

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT  
OF FLORIDA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DADE

SPRING TERM A.D. 1981

ADDITION TO THE  
FINAL REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY  
METRO TRANSIT AGENCY

FILED  
NOVEMBER 10, 1981

LEONARD RIVKIND

Officers and Members of the Grand Jury

CLARISSA DEBS MORALES, Forewoman

EARL BARNSWELL, JR., Vice Foreman

MARIA LUZ SCHARF, Clerk

ELIZABETH M. PICARD, Assistant Clerk

REGINA ARENTZ, Treasurer

JAMES J. BROOKS

EVELYN CRAWFORD

ALLITA MAE DUNN

PATSY A. GUNN (Excused)

ROSE ANN HALLUMS

KATHLEEN V. JOHNSON

BEVERLY ANN JONES

JAMES C. KEY

WILMA L. LUMPKIN

ELIZABETH MITCHELL

EDWARD NODARSE

LUCILLE TAYLOR

PHILLIP WEINRICH

\*\*\*\*\*

State Attorney

JANET RENO

Chief Assistant State Attorneys

THOMAS K. PETERSEN

GEORGE YOSS

Assistant State Attorneys

GEORGE DePOZGAY

STEVE ROSIN

LAWRENCE LaVECCHIO

TRUDY NOVICKI

MICHAEL BAND

\*\*\*\*\*

Clerk of the Circuit Court

RICHARD P. BRINKER

\*\*\*\*\*

Administrative Assistant

MADELINE CAMP

\*\*\*\*\*

Official Court Reporting

NATIONAL REPORTING SERVICE

\*\*\*\*\*

Bailiff

SAM KARLIN

METRO TRANSIT AGENCY INVESTIGATIONI. The Metro Transit Agency 1976-1980: Public Transportation and Public Waste

Because the automobile is our primary mode of transportation, most Dade County residents are not directly affected by inefficiency in mass transit. Yet Dade's buses carry an average of 250,000 passengers a day along ninety-four bus routes traveling approximately 76,000 miles. These passengers are directly affected by the quality of Metrobus service and they, the elderly and the poor predominant, rely upon the bus as their only means of getting about.

However, all Dade residents are indirectly affected by rampant waste and inefficiency in an agency employing eighteen hundred persons with an annual operating budget of over fifty-seven million dollars. All Dade residents are affected by an agency whose operating income loss ballooned from twenty million dollars in 1977 to thirty-four million dollars in 1980. And all Dade residents are affected by the abuses which will be enumerated in this Report, abuses which include the following:

- Atrocious service characterized by dirty buses without working air conditioners breaking down frequently.
- Preferential treatment of MTA vendors and an unethical atmosphere which appears to be the accepted method of business.
- A shocking absence of inventory controls, an indifferent attitude toward how funds are spent and a failure to use items once they have been purchased.
- Negligent record keeping with respect to inventories and repair work, coupled with underutilized employees, overstaffing, lack of supervision and unjustified overtime pay.

This Report will present an almost unbelievable chronicle of waste, inefficiency and unethical practices in a major public

agency. We emphasize that the time period during which these abuses occurred was 1976 to 1980 and that since 1980 we note progress which we acknowledge and commend.

As we will point out, the abuses have been identified and, to a significant extent, corrective action has been initiated. New procedures and new personnel are in place and we deem it important to acknowledge that. Yet the lessons to be learned from the recent history of MTA are lessons which must be studied and learned by taxpayers and government officials alike if we are to achieve efficiency and economy in local government.

In the following section we will relate the recent history of Metrobus. In the next sections we will present the specific abuses which have been uncovered in the Metro-Dade Police Department's investigation. The section following that will present our analysis of what occurred during 1976-1980 and an assessment of the state of Metrobus today. And in the final portion of our Report, we will set forth our recommendations.

## II. Metrobus in Dade County: An Overview

The Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), now divided into Metrobus and Metrorail, was originally created in 1962 as a unified County bus system which replaced the independent local Transit systems which had existed previously. The MTA functioned as a semi-autonomous Authority until October of 1974, when the County Commission abolished the Authority and created a new Department under the authority of the County Manager and responsible to the Transportation Coordinator.

In the early nineteen-seventies Dade Metrobus was considered a model mass transit system. At that time the semi-autonomous authority was managed by a private entity, the National City Management Company, which charged a fee for its

services. Perhaps in order to eliminate the fee, the contract with the Management Company was terminated in 1976 and the administration of Metrobus was assumed by Dade County.

