

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF FLORIDA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DADE

FALL TERM A.D. 1981

FINAL REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY

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Circuit Judge Presiding

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I N D E X

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PAGES</u>
IMMIGRATION AND NARCOTIC INTERDICTION	1-41
HANDGUNS	42-44
GRAND JURY QUORUMS AND REIMBURSEMENT	45
INDICTMENTS	46-53
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	54-56

IMMIGRATION AND NARCOTIC INTERDICTION

I. INTRODUCTION: PARADISE LOST?

By the late nineteen seventies we who live in Dade County had seen indications, many of them ominous, that the nature of our community had changed. By the summer of 1979 we had learned that three quarters of the cocaine and marijuana entering this country did so by way of South Florida. We learned that the rate of violent crime in Dade County nearly doubled between 1975 and 1979. New terms, such as "Cocaine Cowboys" became part of our vocabulary. And in July of 1979 these abstract statistics and trends sprung vividly to life one afternoon in a most graphic, and symbolic, manner: a drug war assassination occurred in mid-afternoon in a crowded neighborhood shopping center. Miraculously no bystander was seriously injured as the shopping crowd stood frozen or sought cover from the hail of bullets generated by an arsenal of automatic weapons. But we were all bystanders that afternoon and all of us saw our worst fears play out before our eyes.

And then, in the spring of 1980, coinciding with our experiencing the first large scale urban disorder in a decade, we witnessed a new and unexpected event: photos of boatloads of Cubans, and of Haitians, entering South Florida adorned our daily newspapers. The Haitians were pictured packed in small overcrowded vessels, wearing tattered clothing and impenetrable expressions. Who were these people and why were they coming here?

The Cubans, over one hundred thousand of them, arrived in what we first termed a Freedom Flotilla, a positive name for what appeared to be a positive event: the liberation of victims of Castro's oppression coming to reunite with their families here. But we then learned that the stream of immigrants was tainted, perhaps poisoned, by an infusion of prisoners

and mental patients from Castro's jails and psychiatric hospitals. The term Freedom Flotilla quickly disappeared and we learned to use a more guarded, more neutral, term: The Mariel Boatlift.

By the end of 1980 our worst fears regarding the nature of those who had come in the Boatlift appeared to be close to confirmation. A study revealed that Dade County's homicide rate had increased by nearly one hundred percent in 1980 as compared to 1978. Moreover, the homicide rate in which victims were Latin had, in 1980, increased by three hundred percent over what it had been six years earlier. The study, conducted at Florida International University, attributed the phenomenon, in large measure, to the Mariel influx and to "the increase in drug traffic and tendency of those involved to kill each other." Again, the Cocaine Cowboys, the Colombia drug dealers. They now began to merge in our minds with the Mariels as sources of our problems.

And then, as if we hadn't seen and heard enough that was both confusing and distasteful, the Haitians impenetrable expressions appeared once again in our morning papers: this time their faces stared at us not from decrepid fishing boats off Key Biscayne, but from behind barbed wire topped fences at a detention camp on Krome Avenue on the edge of the Everglades. On the one hand critics of the federal government's new detention policy called Krome a concentration camp and the policy an inhumane departure from our historic open-arms attitude toward refugees. The federal government told us, however, that the Haitians were here illegally and that their detention was only for as long as it took to hold immigration hearings. The Haitians' lawyers, the government contended, were at fault for prolonging the process and the detentions. And those issues, again, were complex and confusing.

Finally, by the fall of 1981, our problems and our issues became national news. The media compared our drug wars

to Chicago during Prohibition. We saw ourselves on the cover of Time Magazine in a collage of snapshots: a homicide victim, a cocaine sniffer and a citizen arming himself for his own protection. The New York Times referred to us as Ellis Island South and, in another article, reported that the Drug Enforcement Administration had estimated that the narcotic traffic generated "\$7 billion to \$12 billion a year in South Florida, or roughly the same amount as tourism... foreign money continued to cascade into the area in legal as well as illegal channels, fueling a commercial building boom in downtown Miami." Another new word - "Narcobucks" - entered our expanding vocabulary. Had the drug traffic replaced tourism not only as our national image but also as the cornerstone of our economy?

When this Grand Jury convened, in mid-November of last year, these many questions and issues were very much on our minds, as they were and are on the minds of all of us who make South Florida our home. We decided to try to explore these issues during our six month term, fully realizing that we are powerless to solve such a broad range of problems, if indeed there are any solutions. What we set out to do was to gather as much information as we could so as to better understand these complex and emotional questions. Perhaps, we felt, in some small way we could separate myth from reality and perhaps we could shed some light in some areas. Perhaps we could do that for ourselves, and for the citizens of this community whom we represent as a Grand Jury.

At our weekly sessions we have heard testimony from a wide range of government officials and from a variety of experts. We are grateful to all of those who appeared before us and, at the end of this Report, we will acknowledge their contributions.

The issues and areas we sought to address were (1) issues relating to immigration and refugees generally and to the Mariel

and Haitian influx specifically, (2) issues relating to the impact of the refugees upon our community's resources and institutions, (3) issues relating to narcotics and narcotic interdiction in South Florida, and (4) issues relating to violent crime and the proliferation of handguns in our community. The next four sections of our Report will summarize what we have learned in each of those four areas. Finally, in the last section of our Report, we will present our Findings and our Recommendations. Our comments relating to handguns will be presented in a separate section.

II. IMMIGRATION ISSUES: FROM MARIEL TO KROME

A. Immigration in Perspective.

The drama of the most recent wave of Cubans who flooded the shores of South Florida, as the Freedom Flotilla journeyed from Mariel Harbor to the Truman Annex at Key West, Florida, has probably done more than anything else to force questions as to the policies of both State and Federal governments with regards to immigration to the United States.¹

This Report will present a record of failure on the part of the federal government to meet its responsibility of addressing the crisis that confronted our community during and after the unprecedented influx of Cubans and Haitians during the spring and summer of 1980. It will also present a record of the federal failure to stem the flow of illegal aliens into our community and the failure to identify and deport them once they have come. What we will present, in short, is a case history of the effects upon a locality of a federal failure to define and to enforce a coherent immigration policy.

And we have learned that the lessons to be learned from these federal failures are not merely local in nature. The problems that we have experienced have national implications

¹ Clyde McCoy and Diana Gonzalez, "More on Cuban Immigration," Humanist Sociology, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1980).

and immigration issues are national in scope. The United States is a nation of immigrants, and we look with pride at the diversity and the invigoration that immigrants have always provided. We are by far the world's largest receiver of immigrants and refugees and in fact we accept on the order of twice as many as the rest of the world combined. Immigration and refugee flows during the last five years have been at or near the highest levels ever experienced, including the period before immigration was first broadly restricted in the 1920's. The 1980 census reveals that, for the first time since 1920, the percentage of our population born in other nations increased after five decades of decline. We can expect this increase to continue.

Central and South American nations are the source of most of our immigrants, and of most of our illegal aliens, both locally and nationally. These nations can expect population growth ranging from a third to ninety percent over the next twenty years. Examples of projected 20-year population increases are 89 percent for Mexico, 58 percent for both Colombia and the Dominican Republic and one-third for Jamaica and Cuba.

Dr. Jan Luytjes, of Florida International University, made several important observations in his testimony before us. He pointed out that when the resources of a specific region are not sufficient to sustain its population, that population will migrate to another area and that in the Caribbean Basin there is going to be greater movement of people in the future than there has been in the past. We are just beginning to feel the effects of rising birth rates in Haiti and Central America and the exodus of peoples for economic reasons will continue to increase over the next two to three decades.

