Kidnapping Possession of a Firearm in the Commission of a Felony	True Bill
MICHAEL ANTHONY SANTANA, STEPHEN EGGLETON, and ALICIA KEATING	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Attempted Robbery	True Bill
FELIPE BELTRAN, ROLANDO OCANA, and JESUS FERNANDEZ	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Robbery	True Bill
JUAN JESUS FLEITAS, also known as "CHINO" and MIGUEL ROBERTO NORAT, also known as "COTORRO"	First Degree Murder Attempted Armed Robbery	True Bill
MICHAEL RECTOR	First Degree Murder First Degree Murder First Degree Murder Armed Robbery	True Bill
JOSE LUIS GARCIA	First Degree Murder	True Bill
GILFORD DAVE ROBINSON	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery Attempted Armed Robbery Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
STEVE IVORY	First Degree Murder Aggravated Battery Sexual Battery Sexual Battery Robbery Burglary Kidnapping	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
JOSE FUNES, also known as JOSE FUNE GARCIA, also known as ANGEL GARCIA, also known as HUMBERTO GONZALEZ, also known as JOSE FUNES GARCIA, also known as JOSE FUNES-GARCIA, also known as JOSE GARCIA, also known as FRANK ROBINSON	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
VIVIAN ESTELLE ROBLES	First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
ALBERTO FARINAS	First Degree Murder Kidnapping Burglary	True Bill
DANIEL HILBERT, also known as ANDRE HELBERT	First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
STANLEY JEFFERSON, also known as NAP, and LANCE REDDICK	First Degree Murder Attempted Armed Robbery Armed Burglary	True Bill
ALBERTO E. NUNEZ	First Degree Murder	True Bill
ARMANDO ESTRADA RODOLFO ARIAS ROMAN RODRIGUEZ ARMANDO GARCIA ARTURO DE LA VEGA OSVALDO COELLO RUBEN ORTIZ PEDRO BAEZ RODOLFO CORDERO	I. RICO (A,B,C,D,E,F Defs) II. Grand Theft, Second Degree (B Def) III. Armed Trafficking (A Def) IV. Armed Possession of Cannabis (A, E Defs) V. Armed Trafficking (A, B Defs) and Trafficking (C Def) VI. Armed Trafficking (E Def) and Trafficking (A Def)	

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
	VII. Armed Trafficking (A, D Defs)	
	VIII. Grand Theft, Second Degree (A, D Defs)	
	IX. Armed Possession of Cannabis (A, E Defs)	
	X. Conspiracy to Commit Trafficking and Armed Robbery (A, C Defs)	
	XI. Armed Trafficking (A,B,D,E Defs) and Trafficking (C, F Defs)	
	XII. Aggravated Battery (A,B,C,D,E,F Defs)	
	XIII. Conspiracy to Commit Trafficking and Armed Robbery (A,C,D Defs)	
	XIV. Armed Trafficking (A, C Defs) and Trafficking (D Def)	
	XV. Armed Robbery (A, C, D Defs)	
	XVI. First Degree Murder (A, C, D Defs)	
	XVII. First Degree Murder (A, C, D Defs)	
	XVIII. First Degree Murder (A, C, D Defs)	
	XIX. Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder (A, B, D Defs)	
	XX. Solicitation to give False Information to a Law Enforcement Officer (A Def)	
	XXI. Solicitation to Commit Perjury in an Official Proceeding (A Def)	
	XXII. Solicitation to give False Information to a Law Enforcement Officer (A Def)	
	XXIII. Trafficking (G Def)	
	XXIV. Trafficking (H, I Defs)	
	XXV. Second Degree Murder (H, I Defs)	
	XXVI. Second Degree Murder (H, I Defs)	
	XXVII. Second Degree Murder (H, I Defs)	True Bill
ANTONIO FERRER	First Degree Murder Kidnapping Attempted First Degree Murder	True Bill
WILLIAM MARCELLAS BERRY, also known as JAMES BERRY	Aggravated Child Abuse First Degree Murder	True Bill
KENNETH HUGHES STRAUSSER	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
JUANITA LOUISE HEADLEE	First Degree Murder First Degree Arson Criminal Mischief Arson Injury Arson Injury	True Bill
EUGENIO RUBIER	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Armed Burglary Shooting or Throwing Deadly Missile into Occupied Building or Vehicle Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
ANTONIO REBELO	First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
DUDLEY BACQUIE	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Armed Robbery Armed Burglary Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense Trafficking in Narcotics	True Bill
CARMELO O. GIBRALT	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon	True Bill
RIGOBERTO ALBERJA	First Degree Murder Burglary with a Firearm Robbery with a Firearm Robbery with a Firearm Aggravated Battery Shooting or Throwing Deadly Missile into Vehicle Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
VARNELL DARDY, SR.	First Degree Murder	True Bill
LINDA PEREZ	First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill



<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
ANGEL RODRIGUEZ and LINO MARANTE	First Degree Murder (A Def.) First Degree Murder (A Def.) Armed Robbery (A Def.) Armed Robbery (A Def.) Conspiracy to Commit Kidnapping (A & B Defs.) Accessory After the Fact (B Def.) Arson (B Def.)	True Bill
JEFFREY LAMAR FLOYD	First Degree Murder Aggravated Battery Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
ESTELLE ARWOOD, JODY GIFFORD and ANTHONY HATCHER	First Degree Murder Conspiracy to Commit Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Attempted Robbery Armed Burglary	True Bill
R. L. WILLIAMS	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery	True Bill
RENE GARCIA, also known as RENE GARCIA PADRON	First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of Firearm while Engaged in Criminal Offense	True Bill
ROBERT R. CANNON and PEDRO ALVARADO	First Degree Murder Armed Burglary of Dwelling Attempted Armed Robbery Shooting within an Occupied Dwelling Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Criminal Offense (B Def.)	True Bill
WARREN SWANSON	First Degree Murder Burglary Sexual Battery Robbery	True Bill
WENDALL LEVARTY	First Degree Murder Use of Firearm in Commission of a Felony	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
JOSE ARTURO SIMO, CAMILLE SCHILLER and ROBERTO COLLAZO	First Degree Murder Use of a Firearm in a Commission of a Felony Robbery Burglary	True Bill
JOSE ANTONIO MULET, JOAQUIN REVILLA and JOHN OROSMAN BECERRA	Kidnapping Kidnapping First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in Criminal Offense	True Bill
DANNY RAY PRICE	First Degree Murder Armed Burglary Armed Trafficking in Cocaine Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
DARYLL DANIELS	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery Use of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon	True Bill
JOSEPH DANIEL SIKES	First Degree Murder	True Bill
DANIEL RAMOS also known as "DANNY"	First Degree Murder Shooting into an Occupied Dwelling Possession of Firearm During Commission of a Felony Carrying Concealed Firearm	True Bill
RAUL CAMACHO, LUIS RAFAEL CARRASQUILLO, also known as "CHICO" ROSA ESTHER NUNEZ, and PEDRO A. NUNEZ	First Degree Murder (A & B Defs.) Armed Robbery (A & B Defs.) Accessory After the Fact (C & D Defs.)	True Bill
LAZARO PRENDES	First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
ROY GEORGE WHITCRAFT, III	I. First Degree Murder II. Burglary with Assault III. Robbery IV. Grand Theft V. Uttering a Forged Instrument VI. Forgery VII. Grand Theft VIII. Uttering a Forged Instrument IX. Forgery X. Grand Theft XI. Petit Theft	True Bill
TOMMY JOE CHAPPELL	First Degree Murder Burglary Robbery	True Bill
WILLIE LEE WILLIAMS	First Degree Murder First Degree Murder Arson	True Bill
LARRY DARNELL GREGGS	First Degree Murder Burglary	True Bill
GEORGE BERNARD FRAZIER, JAMES ALAN JOYCE, KEITH DWAYNE JONES, ZACHARY DENAND CLARK, BOBBY BROWN, JR., and MICHAEL RAY WILLIAMS	I. First Degree Murder II. Armed Burglary III. Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder and/or Armed Burglary IV. Unlawful Possession of Firearm while Engaged in Criminal Offense V. Armed Robbery VI. Armed Burglary	True Bill
RAYMOND JOSEPH	First Degree Murder Possession of a Weapon in the Commission of a Felony	True Bill
JAMES LEWIS BOND	First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
ALBERT RICHARDS and VERNALD NEWMAN	I. First Degree Murder II. Attempted Armed Robbery III. Conspiracy to Commit Armed Robbery IV. Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense ("A" Def.)	True Bill
NORBERTO NUNEZ	First Degree Murder Possession of Firearm During Commission of Felony Shooting into an Occupied Building	True Bill

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

On the morning of November 12, 1985, we were chosen to serve as Dade County Grand Jurors for the 1985 Fall Term. We would like to express our thanks to His Honor Herbert M. Klein and State Attorney Janet Reno. We are especially grateful to the many dedicated individuals who helped us carry out this awesome responsibility; specifically, Katherine Fernandez Rundle, Chief Assistant State Attorney, whose dedication and capable assistance greatly simplified our work, Madeline Camp, our Administrative Assistant, for her efficient and professional handling of an enormous volume of work, and our Bailiff Stanley Brown, for always looking after our needs.

During our Term we heard numerous capital crime cases. We acknowledge the professionalism of all the Police Departments, including Metro-Dade, City of Miami, Hialeah and Miami Beach in the performance of their duties.

Our Final Report on Public Housing would not have been possible without the work of many of the State, County and City inspectors and officials who contributed to our public housing report to whom we are very grateful.

Respectfully submitted,



Fred Mayer, Foreperson  
Dade County Grand Jury  
Fall Term 1985

ATTEST:

  
Sara DeMolina  
Clerk

Dated: May 13, 1986