The subsequent deterioration of Metrobus in the latter part of 1980 was as rapid as it was shocking. The condition of Metrobus at that time was perhaps best described by its present Director, Ronald Tober, shortly after his arrival in a memo to all Metrobus employees. That memo, which presented a number of Mr. Tober's recommendations for improvement, began:

"...None of us have been happy with the quality of the bus service we have been providing to the residents of Dade County recently. In a word, Metrobus service has been atrocious. It has been so primarily because of the poor condition of our bus fleet. When dirty buses without working air conditioners break down frequently, and when we don't have enough buses to cover our schedule requirements, not only is the public subject to inconvenience and discomfort, but also our own employees are subjected to abuse, harassment and discomfort. We recognize that this situation exists today and has, unfortunately, existed for some time..."

The state of the agency which Mr. Tober inherited in 1980 is best described in three reports issued by the United States Department of Transportation, the Florida Comptroller's Office and the Dade County Productivity Analysis Unit.

The United States Department of Transportation's report dealt with bus maintenance and fleet size in mid-1980. It read in part:

The MTA maintenance operations were inadequate to keep its bus fleet in satisfactory operating condition. This was caused by management's decision to adopt a failure maintenance program rather than continuing the preventive maintenance program that had been previously used. The shift in policy resulted in the deterioration of the bus fleet to the extent that MTA has been the subject of strong news media and citizenry criticism. In addition, the vehicles are beginning to wear out prematurely and are

being taken out of service before the normal life expectancy expires. The replacement value of the unused life span of 29 vehicles that had worn out prematurely totaled \$1,345,600.

The Report also found that "Metrobus records disclosed that maintenance of the fleet has been neglected for several years" and that "even the basic maintenance operations (oil and oil filter changes) were not being performed on a regular basis... The lack of maintenance undoubtedly caused the bus users inconvenience resulting from breakdowns and missed schedules." Observing that "The bus fleet is excessive for the present and immediate future MTA operations, containing both excessive serviceable and unserviceable buses... that should be sold," the report concluded that an MTA request for nineteen million dollars in federal assistance should be denied. The request was for one hundred and fifty new buses which the Report found that MTA did not need and could not maintain.

Another report, this one by the Florida Comptroller's Office, concentrated upon the Metrobus Maintenance Division, which is one of six subdivisions of the MTA and the principal focus of criticisms of MTA operations prior to its new administration. The Maintenance Division comprises one-fourth of the Agency's total work force and accounts for over forty percent of the total MTA operating budget, in excess of thirty-one million dollars. The following excerpts are taken from the Comptroller's Report:

As illustrated in this report, MTA's management of its operation has serious problems. The purchases made by MTA are clearly influenced by direct contact on the part of MTA employees with vendors from whom the purchases are made. Examples of preferential treatment of vendors by MTA purchasing combined with favors and gifts received by these same MTA employees depicts an unethical atmosphere which appears to be the accepted method of business...

The lack of control over the property, much of which has been and will be purchased utilizing state funds, by

MTA officials demonstrates an indifferent attitude toward how funds are utilized. Their inability to maintain good maintenance records offers little reassurance that the cost involved with the bus rehabilitation project is accurate. Further the use of inferior parts supplied by a particular vendor, who has admittedly bought lunches and given money to MTA employees, has an unknown affect on the cost of those parts, which are also used in the rehabilitation buses. Even when efforts have been made to institute the necessary controls, they have been met with resistance and even disregarded...

Thefts and failure to account for equipment, tools and parts illustrate additional examples of disregard of public funds. The taxpayers have little assurance that their tax dollar will be utilized to its fullest potential when these items are purchased, since there is a definite chance it will be missing before it succumbs to normal wear and tear.