Yet the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service is not equipped to deal with our problems today, let alone those we can anticipate in the future. There are, in

addition to the estimated 150,000 Cubans and Haitian Entrants who arrived in 1980, an estimated 175,000 illegal aliens in South Florida. We have learned that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), whose responsibility it is to detect and to deport illegal aliens has, in Dade County, a mere nineteen investigators for this purpose, which is a reduction from thirty-seven investigators assigned in 1979.

Yet we have found that, while we in South Florida are feeling the effects of INS' laxity most acutely, the problem is not a local one. In recent years the priority accorded INS at the national level has declined dramatically and the federal government has failed to adequately staff and fund INS efforts throughout the nation.

We have learned, for example, that of the more than eight million people entering the United States legally on visas in 1977, the archaic INS administrative system was unable to account for the departure of fifteen percent, or over 1,200,000 people. And we have learned that INS does not have the resources to verify whether or not visitors overstay their visas. And once we learn that INS cannot oversee legal immigration, it is little wonder that illegal immigration is beyond its control.

This too is a national problem - the INS Border Patrol nationally, for example, is smaller than the Baltimore police department.

III. THE IMMIGRANTS: IMPACT UPON DADE COUNTY.

A. Background

Unlike the two earlier waves of Cuban refugees, the first of which arrived in the early 1960's, and the second of which arrived before the 1975 recession, the Mariel Boatlift occurred during less opportune economic conditions and a national mood of fiscal restraint on the part of the government.

This, perhaps coupled with the media image of the arriving refugees, led the Carter Administration to decide not to grant the Mariels the generous benefits of refugee status which would have led, for example, to one hundred percent Federal reimbursement of refugee assistance costs. Instead, the Administration announced that the newcomers, including the approximately 18,000 Haitians who were arriving at that time, would be treated as applicants for asylum and that special legislation would be sought to resolve both the Cuban and Haitian legal status issue.

The federal creation of the "Entrant" classification meant that the federal government would not assume any responsibility for financial refugee assistance and the result was that, until early 1981, the entire burden of providing relief and services to the refugees fell upon the County and State. The Fascell-Stone Amendment provided some federal financial assistance from 1981 to the present, but now we learn that this partial assistance is to be cut off at the end of May and at that point the burden will once again fall upon the County and State. We find this to be totally unacceptable.

And coupled with the federal government's failure to assume economic responsibility, we have learned that the federal authorities mishandled the Mariel immigrants in a manner which placed the burden, once again, almost totally upon Dade County.

For the first two weeks of the Boatlift the federal authorities were completely absent and Dade County employees and volunteers processed the new arrivals. When the federal authorities did become involved, we have learned, their involvement was slipshod. INS did an extremely poor job of documenting the new arrivals. And the federal resettlement effort failed to achieve the objective of spreading the refugees out nationally: the Carter Administration appears to us to have had no plan for admission, processing or for resettlement.

The federal resettlement effort failed for a lack of commitment and a lack of effective execution. The result is a trail of broken sponsorships and a "secondary migration" of Mariel refugees from other areas of the country and from the closed camps. These secondary migrants continue to trickle into South Florida, where the number of Mariel migrants continue to grow daily.

B. Health, Educational and Social Service Costs to Dade County

We have already discussed the failure of the federal government to provide adequate assistance to refugees and the impending cutoff of all direct assistance on June 1. In this section we will summarize the impact upon our local resources of this federal failure.

The arrival in 1980 of more than 150,000 refugees is comparable to our absorbing the population of the entire city of Tallahassee: in addition to the need for direct financial aid for such a mass of arrivals until such time as they become self-sustaining, Dade's existing resources were called upon to provide services to these new arrivals. Our public health, educational, social service and criminal justice systems, to name a few such resources, were called upon to accommodate a sudden increment in our population of nearly seven percent.

It is extremely difficult to measure the total cost of this impact upon our local resources. How, for example, do we attach a dollar figure to the increased police protection, or increased garbage collection, that must be available to 150,000 people. Those estimates that have been ventured, however, of documentable costs estimate that Dade County has incurred 130 million dollars in costs that have not been reimbursed by the federal government.

The total inadequacy of the federal response is perhaps best illustrated by an example that was related to us. While Jackson Memorial Hospital does receive some federal reimbursement

for aliens who are registered with INS, there is no such reimbursement for an undocumented (and therefore illegal) alien who is treated at public expense at the hospital. Hospital administrators advise us that when they discover that they are treating an illegal alien they would initially notify INS so that an INS representative would come to the hospital to document the alien. They would do so, obviously, so as to obtain federal reimbursement for the medical treatment, but this notification would have the further effect of placing INS in a position to initiate deportation proceedings, if warranted. INS' response, however, was that it did not have sufficient resources to send investigators to Jackson Memorial Hospital to do this: the result has been that local taxpayers have had to bear the cost of the treatment of illegal aliens and that, once treated, these illegal aliens have been free to go about their business without INS intervention. We will see another example of this INS policy of benign neglect toward illegal aliens when we look at the impact of illegal aliens upon our criminal justice system.

Jackson Memorial Hospital administrators state that they have expended twenty-one million dollars in medical services to entrants and aliens. The federal government has reimbursed fourteen million, meaning that local taxpayers have had to bear the cost of the remaining seven million dollars.

Another area in which Dade taxpayers have been short-changed by the federal government is the school system. In 1980 our school system was suddenly asked to absorb 19,000 newly arrived non-English speaking children (as well, eventually, as 25,000 adults who enrolled in the adult programs). School administrators estimate that this process cost a total of 32 million dollars. The federal government has reimbursed Dade for twelve million of those dollars, leaving a net deficit of twenty million dollars to be absorbed by State and local taxpayers.

We are proud to point out in this context that the public school system provides us with another example of how well our local institutions have managed, in the face of federal inertia, to absorb the waves of immigrants: our school system absorbed these 19,000 students virtually without any disruption which is, we feel, a monumental achievement that should receive appropriate praise. Another bright note is that the Mariel and Haitian children are assimilating well into our school system. The Mariel children, we are told, came with academic levels that were higher than anticipated. The Haitians children, however, came to us from a virtually non-existent educational system in Haiti.

C. Immigrants and the Criminal Justice System

Any discussion of the burden placed upon local facilities by the combined impact of refugees and illegal aliens inevitably includes the criminal justice system as a focal point. Clearly our recent immigrations have caused an increase in crime and added a sizeable load to an already overcrowded criminal justice system. And just as clearly, this in turn translates into increased costs to be passed on to the community's taxpayers.

In later sections of this Report we will return to the issues of crime and refugees and aliens. In this section we will present our findings with respect to the post-1980 state of the criminal justice system itself. In order to reach these findings we undertook an Impact Study which included five separate phases:

(1) A study of all felony arrests during a four week period beginning March 11, 1982. This phase included a study of approximately 2500 defendants;

(2) A similar study of the 2200 defendants incarcerated in the Dade County Jail and correctional system facilities on March 14, 1982;

(3) A study of a random sample of 1500 Mariel refugees so as to attempt to address the question of what percentages of all Mariel refugees have been arrested for crimes in Dade County;

(4) The in-depth interview of at least 400 Mariel refugees using a modified version of a questionnaire developed for Dade County in late 1980; and

(5) An assessment of the impact of illegal aliens upon the criminal justice system and the efficiency of the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in identifying illegal aliens who have been arrested for felonies.