A third study of Metrobus, conducted by Dade County's Productivity Analysis Unit, was released last January. Its findings included the following:

- It was noted that, generally, records of fleet repair work were very inadequate; repair costs for minor defects are usually not recorded although such repairs constitute a significant amount of the Maintenance Division's workload; and discrepancies in fuel and oil daily disbursements are not aggressively pursued by staff. In general, it appeared that employees were underutilized, unaccounted hours were excessive, and certain tasks were duplicated elsewhere...
- The Productivity Analysis Unit conducted interviews with nearly all employees in the Paint and Body Shop. It was clear that there was a significant backlog of fleet body repairs and that the existing work force and system was not capable of coping with the workload. Problems in planning, scheduling and control of work in the Body Shop were evident in terms of the deteriorating condition of the bus bodies being used in service and seen on the streets. Most frequently heard complaints from Paint and Body employees centered around the unavailability of parts, priority and schedule changes, and inconsistent quality standards...
- It is recognized and acknowledged by all segments of the community that MTA fleet maintenance service has seriously declined in the past several years. As a result, much of the MTA fleet had fallen

into disrepair and was not receiving proper maintenance necessary to provide the citizens of Dade County with reliable service...

- Indicative of the lack of an adequate fleet PM Program was MTA's high incidence of "dead" buses and requests for road calls. For example, during September 1980 as many as 200 buses were daily reported out of service and road calls were as high as 160-180 per day.

Yet it was the Metro-Dade Police Department which uncovered the most devastating instances of abuse during that same time frame. The Department looked specifically at purchases and utilization of glass, paint, chemicals and parts and equipment during 1976-1980. The following four sections of our Report present the results of the Department of Organized Crime Bureau investigation.

### III. Grand Jury Findings: Glass Contracts

Our review of the awarding of contracts for bus glass from 1976 to the present reveals the first of several examples of how the bidding process was manipulated or entirely circumvented to the advantage of a favored vendor, in this instance the Acme Glass Company.

The process by which bus parts or paint are ordered begins with the Metrobus Maintenance Division. Once an item is desired a requisition is executed by MTA Stores and forwarded to the General Services Administration Purchasing Department. After receipt of the requisition at GSA Purchasing, a buyer/procurement specialist attempts to purchase the item for MTA by one of three methods which are formal bids, informal bids and telephone or written quotations. The amount of the purchase determines the method used.

In September of 1977 the formal bids for Metrobus glass for the 1977-1978 fiscal year were opened. Acme Glass was not the lowest of the three bidders, yet Acme Glass received the contract when, one day after the opening, Acme Glass wrote to the Director of Purchasing, John Berger, requesting a change in

the percentage of discount. The change in the bid was made with Mr. Berger's permission if not by his own hand, in direct violation of the law, and Acme Glass was awarded the contract.

In 1979 a contract for a \$50,000 blanket purchase order was awarded to Acme Glass, the only bidder. Six months later this was increased to \$125,000 and the following year, three months after the purchase order expired, it was again increased to \$157,000. A total of \$67,000 was expended after the expiration date and as of the date of that investigation glass acquired pursuant to that order remained unused, stacked in ninety-two crates in the MTA shop where the lack of storage space is a chronic complaint.

The glass purchase bid for 1980-1981 had two bidders, Acme Glass and the Whalley Glass Company. The bid opening revealed that Whalley Glass was lower than Acme Glass on individual items in amounts ranging from 11% to 96%. Two weeks thereafter the Metrobus Maintenance Superintendent of Stores sent a memorandum to GSA Purchasing stating a rebid would be necessary due to a failure to specify in the original request for bids that some items were to have been tinted plastic rather than clear plastic.

The entire contract was rebid despite the fact the omission did not concern the bus glass bid on by Whalley Glass and Acme Glass. On the rebid Acme Glass lowered its prices to beat the Whalley Glass prices and Acme Glass was awarded the entire contract.

During the life of the contract entered into with Acme Glass following the rebid, MTA purchased \$13,590 worth of glass. Slightly more than half of these purchases were for items that were not bid on, in violation of a Dade County ordinance. As the term of the contract expired, the President of Whalley Glass received numerous telephone calls from Metrobus Maintenance Stores personnel asking for Whalley's prices on over one hundred items. Whalley personnel feel, with apparent justification, that this was done in order to pass the information along to Acme Glass.

#### IV. Grand Jury Findings: Paint Contracts

A study of Metrobus purchases of paint for buses during the same period again reveals the existence of a favored vendor, in this case the Automotive Paint Company. In addition, the use of paint, once acquired, illustrates vividly the lack of internal controls and waste that permeated the agency.

During the period of 1978-1981 Automotive Paint Company was able to outbid other local vendors by quoting a price generally exactly one penny less for each bid item, suggesting prior knowledge of the competition's bids. In addition, Automotive Paints was permitted to raise its bid prices after the contracts had gone into effect, with the price increase passed on to the taxpayer despite the fact that the bid as awarded was at a lower price.