The full results of that Study will be presented separately in a Report to be issued by the State Attorney's Office. In this section we will present what we deem to be the most significant findings derived from the Study, which are:

(1) Felony arrests attributable to Mariel refugees and other, mostly illegal, aliens have contributed greatly to an increase in the criminal justice caseload of about twenty-five percent as compared to pre-1980;

(2) The crime increase generally attributed to Mariel refugees has been somewhat overestimated while the crime increase attributable to other, mostly illegal, aliens has been considerably underestimated;

(3) The overwhelming majority of Mariel refugees in our community have had no contact with our criminal justice system, but

(4) Of those Mariel refugees who have been arrested, a very violent and dangerous minority are identifiable;

(5) INS has no policy or procedure for either identifying or assuming responsibility for this discernable minority of dangerous Mariel entrants;

(6) INS has no policy or procedure for either identifying or assuming responsibility for the apparently large numbers of illegal aliens who are being arrested for felonies and they are passing through our justice system virtually undetected, and

(7) Likewise, there is no means of identifying the legal aliens who are being arrested and they are therefore immune to INS action relating to their immigration status;

(8) The cost to the local and state taxpayers of the processing of cases involving entrants and aliens is nothing less than staggering;

(9) Mariel entrants, collectively, are making a very real and laudable attempt to assimilate themselves into this community, yet

(10) Many entrants remain unassimilated exhibit the need for a diversity of social services which must be provided if they are to remain undetained among us. The costs of these needed and necessary services is, and will increasingly become, very substantial and federal support is both warranted and necessary.

At this point we will comment upon each of the ten findings which emerge from our study:

- (1) Felony arrests attributable to Mariel refugees and other, probably illegal, aliens have contributed greatly to an increase in the criminal justice caseload of about twenty-five percent as compared to pre-1980.

Prior to 1980 Latins and Caribbeans, referring to persons whose culture and ethnicity is Caribbean or Central or South American (which includes Blacks from all such cultures, including Black nations such as Jamaica and Haiti) constituted about twelve percent of all felony arrests. Today Latin-Caribbeans constitute 38% of all arrests and the group has moved to first in percentages of felony arrests, with American Blacks accounting for 35% and non-Latin Whites 27%.

Our analysis of the Latin-Caribbean felony arrests reveals the following breakdown:

Total Latin/Caribbean:	100%
Mariels:	44%
Pre-Mariel Cuban:	22%
Other Latin/Caribbean:	34%

As percentages of the total felony arrest population the three categories represent the following:

Total Latin/Caribbean:	38%
Mariels:	16%
Pre-Mariel Cuban:	9%
Other Latin/Caribbean:	13%

What is evident is that the combination of Mariels and Other-Latin-Caribbean constitute about 29% of our felony arrest population.

- (2) The crime increase generally attributed to Mariel refugees has been somewhat over-estimated while the crime increase attributable to other, probably illegal, aliens has been considerably underestimated.

The prevailing estimates of the crime rate increase attributable to Mariels has been in the range of 20%. The actual figure, 16%, is considerably below that. Yet, at the same time, the "other" category of Latin-Caribbean is surprisingly large, and indeed almost as large as the Mariel group. What we conclude from this is that while the Mariel phenomenon is clearly of great significance to our criminal justice system, it may have obscured the more significant, and more permanent, trend in our justice system and in our community and its institutions, this being a trend of internationalization.

To make this discovery in a study of criminal justice felony arrests in no way should be interpreted as that increased internationalization is negative: a similar study of college enrollments, or driver license records, of private hospital admissions, or of any other index of population growth or population change, would unquestionably show the same trend.

- (3) The overwhelming majority of Mariel refugees in our community have had no contact with our criminal justice system.

While it is clear that Mariel refugee crime has had a major impact upon Dade County's criminal justice institutions, it should be equally clear that this crime data should not be presented without simultaneous information relating to what percentage of all Mariel refugees are responsible for the commission of these crimes. To condemn an entire community, now representing an estimated 7% of our population, for the acts of a minority who were transported here from Cuban jails and criminal lifestyles, would be irresponsible.

The Cuban population of Miami has historically and consistently had a lower crime rate than either their Black or non-Latin White counterparts.

The present population percentages of Dade County, as compared to the current arrest percentages, breakdown is as follows:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Dade Population</u>	<u>% of Arrest Population</u>
Anglo	44%	27%
Pre-Mariel Cuban	32%	9%
Mariel	7%	16%
Black	17%	35%
Latin/Caribbean	Unknown	13%

In order to address the question of what percentages of Mariel refugees have accounted for that group's criminal activity, a sample of 1563 Mariel refugees residing in Miami has been identified by the Drivers Licenses Record Office and the percentage of these individuals who have been arrested since arriving in Miami has been determined. The results are as follows:

	<u>No. (%)</u>
Total Mariels Studied:	1563 (100%)
Mariels Never Arrested:	1419 (90.8%)
Mariels Arrested:	143 (9.2%)
Felony Arrest	79 (5.1%)
Misdemeanor Arrest	64 (4.1%)

We do not see any threat to this community by a collective group of which only one in twenty has been arrested for a felony.

- (4) Of these Mariel refugees who have been arrested, a small but very violent and dangerous minority are discernable.

However we must qualify our last observation by adding this one. It is common knowledge now that the Cuban government purposefully emptied many of its jails and mental institutions into the stream of immigrants departing Mariel. That act abruptly altered the boatlift's image and the taint, unfortunately, still afflicts that majority of the refugees who came to flee communist oppression and economic deprivation.

We as a community need to learn to distinguish that majority from that minority before the assimilation process of the Mariels can really be completed.

To make this distinction it will be necessary to identify those violent criminals among the Mariels immigrants: while Mariels constitute less than half of all Latin felony arrests, they constitute nearly three quarters of all Latins ordered incarcerated in the Dade County jail system. Of this group 60% have called attention to themselves by having a prior arrest record in less than two years in this community. And another 60% have committed crimes against the person.

- (5) INS has no policy or procedure for either identifying or assuming responsibility for this discernable minority of dangerous Mariel entrants.

Traditionally, immigrants or aliens have been treated differently than citizens when they have been identified as dangerous criminals. That is no longer the case in Dade County. A Mariel charged with the commission of a crime is treated in the same manner as a citizen which means pretrial release or detention, court hearings and, when convicted, probation or incarceration, all at local or state expense. The cost to Dade taxpayers of Mariel and Latin-Caribbean detainees in the Dade Department of Corrections is, for example, over six million dollars per year.

Traditionally, INS would place immigration holds on such non-citizens and deportation proceedings would begin. This is no longer the case. There are virtually no deportation hearings and INS, granted its inability of finding a way to deport dangerous Mariels, has managed to elude responsibility for utilizing federal personnel and federal dollars to deal with the dangerous Mariel criminals that we have identified.

- (6) INS has no policy or procedure for either identifying or assuming responsibility for the apparently large numbers of illegal aliens who are being arrested for felonies and they are passing through our justice system virtually undetected.

The same shortcomings with respect to INS is true in the case of non-Mariel illegal aliens.

As part of our study, a list of 71 aliens arrested for felonies or in jail was submitted to INS with a request that they advise us of the immigration status of these individuals. INS advises that they were able to locate files for "about 25%" of the defendants and that most of the remaining 75% are probably here illegally. Not one single "immigration hold" had been placed on one single defendant. INS had not initiated any action in any one of the 71 cases. Each one of the 71 defendants, some legal aliens but mostly illegal, remains among us undetected by INS and being processed in the same manner as U.S. citizens.

With respect to INS we lay the blame at the national, not the local, level. We have learned that the local INS office is incredibly understaffed. The investigative unit, charged with the responsibility of identifying and deporting illegal aliens has a staff of only nineteen investigators. This is a decrease from a staff of thirty-seven in 1979. With so small a staff it is impossible for the local INS investigative unit to aggressively seek out illegal aliens. The federal government has given INS low priority and has failed to fund the agency adequately. The result is the totally inadequate staffing of agency efforts throughout the nation.

And once again, state and local taxpayers are the victims: every day sees additional illegal aliens pass through our criminal justice system undetected when they should be deported. Ironically, many of them are put on probation (at our expense) which results in an inducement to remain in Dade County during the probation term.

If illegal aliens were identified and deported at the time of their arrest, as they should be, the savings to our criminal justice system, in terms of money and of manpower, would be enormous.

- (7) Likewise, there is no means of identifying the legal aliens who are being arrested and they are therefore immune to INS action relating to their immigration status.

Since INS has abdicated its responsibility in the criminal justice system it follows that legal aliens, illegal aliens, entrants and U.S. citizens are all treated identically. The policy is one of benign neglect. Those affected by this policy are Dade's taxpayers.

- (8) The cost to the local and state taxpayers of the processing of these cases is nothing less than staggering.

We have estimated the annual costs to the Dade Corrections Department of housing and processing the Mariel refugees and aliens who are arrested for felonies at in excess of six million dollars per year.

We also note that three criminal court felony divisions have been added to the Circuit Court since late 1980 in response to the increase in the number of felony arrests. The annual cost of three new divisions we approximate at one million dollars each.

We caution that it would be unfair and inaccurate to attribute the increase in our crime rate solely to Mariel entrants and other aliens. We can say that the Mariels account for 16% of felony arrests and that they were not here prior to 1980. Many of the legal and illegal aliens who account for an additional 13% of the felony arrests were undoubtedly in Dade

County prior to 1980 and legal and illegal aliens did constitute some portion of felony arrests then as well as now. The increase in felony courts by three since 1980, however, represents an increase in case capacity of 20%, which in turn corresponds to a conservative estimate of the combined impact of entrants and aliens.

Thus, without even estimating police costs and post-sentencing dispositional costs, such as costs of state imprisonment or probation, and without even including the cost of misdemeanors, we estimate an annual cost to the local and state taxpayers of about nine million dollars per year.

- (9) Mariel entrants, collectively, are making a very real and laudable attempt to assimilate themselves into this community.

We have learned that media reports of examples of the dark side of the Mariel exodus, particularly as to crime, have obscured a brighter side: the significant majority of the Mariel refugees are assimilating and they are coping and adjusting. Many hundred, for example, are attending English and other classes at Florida International University and elsewhere. Many others arrived with technical skills which have been easily absorbed in our economy. And overall, three quarters of the Mariel entrants have become self-sufficient since their arrival.

- (10) Many entrants are still unassimilated and exhibit the need for a diversity of social services which must be provided if they are to remain among us. The costs of these needed and necessary services is, and will increasingly become, very substantial and federal support is both warranted and necessary.

Yet one quarter, or about 25,000, of the Mariel entrants have not assimilated and perhaps they never will. Among this group are the hard-core which were expelled from Castro's jails and mental hospitals. And even were it not for the history of incarceration which many of these entrants bring

with them, we note other formidable obstacles to assimilation. These obstacles include two decades of life in a socialist society and a lack of understanding of our economy and labor market, the inability to speak English, the lack of a support system of family, friends or community and a lack of job skills in a period of high unemployment.

Many of these unassimilated Mariels should be incarcerated or taken into federal custody or both. But if any of this group are to remain in our midst, they will require a large commitment of services and resources. We anticipate the arrival of federal impact funds for this purpose but we fear that the commitment is too temporary and limited when it should be neither. And we have just learned that Congress has, at the last minute, cut in half its original commitment. We urge that our congressional delegation make every effort to restore the original impact aid commitment.

IV. THE MARIEL AND HAITIAN ENTRANTS: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS.

A. The Mariels

The Mariel exodus, although it was the third mass exodus from Cuba since the Revolution, was unique in at least two respects. First, the suddenness in which the Boatlift occurred precluded the accustomed pre-screening of the arriving immigrants. And secondly, as Dr. McCoy has pointed out, while the previous Cuban influxes were prompted by changing economic and political situations, the Mariel exodus was directly related to Cuba's difficulty in providing adequate economic and educational opportunities to a young and rapidly growing labor force. The return to Cuba in 1979 of 100,000 visiting Cuban exiles from the United States added to the pressure as the Cuban nationals viewed their relatives' affluence and listened to often exaggerated accounts of economic opportunity in South Florida.

When the Castro government announced the opening of the Mariel Port, the Miami Latin community rushed to liberate friends and relatives, only to find the returning boats filled with strangers as the Boatlift progressed. These, we learned, were Castro's undesirables. Castro termed them "social dregs" and "delinquents" and the U.S. press began to echo that theme and quickly public opinion, both within and without the Latin community, began to change. The Freedom Flotilla had become the Mariel Boatlift. And from then on we read only of the criminals.

The attempts to define the nature of the Mariel refugees is best summarized by Robert L. Bach, an assistant professor of Sociology at the State University of New York, in an article prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor. According to Bach, "compared to the "Golden Exile" of the 1960's, when wealthy businessmen, professionals, and managers migrated en masse, this latest wave of Cubans fared poorly. But how poorly? Did the disorganization of their flight or the current political climate unfairly color our impressions? Based on an analysis of data collected by the Immigration Service during processing, the new arrivals were neither the "upper-crust" nor the bottom layer of Cuban society. They generally possess education and skill levels above the average for those remaining in Cuba and about the same as those who arrived in the 1970's... By projecting this future on the majority of the recent immigrants, it appears that they will find self-sustaining employment within a relatively short period as part of the Cuban-American working class.

Clearly, Dr. Bach's conclusion is optimistic: notwithstanding, a small and dangerous subgroup, the great majority of the Mariel refugees are no different than their predecessors who arrived in the early 1970's.

B. The Haitians

While the Mariels, collectively, are victims of a very negative and generally inaccurate stereotype, the Haitians share a quite different stereotype which is by no means negative and generally accurate: "gentle," "hardworking" and "diligent" are the recurring descriptives. Dr. Jan Luytjes of F.I.U. also pointed out that these Haitians have substantial potential for entrepreneurial success in this country. They are, pointed out Luytjes, the "risk takers." They invested their life savings and their lives in an uncertain sea voyage of almost a thousand miles in an attempt to reach these shores. We will never know, perhaps fortunately, how many of them drowned at sea. If initiative is a quality which we honor in this nation, then clearly these people have demonstrated initiative.

We have learned the following about the nature and motivation of the Haitian immigrants:

(1) The flow of Haitian boat people is undeniably but one part of a much larger flow of Caribbean peoples. In 1980, there were in the United States an estimated 50,000 Barbadians, close to half a million Jamaicans and some 150,000 Trinidadians;

(2) They are fleeing the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and the 27th poorest in the world. It is also a country with one of the world's most inequitable distributions of income and wealth with less than one percent of the population possessing forty-five percent of the wealth;

(3) Income disparities between the rural regions, which contain up to 90% of the population, and urban areas are increasing, and even without corruption the government's policies seem ill-designed for the nation's problems of massive rural poverty: while 90% of the population is rural, 83% of the government's expenditures are in Port-au-Prince, the nation's capital. Agricultural expenditures never exceed 7 to 10% of the budget and the tax structure is highly regressive.

(4) In the midst of grinding poverty and corruption, arbitrary repression and persecution are alleged to have been the hallmarks of the Duvalier regimes. In 1973, Amnesty International stated: "Haiti's prisons are still filled with people who have spent years in detention without ever being brought to trial... The variety of torture is incredible."