Furthermore, requisitions for Automotive Paint in amounts in excess of \$1,000 were broken down into separate purchases of \$900 each in order to avoid the bidding procedure that County regulations require where a purchase exceeds \$1,000. A buyer/procurement specialist testified before us that such circumvention of County bid regulations was "routine in the office at the time."

Once acquired, the paints' use is virtually impossible to document due to the appalling inventory control and record keeping at MTA. There are, for example, no records of the numbers of buses painted in 1979 and thousands of dollars worth of paints are totally unaccounted for. We have seen photographs of trash cans and pavement at MTA painted with top of the line Imron paint, as well as the automobiles of MTA supervisors, and these photographs suggest the price the taxpayers have paid for this flagrant laxity.

V. Grand Jury Findings: Chemicals

Purchases of chemicals, used mainly to clean the interiors and exteriors of buses, from 1977 through 1980, were examined and the examination reveals a concentrated attempt to systematically bypass Dade County regulations regarding purchasing and contracting. Approximately one half million dollars worth of chemicals were repeatedly purchased by using emergency requisitions without justification and in violation of administrative orders. By MTA not requesting bids, premium prices were consistently paid for the chemicals. As an example, in 1977 the B & B Chemical Company sold steam cleaner to MTA for \$2.99 a gallon without bids. Yet, once MTA put out bids in 1981, B & B's price was only \$1.20 a gallon. And here again we find two purchases from B & B Chemicals made on the same day, each in the amount of \$987, in another blatant circumvention of the bidding requirements for purchases in excess of \$1,000.

We also find clear evidence of excessive use of chemicals by MTA. This instance of waste is vividly illustrated by the following chart, which compares the chemical costs incurred by MTA as compared to the Greyhound Company, the Tallahassee Transit Company and the Broward County Transit Authority:

	<u>MTA</u>	<u>Greyhound</u>	<u>Tallahassee Transit</u>	<u>Broward Transit</u>
Total Buses	660	375	50	150
Average Annual Chemical Cost	\$ 156,500	\$ 7500	\$ 1980	\$ 12,200
Cost per bus per year	\$ 237	\$ 20	\$ 40	\$ 81
Usage Comparison: MTA More By		12x	6x	3x

A total of nearly one half million dollars worth of chemicals were purchased without competitive bidding during two and a half years. Six hundred separate purchase orders were submitted for less than one thousand dollars each in an obvious attempt to circumvent bid procedures.

VI. Grand Jury Findings: Parts and Equipment

An additional function of Metrobus Maintenance which we find to have been characterized by waste, circumvention of bidding requirements and conflicts of interest is that of purchasing of bus parts and equipment. These abuses were the subject of the Florida Comptroller's Office investigation quoted in the second section of our Report.

In this instance the two favored vendors were the Lankford Equipment Company and J & P Carburetor and Regulator Exchange. The Comptroller's report cites numerous instances of the MTA Maintenance Superintendent of Stores and his Assistant being taken to lunch by representatives of these companies as often as twice weekly as well as gifts from the company representatives to these and other MTA personnel, including meat, dishes, a camera and liquor. Numerous instances of circumvention of bidding requirements are documented, including purchasing from these companies by telephone quotation when formal or informal bidding was required and purchases made on emergency basis to avoid the formal procedures. Purchases from J & P increased from \$42,000 to \$226,000 from 1977 to 1980 with 79% of the items purchased not having been bid. During that time period half of the bus fleet was new with bus parts subject to warranty, yet there is no indication that parts were obtained pursuant to the warranty terms.

And here, once again, we find that once purchases have been made the purchased items disappear into an oblivion created by the absence of inventory controls. With a lack of inventory control and safeguards, thefts had occurred continually for at least four years. One witness stated that as many as two hundred hydraulic jacks may have been removed from MTA over the previous two years.

VII. Grand Jury Findings: Causes of the Decline and the State of Metrobus Today

A. 1976-1980: The Causes of Decline

At the outset of this Report, we noted that the chronicle of the decline of Metrobus during the period 1976-1980 is not a simple one. We also noted that the lessons to be learned are not limited to Metrobus. In this section we will elaborate. We will also comment upon the condition of Metrobus in 1981.