The Haitians, 18,000 of whom arrive simultaneous to the 1980 Mariel Boatlift, augmenting an existing Haitian population in Miami from an estimated 14,000 to an estimated 32,000.

We have begun to understand why these people have come here. And it would appear that unless our national policies relating to Haiti deal with the "push factors" that are causing so many to leave, the migration to South Florida will never be eliminated. But we see no reason why Dade County should bear the burden of this national, or better stated international, issue. It is for the federal government to formulate our future attitude toward the Haitian government and, clearly, it is for the federal government to deal with the immigration problems caused by our attitude toward that government. As we have indicated previously, we in Dade County can not afford to absorb masses of people migrating to this country due to economic and political considerations over which we have no control.

The Haitians who have arrived here have requested political asylum, the obtaining of which requires a showing that they individually left Haiti "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted," a condition that has never been precisely defined but one that has been very difficult for the Haitians to meet. And while in the past Haitians applying for asylum were paroled to the community pending the litigation of their asylum claims, the federal government last year began a policy of detention of the Haitians in

facilities like Krome, which one witness who appeared before us described as "nothing more than a concentration camp." The government's Haitian policy has been described as discriminatory and racist.

Dr. Howard Gitlow of the University of Miami recently analyzed INS parole-detention decisions made in refugee cases in New York and concluded that in all cases in which the person seeking asylum was non-Haitian, the decision reached was to parole the person seeking asylum, while in 95% of the Haitian applications the person seeking asylum was detained.

We are not qualified to pass judgment on INS' motivations but we do note that Federal District Judge James Lawrence King has written the following in an opinion arising from the Haitian litigation:

"Haitians who came to the United States seeking freedom and justice did not find it... they were confronted with an Immigration and Naturalization Service determined to deport them... (and to do so) irrespective of the merits of their asylum claims... Over the past 17 years, Haitian claims for asylum and refuge have been systematically denied, while all others have been granted. The recent Haitian Program is but the largest scale, most dramatic example of that pattern...

The Court has seen a stark picture of how these plaintiff-immigrants will be treated if they return to Haiti, and it has seen an equally stark, and even more troubling, picture of the treatment of the Haitians by the Immigration and Naturalization Service."

We note that INS has of late acknowledged that the detention policy, and the Krome Camp which represents its implementation, are intended as deterrents to other potential refugees from the Caribbean and we wonder how just, and how effective, it is to create an immigration policy based upon deterrence. What we feel is needed in a coherent national immigration policy and a coherent policy intended to address the "push factors" which cause residents of impoverished or overcrowded nations to emigrate to the United States. As we

have already noted, refugees move geographically in response to political and economic considerations: alleged repression and poverty in Haiti and leftist revolutionary movements in Central America. To suggest that the symbol of Krome Camp can, in all but the very short run, affect the movements of people reacting to such events is, to say the least, simplistic.

And we make one additional observation with respect to Krome: INS lacks the manpower and the ability to identify illegal aliens who are arrested for and convicted of felonies and who are sitting in the Dade County Jail at taxpayers' expense when they should be deported. Instead of deploying its manpower in such a way as to protect this community from illegal aliens and Mariel entrants that INS has itself paroled here, it has chosen to use its manpower to staff its own jail containing 600 Haitians on the edge of the Everglades.

There are 30,000 Haitians in Dade County who are not detained, among them the friends and relatives of those at Krome. Detention is expensive and cruel. Haitians in Dade County, in the past and at present, constitute a minuscule percentage of arrests and their presence poses no danger to our society. INS needs to allocate its resources to create a linkage with Dade's criminal justice system. We advocate paroling the Krome Haitian detainees with relatives here pending resolution of their litigation, while resettling those who do not elsewhere, and getting on with the real business of dealing with the many thousands of criminal illegal aliens and Mariel entrants who are crowding our jails and walking our streets. Krome can then be used to incarcerate these Mariel criminals and illegal aliens who are taken into federal custody.

As for the deterrence argument, we have learned that the Coast Guard has now effectively deterred mass Haitian emigration by deploying a ship off the Haitian coast. The Coast Guard is doing its job effectively and this should provide deterrent enough.

V. NARCOTIC AND CRIME: THE COLOMBIAN CONNECTION

A. A Geographic Perspective

We have learned that not only do people follow trade routes, so too do narcotics. The same geographic considerations that cause peoples to flow into South Florida from the south cause narcotics to do the same. Just as during the Vietnam War the West Coast of the United States was the prime point of entry for narcotics from Southeast Asia, due to the amount of commerce then flowing, so too now has our recently acquired role as hub of Caribbean trade brought with it the sinister side effects of marijuana and cocaine smuggled in from Colombia. Narcotics smuggling follows established trade routes, blending into legitimate commerce where its presence generally goes undetected.

We have learned that the twin problem that have plagued us of late - refugees and narcotics - are closely related. Both problems emanate from our geographic position. Both problems are national in scope: we provide the point of entry for an estimated eighty to ninety percent of all the marijuana and cocaine consumed in the United States. While immigrants tend to settle here, narcotics of course for the most part flow through to other markets in the nation. This last fact, of course, renders it more difficult for the federal government to argue that narcotic interdiction in South Florida is a "local problem." Both problems are of national, perhaps more correctly international, dimension.

In this section of our Report, we will discuss the twin impact upon our crime rate of the federal failure to assume its responsibilities in the areas of immigration and narcotic interdiction. The relationship is clear: the two phenomena that have dramatically increased our crime rate generally, and our homicide rate specifically, have been the relatively unrestricted flow of narcotics. It is not the presence of narcotics alone that has caused the rise in homicides,

it is the presence of illegal aliens drawn here by the lure of profit whose presence is facilitated by the federal failure to regulate immigration. The Mariel homicides, generally not related to narcotics traffic, are however attributable to the same laxity in that they are generally committed by that small but violent pool who passed undetected from Cuban jails into the streets of Miami.

And while discussions of homicide rates do not necessarily coincide with discussions of overall crime rates (murders represent at best two percent of all arrests), we have already seen that felony arrests attributable to Mariel entrants and other, generally illegal, Latin-Caribbean defendants represent nearly one-third of all felony arrests.

B. Dade County Homicides: Recent Trends

Notwithstanding the fact that murders represent only a minute percentage of all crimes, murders and specifically the motives and ethnicity of perpetrators and victims have been the focus of considerable attention over the past two years.

June Hawkins, a crime analyst at the Metro-Dade Police Department, has noted the following trends in homicides in Dade County (not including its municipalities). These trends are also noted by Dr. William Wilbanks of Florida International University, and by Assistant Dade County Medical Examiner, Dr. Charles Wetli, both of whom also testified:

(1) The number of homicides in which defendants and victims are Latin has increased dramatically, and this in turn has caused the widely publicized rise in our overall homicide rate.

Dr. Wilbanks points out a 300% increase in the percentage of homicides in which Latins are victims between 1974 and 1980, as compared to a non-Latin White increase of 65% and a Black increase of 16%, for an overall increase of 120%.

June Hawkins provided the following information regarding the numbers and ethnicity of homicide victims over the last several years:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Ethnicity of Victim</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Black</u>	<u>Anglo</u>	<u>Latin</u>	
1977	60	63	21	144
1978	72	48	33	153
1979	70	71	48	189
1980	131	90	82	303
1981	126	82	124	332

While in 1977 15% of all homicide victims were Latin, that figure stood at 37% last year. In that homicides are generally intra-ethnic, these studies assume that the perpetrators is generally of the same ethnicity as the victim. The intra-ethnic nature of homicides is documented in the Final Report on Criminal Justice prepared by the Fall Term 1979 Grand Jury. It was also documented by statistics given to us by the Medical Examiner's Office and the Metro-Dade Police Department.

(2) Corresponding to the increased latinization of our homicide rate is an increase in homicides which have been classified as drug related.

Twenty-six percent of Dade's homicides in which a classification could be made were drug related in both 1980 and 1981, as compared to fourteen percent in 1977.

(3) Colombian nationals are disproportionately represented among the homicide victims, and they are generally illegal aliens.

In 1981, Colombians represented eight percent of all homicide victims, although they are estimated to represent less than two percent of our population. And of these Colombian homicide victims, approximately ninety percent were illegal aliens.

(4) While handguns continue to dominate as murder weapon, automatic weapons and machine guns are used increasingly in homicides in which Latins are victims.

Eighty percent of all victims of homicides in 1981 were killed by guns. Increasingly, however, we find the presence of more sophisticated weaponry, such as that found at the Dadeland Mall shooting, in those homicides in which narcotics appear to have been the motivating factor and in which the victim was Latin. This trend was noted by both Dr. Charles Wetli of the Medical Examiner's Office and June Hawkins of the Metro-Dade Police Department.

C. Our Interdiction Efforts: Introduction

The Colombia source of the marijuana and cocaine flowing into South Florida has been well documented. Colombians have, during the course of the last six years, acquired a virtual monopoly of the supply side of the narcotics traffic in South Florida (and consequently, in the United States), a traffic in which the profits locally are estimated to exceed a billion dollars annually. This monopoly now extends to distribution from South Florida to the rest of the nation.

Our interdiction efforts, understandably, are aimed at the interception of cocaine, marijuana and quaaludes emanating in Colombia en route to South Florida in the air and at sea. We must again point out, however, the close relationship of the flows of narcotics and of people. No drug interdiction effort will be successful unless it also interdicts the flow of illegal aliens, in this case Colombians, entering our community. We in no way imply that, collectively, Colombian nationals are harming our community or its growth: on the contrary, our legitimate commerce with Colombia and its people is of great importance. But once again we return to the issue of the complete inability of INS to interdict the flow of drug traffickers who are illegal aliens into our community. We must remember that without drug traffickers there could be no drug traffic.

Yet here we must point out a paradox: we are a center of international commerce and of tourism. To impede the flow of people (or of commerce) into our community is to impede our economic well-being. Every increase in regulation measures in Customs processing at the airport (or Seaport) slows down the flow of tourists (or of merchandise). Tourists do not wish to spend hours in lines at Customs and this conflict in priorities (facilitating tourism and commerce here being in conflict with maximizing interdiction of illegal aliens and narcotics smuggling) actually translates into tensions between Customs officials and airport administrators. We Grand Jurors strongly urge that this conflict be acknowledged and that it be definitively resolved in favor of drug and illegal alien interdiction.

So much for the supply side. When we look at the demand side of the narcotics equation we are left with even more troubling feelings, and these feelings are about ourselves. We create the demand for narcotics. The drugs have not been thrust upon us. We are a drug oriented society in which the usage of alcohol, nicotine and prescription drugs is a great part of our everyday life. And we are a society which has become tolerant of marijuana and, to an increasing extent, of the cocaine which has become the occasional stimulant of the successful affluent. Can any interdiction effort succeed when we as a society are by no means committed to its success? The answer, painfully, is probably no. And can we be surprised that the mood of law enforcement officers is that of angry frustration? We have listened to expressions of that frustration and we are not surprised.

Finally we have heard repeatedly that alien drug smugglers frequently post large bail amounts and then abscond to their nation of origin, often only to return later under a new fictitious name. The bail expenditures have, in these cases, become a business expense in an industry in which expense

accounts appear to be unlimited. Clearly our bail laws and procedures were not designed with an alien defendant population in mind. We need to revisit these laws and procedures and we should make every effort to introduce into the State courts provisions which will require defendants to document the legitimate source of bail bond premiums and collateral before permitting the posting of bail. Also, if illegal aliens were efficiently identified, the initiation of deportation hearings would render the posting of bond more difficult in those cases.

D. Interdiction Efforts: A War on Three Fronts

The Colombia marijuana, cocaine and quaaludes enter South Florida in three principal manners: (1) at sea smuggled in private vessels, (2) in the air by private planes and (3) through the Miami airport and seaport by scheduled flights and arriving commercial shipping. A coordinated interdiction effort requires a coordinated response on these three fronts and experience has shown that a successful response at sea merely results in increased smuggling in the air. Of late, an increased interdiction rate in the air and at sea has apparently caused increased smuggling through the airport.

The narcotic interdiction effort, we have learned, is being waged by the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs, the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (D.E.A.) and local authorities, principally the Metro-Dade Police. The front-line in this effort, off-the-coast interdiction at sea and in the air, is the responsibility of the Coast Guard and Customs. We have found that both of these agencies are very competently administered and are doing their job as effectively as their resources allow, and we are grateful for their willingness to testify before us. And we note that neither of these agencies were created for, or have as their primary responsibility, narcotic interdiction. The

Coast Guard has as its main responsibility search and rescue missions and Customs was created to regulate taxable merchandise entering our ports from abroad. Both of these agencies gradually have been brought into the previously non-existent field of narcotic interdiction.

The agencies responsible for interdiction appear to be adequately coordinated although we have heard hints of rivalries and friction. And it is difficult for us to understand how such a multiplicity of agencies can conduct a coordinated effort without a permanent coordinating entity such as now is apparently temporarily represented by the Bush Task Force administration.

As to the success of our interdiction efforts we have heard a variety of assessments. In general we have learned that there is no prospect of our stopping the flow of narcotics, but that there is a prospect of diverting the flow to other ports of entry in the United States. That is a modest, even discouraging, goal but given our continuing demand and the seemingly limitless supply of narcotics it is perhaps the only realistic goal.

Prior to the added resources provided by the Bush Task Force it was estimated by the federal authorities who testified that only about fifteen percent of narcotics were interdicted. That estimate has now been increased to better than twenty-five percent due to Task Force efforts. We discount recent press reports indicating that the interdiction effort has now succeeded in stopping the narcotics flow. The federal authorities have estimated that a seventy-five percent interdiction rate will be required before drug smuggling becomes economically detrimental to the suppliers. The same authorities indicated that a seventy-five percent interdiction rate would require a commitment of resources that is absolutely not achievable due to the costs that would be involved in undertaking such an effort.

E. The Bush Task Force

When Vice President Bush, on February 16, finally acknowledged that "Miami has a disproportionate problem" in a speech dealing with crime in South Florida, the acknowledgment was the result of the intense efforts of the recently formed Miami Citizens Against Crime (MCAC), a coalition of local business and community leaders who had finally prevailed upon the Administration to commit additional federal resources to the narcotic interdiction effort here. We commend the MCAC for their efforts on behalf of this community.

We also acknowledge that the commitment of personnel and resources, including 130 Customs agents, 20 additional DEA agents, a radar plane and additional Coast Guard vessels appear to have had a significant impact upon drug traffic. In particular, the Coast Guard's effectiveness in patrolling the Caribbean channels has been improved as has U.S. Customs' surveillance of planes entering South Florida.

It is still, however, too soon to tell how effective these efforts will be in the long run. Past history has taught us that enhanced capability of intercepting one means of smuggling in narcotics has only resulted in a change in the method used by the smugglers, and we are still incapable of achieving the seventy-five percent interdiction rate that has been estimated as the rate needed to make smuggling unprofitable for the suppliers. Also, as we have indicated elsewhere, we are concerned that this commitment of resources is only temporary and we, as we indicated earlier in this Report, are concerned that the commitment does not provide resources for the INS investigative unit charged with the responsibility of identifying illegal aliens.