It is impossible to understand the causes of the abuses outlined in this Report without commenting upon the conditions at the Dade County Procurement Management Division during the same time frame. It is likewise impossible to describe conditions at Metrobus today without commenting upon the contemporary state of the Purchasing Department.

General Superintendent of Maintenance, which again is that division of Metrobus which is the focus of this Report, was B. W. Skinner. In addition to sharing responsibility for the events and abuses which occurred in his department, if only by his failure to be aware of their existence, Mr. Skinner's lack of management abilities is universally cited as an outstanding cause of the extremely poor employee morale described in the Dade Productivity Analysis Report.

We have previously described the interaction between Metrobus Maintenance, from which purchase orders originate, and GSA Procurement which has the responsibility for maintaining the integrity of the County purchasing process which the public expects. The magnitude of this responsibility is illustrated

by the fact that ten million dollars passes through the procurement process each month. Until late 1980, and for the two preceding decades, John Berger was responsible for purchasing. By the late nineteen seventies it is clear that Mr. Berger's longevity was a liability, not an asset. His procedures were at best antiquated and he totally lacked control over the procurement process. The abuses uncovered by the Organized Crime Bureau were symptoms of conditions at GSA Procurement and it is particularly frightening to note that these conditions might easily have existed in other County departments as well, given the laxity of Mr. Berger's operation. It becomes relatively simple to understand the bidding abuses at MTA when one learns that Purchasing under Mr. Berger merely opened submitted bids, then forwarded the bids to the individual County Departments (such as MTA Maintenance) where the bids were tabulated and the prevailing vendor was selected. The individual Departments then communicated the results back to Procurement, which was obviously acting as no more than a courier when it should have been acting as a watchdog.

We find that it was the combination of bureaucratic inertia and mediocrity at MTA Maintenance and GSA Procurement which caused the abuses outlined in this Report.

We trust it is not inevitable that government personnel and procedures lag behind contemporary conditions and needs. In this instance, however, that is exactly what occurred and the taxpayer has paid a heavy price.

#### B. 1980-1981: Metrobus and Purchasing Today

Our account thus far has been a dismal record of how government agencies fail to meet contemporary needs. We are particularly grateful to be able to conclude with a note of optimism.

We were surprised to learn that the peak year of national mass transit growth was 1948. Following that year mass transit declined until the middle nineteen seventies when the public, and government, began a reassessment of the relative merits of automobiles and mass transit. Dade County's decision to shift its emphasis from expressways to a balanced Metrobus-Metrorail system is a creditable example of this reassessment. It was at approximately that point in time, we learn, that professional interest in urban mass transit systems was revived and that a new generation of administrators began to replace the uninspired bureaucrats who had often preceded them.

This appears to have been the case in Dade County. We are impressed with Ronald Tober, who appears to exemplify this infusion of new young professionals into the mass transit field. In one year, Mr. Tober and his staff have done much to reverse the deterioration of the four preceding years. That marked improvement has taken place rapidly is attested to by the same federal and local agencies which generated the critical United States Department of Transportation and Dade Productivity Analysis reports. In our recommendations, which follow, we hope to provide positive support to his efforts to return Dade Metrobus to a posture of one of the leading mass transit systems in the nation. In the one year since he assumed his position, Mr. Tober has initiated an effective bus preventive maintenance program, has installed a computerized inventory control system and has significantly improved employee morale. He has selected a qualified professional to head the Maintenance Division and has gone far to address the concerns of the federal and local studies mentioned earlier in our Report. He has in fact installed his own permanent Productivity Analysis Unit.

And we are equally pleased to note the present state of GSA Procurement Management.

Leila Collins re-

placed John Berger at GSA Procurement. Her accomplishments have been outstanding. She has revised and streamlined bidding procedures and forbidden the direct contacts between salespeople and county department personnel which led to the lunches and gifts discussed previously. She has increased healthy competition among vendors by introducing pre-bid conferences with vendors, designed to resolve technicalities which might otherwise result in competitors' failure to submit bids. Such a procedure, had it existed at the time, would have averted and resolved the problems experienced by the Whalley Glass Company which resulted in its exclusion from the competitive bidding process. We have learned that one such pre-bid conference resulted in the ending of the domination of a tire vendor and a saving to Dade County of two million dollars.

Again, the history of MTA and of GSA Procurement over the past decade has vividly illustrated how the rapid growth of our community had outdistanced government's ability to respond. We are pleased to note, however, that the most recent portion of that history teaches us that, with proper vigilance, government can respond.