F. Interdiction Efforts: A Prognosis

"It is not just something that is South Florida. That is the most irritating thing... What is happening here is in the future for everyone, unless something is done now."

"We are terribly outnumbered and we keep losing man power while the drug violators continue to increase... It's a mismatch but it doesn't have to be."

"Do we want a problem like this in South Florida? With the violence now that we have related to it, why aren't more men assigned to deal with the problem?"

"We have never fought a group of people before that didn't live here... even the Mafia lived here... I think it's going to get a little worse before it gets better."

"I don't think it's time to give up."

These excerpts from the testimony of local line law enforcement officers who appeared before us summarize our present posture.

There is clearly a need for a greater commitment of resources at all levels. We have heard that less than two percent of all sworn law enforcement officials are specifically assigned to activities related to narcotic interdiction. We have heard that interdiction personnel feel they are undermined by a lack of public commitment as well as by a lack of resources.

But we heard that rhetoric before, in the context of a war in Southeast Asia. Is the interdiction effort another commitment of resources to an unwinnable war rendered futile by the lack of a popular commitment? Are we replaying Vietnam in the Caribbean? Much of what we have heard indicates that we are. The apparently prohibitive cost of a total interdiction effort, coupled with the continuing demand for narcotics, permits no room for optimism. Also, we have

learned that the commitment of an intensive interdiction effort, such as the Task Force, may only result in the diversion of the drug flow elsewhere necessitating a new Task Force there.

However, we are not yet prepared to admit defeat. But even a modest victory will require that the demand be reduced. We call for an increased commitment of law enforcement efforts at all levels to this effort, and we call for an intensive educational campaign by our schools, by our government agencies and by the media to publicize and to discuss the growing body of evidence that is emerging which indicates that marijuana, cocaine and quaaludes are not harmless. A precedent exists: a prolonged and intense educational campaign, led by the U.S. Surgeon General's Office, resulted in an extremely significant decrease in the use of nicotine. We can learn from that precedent and a similar campaign is called for here.

VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We are extremely proud of the manner in which our community absorbed the 1980 refugee influx. Although that influx and its aftermath triggered fears, confusion and even disruption for many of us, it also triggered compassion and a display of competence on the part of our local institutions that has heretofore not received the praise it well deserves. Our local and state social service agencies have, during a time of budgetary cutbacks, managed to provide the services the refugees so badly needed. Our economy, in the face of a recession, has absorbed the refugees as evidenced by the fact that only one-fourth of the Mariel entrants presently receive direct assistance, indicating that the other three-fourths are employed. And our criminal justice system, already badly overburdened, has managed to cope with an increased caseload of nearly one-third.

We have exhibited compassion and competence for which we are justifiably proud. And we have also exhibited patience. But our patience has been stretched to the limit. We, the Fall Term 1981 Grand Jury, find that our community has been forced to address a migration of nearly two hundred thousand refugees, and the presence of an additional estimated one to two hundred thousand illegal aliens, in the face of incompetence and inertia at the federal level.

We find that the federal government was completely unprepared for the influx and that it completely mismanaged the belated screening and resettlement attempts that it made. The federal government continues to view the problems posed by the influx as local issues, in the face of clear evidence that these issues are of national scope. The federal government has not yet understood the close relationship between the immigration and narcotic interdiction issues, and the government's failure to grasp the importance of a sufficiently funded and sufficiently staffed Immigration Service has left us without any federal help in dealing with illegal aliens and recidivist Mariel refugees in our criminal justice system. And while we acknowledge the overdue resources provided by the Bush Task Force, we are still without a coherent national immigration policy and without a national commitment to address fundamental immigration issues.

In that context we make the following findings and recommendations:

(1) Our immigration laws appear to us to be obsolete and unenforceable. No provisions existed under the law to address, for example, the Mariel Boatlift and no provision exist to deal with the Mariel criminals in our community. We urge that our federal legislators assign the highest priority to the development of an equitable immigration policy, and that they ensure that such a policy address the needs of South Florida.

(2) We also find that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is completely without adequate resources and that its efforts are totally inadequate. We are particularly shocked to learn of INS's total inability to deal with illegal aliens and entrants in our criminal justice system. We have learned that this impotence is not attributable to the ineffectiveness of local INS personnel, but rather to the lack of a commitment by the Administration to adequately fund and staff INS. It would probably be futile to recommend that the federal government make such a commitment, and we recommend instead that at the local level we develop our own capability for identifying illegal aliens and dangerous entrants and that, once they are identified, we transmit the information to INS for appropriate deportation proceedings and for the placement of the individuals in federal custody.

(3) INS has chosen to use its scarce resources in futile endeavors such as the Krome detention camp. As we have already indicated, we recommend that the Haitian detainees with families here be paroled and the remainder resettled elsewhere. The facility properly secured could then be used instead to house those aliens and entrants who represent the real threats to our community while they are awaiting trial, deportation or resettlement.

(4) And we find that, locally, we must address issues relating to our community's growth which are related to, but transcend, immigration issues. We must develop our own agenda of these issues so as to promote the balanced growth of our community and so as to preserve an acceptable quality of life for all of us who reside here. We cannot continue to accommodate new influxes of people: we have reached the limit in terms of the size of the population that we can support. We cannot afford any more Mariels. We recommend that County and municipal officials assign a high priority to this planning

process and that a committee of experts be designated to initiate this process. We are impressed with the expertise in the fields of economic and political implications of immigration and urban growth that has been developed at Florida International University. We urge that a dialogue be opened between our political leaders, our business community, and the academicians at F.I.U. who are studying these issues.

(5) We find that we have gone a long way in a short time toward assimilating the Mariel refugees into our community. We find that the great majority of Mariel entrants are making a very praiseworthy attempt to assimilate themselves into this community and that our own apprehensions and fears are receding. We find, in short, that the crisis of Mariel and its aftermath are, for the most part, behind us. We recommend enhanced and continued support for those educational and social service programs which are facilitating this important assimilation process.

(6) We also find that a relatively small group of Mariel refugees, many of them the outcasts of Castro's jails and mental hospitals, have not assimilated and in many instances these are the violent criminals whose crimes are continuously reported by the media. We have already alluded to INS' inability to identify these individuals and to the federal government's apparent unwillingness to assume any responsibility for their custody. We find this federal policy of benign neglect to be unconscionable. In conjunction with our recommendation that the Haitians at Krome be paroled or resettled, we urge that the facility, properly reenforced and properly secured, be used to detain illegal aliens and violent Mariel recidivists who are now in our streets or in our local jails. We also urge the implementation by the federal government of a resettlement program for the minority of unassimilated Mariel entrants among us.

(7) We must never have another mass influx from whatever origin. Our community's resources, its compassion and its patience have been stretched to the breaking point during the past two years. Fortunately, we were able to prevail but our community must never again be asked to absorb a population influx from abroad. During our deliberations we heard troubling hints of a "Second Mariel." These hints are based upon hard realities: the over one hundred thousand Mariel refugees each have, in most instances, several family members who wish to join them and who will do so at the first opportunity. We have seen how easily Castro has managed to provide such opportunities in the past.

Speculation concerning a second Mariel aside, however, we can neither afford to provide unimpeded access to illegal aliens from the south. We urge here that the next Grand Jury monitor closely steps that we expect will be taken at the federal, and local, levels to implement the recommendations and to address the concerns that are expressed in this Report. We ask also that their Final Report include an assessment of what has been done.