#### VIII. Recommendations

(1) We wish to applaud the dedication and the diligence of the Metro-Dade Department's Organized Crime Bureau at having uncovered the abuses discussed in this Report and the Indictments we have returned as a result of their efforts. We particularly commend Sgt. John Collins. As we have previously pointed out, the laxity in County procurement procedures that resulted in MTA abuses might well have been duplicated in other County Departments and we suggest that the Police Department's investigation continue wherever evidence is uncovered which suggests that this may have been the case.

(2) The integrity of the County purchasing procurement process is essential if we are to avoid scandals similar to that of MTA. We are deeply impressed with the work that Leila Collins has done and with the support that has been provided to her by the County Manager. We urge that she continue to receive the resources and the support that she needs in her endeavors to strengthen and modernize the Procurement Management Division of GSA.

(3) While Ronald Tober has reversed the startling deterioration of MTA in the years prior to 1980, much remains to be done. Specifically, we urge that the status of personnel who are tainted by the scandals we have documented be addressed. We are pleased to learn that Mr. McKinney has resigned and that his resignation has been accepted.

(4) We are impressed with the progress in instituting a computer-based inventory management system, a preventive maintenance program, a Metrobus Management Analysis Division as well as the maintenance work order system in the paint and body shop. In each of these areas additional steps remain to be taken and we urge that Metrobus be given the resources and the support it needs.

(5) The Office of the County Attorney should endeavor to recoup overcharges that were paid to Acme Glass, J & P, Automotive Paint and other companies that have been the beneficiaries of MTA's negligent purchasing policies. Furthermore, the County should cease doing business with these companies.

Only a portion of the Metrobus purchases were investigated. We strongly urge the initiation of an audit of all past Metrobus accounts, particularly the Blanket Purchase contracts, in order to determine what other vendors may have overcharged and if so in what amounts.

(6) The State and County conflict of interest provisions are in need of revision and redrafting. Provisions which have been declared unconstitutional must be redrafted. Additionally, provisions permitting gifts of any value should be eliminated, and provisions permitting dealing with relatives and individuals outside of the employee's household need to be tightened.

We have also heard that at least one Metrobus supervisor in the previous administration apparently obtained successive exempt positions as a result of cronyism. We urge an examination of County hiring and promotion procedures to insure that this does not happen again.

(7) Perhaps most importantly, the recent history of MTA has been characterized by a fixation upon capital equipment at the expense of attention to operational issues. We have accumulated buses, garages and hardware in increasing quantities. Simultaneously, we have exhibited a startling inability to manage this same equipment. The question which looms largest of all is whether we will perpetuate this tendency as we acquire and develop the Metrorail system.

If any one lesson emerges from our study of Metrobus it is that management capabilities must parallel capital acquisitions and growth. That is precisely what failed to occur at both MTA and GSA Purchasing. We stand at the threshold of a new era in Dade County's mass transit history and that failure must never recur.

(8) We are concerned with the length of time which it took the County Manager to uncover the abuses at Metrobus. It is apparent to us that the Metro Transit Authority is in the process of becoming an agency so large that it will be impossible for it to be effectively managed as merely one of the many Departments in Metro government. While we lack the expertise to recommend a definitive alternative, we urge that the County Commission consider alternatives which exist in other

large urban communities, such as a semi-autonomous transit authority with a Board dealing exclusively with transit issues, or a public trust arrangement such as that used by Jackson Memorial Hospital.

(9) An urgent need exists to increase the communication, and the checks and balances, between the procurement and finance disbursement functions and the individual County departments. Our investigation shows clearly that danger signals should have been flagged and that a periodic sample of invoices or requisition checks could well have served this purpose. We urge that the County implement such a system of checks and balances and that the audit division be and remain fully staffed.

(10) Finally, we recognize that the MTA will dramatically increase in size as Metrorail is put in place. Already we hear of potential areas of concern in the Metrorail operation. We recommend that the County Manager and the Transportation Director appear voluntarily before succeeding Grand Juries to present progress reports upon the status of both Metrobus and Metrorail. We recommend that the Spring Term 1982 Grand Jury, one year from now, issue a complete report upon the status of both Metrobus and Metrorail at that point in time. While we have heard evidence that improvement has occurred, we leave it to our successors to determine whether this emerging trend is a permanent one.