(8) And as if another example of federal insensitivity were needed, we are now faced with a cutoff of direct refugee cash assistance as of June 1. This means that the 25,000 entrants who are not yet self-sufficient will become totally dependent upon local cash assistance. We urge that local and state officials do all that they can, including pursuit of the issue in a court of law, to avert this cutoff in assistance.

(9) With respect to narcotic interdiction we welcome the resources made available by the Bush Task Force. These resources appear to be improving the interdiction rate. We are concerned, however, with the prospect that the allocation of these resources may be temporarily and we ask that a federal commitment be made to make their allocation permanent. We are also concerned that the allocation of resources has not

included resources to address the problem of the illegal aliens who are in our community for the purpose of trafficking narcotics. We recommend that the INS investigative staff here be at least tripled in size.

(10) And with respect to narcotic interdiction we recommend that the hard issues begin to be addressed. We find that we have not fully committed ourselves as a society to eradicate narcotics, and perhaps we never will. Our local economy apparently has benefitted enormously and our culture has become tolerant of marijuana and even of cocaine. Yet we ask the small numbers of law enforcement personnel assigned to narcotic interdiction to stop a supply for which we create a demand. That is clearly a costly hypocrisy. We call for the appointment of a committee of law enforcement officials and other experts, including those experts who have testified before us, to explore the complex issues relating to narcotic interdiction and to make specific recommendations as to the types of measures, including educational efforts for the community, which will effectively enhance our understanding of these issues and which will decrease the demand for narcotics which we have ourselves created.

(11) Our bail laws and procedures were not designed with an alien defendant population in mind. Many alien narcotic offenders post large bail amounts, only to abscond to their home nation, only to return later with a new name and new identification. We must revisit our bail laws and procedures and every attempt should be made to enact provisions which require that a narcotic defendant not only post bail, but that he also demonstrate that the premium and collateral posted emanate from legitimate sources.

(12) We note that six of the eleven preceding recommendations call for federal action and the end of federal inertia and insensitivity to the national scope of these issues. As

we have indicated earlier, the issues that are paramount in Dade County today, due principally to our geography, are now or will become issues throughout this nation. A failure of the federal government to deal effectively with these issues here today will provide the prologue for repeated failures elsewhere tomorrow, and perhaps the history of federal failure we have found here will someday prove to be the prologue for the failure of the "New Federalism" nationally.

But we have neither the time nor the patience to wait for that. Our final recommendation is that local and state government officials attempt to negotiate satisfactory agreements with the federal government which will address the issues we have raised, issues which are well known to those state and local officials whose testimony we have heard. If that negotiation process fails, as it seems to be doing, we recommend that those issues be addressed in an appropriate court of law: immigration and narcotic interdiction are federal responsibilities. If the federal government will not accept them as such, we must insist that a court of law direct them to assume that responsibility.

Finally, we wish to end on an optimistic note. We find that we have survived one of the most trying periods in the history of our community. We will never again be a community whose most trying, and most nationally publicized, crises were hurricanes. We are now in the forefront of the national and international issues we have discussed.

And we should be very proud of how we survived and of how we coped and adjusted. In the words of Arva Moore Parks, Dade County's most noted historian:

For a time, the combination of events seemed to overwhelm the city. As strong as a hurricane, winds of rage and hate and fear swirled in the midst of the maelstrom.

The events of 1980 were a temporary setback for the 'Magic City.' But Miami had been set back before -- and had always come back stronger than ever. The city's history prove that Miamians can survive any storm -- Those created by nature and those created by man. The storms will come and go, but the future of 'The Magic City' will always be as bright as the warm sun.

HANDGUNS

Past Grand Juries have called for handgun control in a variety of ways, generally pointing out the very obvious and very significant role handguns played in the capital cases that were presented during their Terms. In the context of our own Report, dealing with aspects of crime in South Florida, we feel it absolutely essential that we comment upon this important issue.

As for our own capital cases, 67% of the first degree murder cases presented to us involved the handgun as weapon causing death. A study of Medical Examiner records of homicides during the past year reveals a similar handgun involvement rate of 70%, which is considerably above the national average of 50%. Handguns do kill people and they kill them in situations that would not otherwise result in a death: a drunken husband shoots and kills his wife because she made a derogatory remark about him in front of neighbors; a teenaged girl borrows a handgun and kills another girl who had slapped her the previous day; another teenager, using a stolen handgun, shoots and kills an acquaintance with whom he has had an argument. These small tragedies multiply ever so rapidly.

Yet the data relating to the role of the handgun in homicide statistics does not seem to convince most people of the need for handgun control. We have tried a different approach, which was to attempt to estimate the cost to Dade's taxpayers of the medical treatment of victims of handgun injuries who were admitted to Jackson Memorial Hospital's Trauma Unit. Dr. David Bernstein, Director of Trauma Services at JMH, to whom we are most grateful, compiled the treatment costs of the 272 patients who were admitted to the Hospital

for handgun injuries (which does not count the so-called "walking wounded" who are not admitted to the Hospital but who are merely treated in the emergency room and released). At Jackson Hospital alone the costs to the taxpayers of this County during that six-month period was in excess of one and one-half million dollars, or nearly three and one-half million dollars per year! And that cost does not even include the doctor fees.

We note the recent formation of the Florida Coalition to Ban Handguns and we applaud their efforts. We believe that not only should handguns be registered, but that handgun owners should be licensed and that licenses should only be granted to those persons who are able to demonstrate a specific legitimate need to possess such a weapon.

We have learned that California is contemplating statewide gun registration and measures to eliminate private transfers of handguns between individuals as well as mandatory jail terms for persons caught carrying unregistered handguns outside of their home or business. The California proposal also calls for civil liability for any person who unlawfully transfers a handgun and penalties for anyone whose handgun is involved in a criminal or negligent act. We find these resources to be worthy of consideration here.

We also urge that our local and state representatives consider a handgun licensing bureau which would screen all applicants who apply for handgun licenses. The screening process would consider such factors as need for the weapon, criminal history, history of emotional instability, and community ties. The licensing process would also require passage of a weapon use proficiency and safety test. Licensing fees would be used to fund the licensing process.

Handguns, and ammunition, would be saleable only to persons with licenses.

To be truly effective, of course, such legislation must be national in nature or else handguns will continue to move between states and counties. In the interim, however, we call for our County Commissioners and our State Legislators to enact strict handgun licensing legislation at both the County and State levels.

A previous Grand Jury stated it in this manner:

If we have learned nothing else during our Term, it is that handguns do kill people. They are made to kill people and have no other purpose. We are appalled at the number of cases we have seen in which a killing could have been avoided if the handgun had been absent.

:

GRAND JURY QUORUMS AND REIMBURSEMENT

Once again we raise the issues of Grand Jury quorums and reimbursement.

We completely fail to understand the Florida Legislature's failure to respond to the repeated expressions of dissatisfaction with the requirement for a quorum of fifteen of eighteen Grand Jurors, as well as with the ten dollars per session reimbursement which we receive. We believe that our work is important and we can only assume that the Legislature does so as well.

Why then not make the obtaining of a quorum less difficult by either increasing the number of Grand Jurors to twenty-one or by reducing the quorum requirement from fifteen to thirteen of eighteen. Hardships arise during a six-month term, many of them permanent such as Grand Jurors who become ill or who relocate, which make it very difficult to assure on a weekly basis the eighty-five percent attendance rate required by a fifteen person quorum.

And one of the factors which makes it difficult to ensure a weekly quorum is the ten dollars pittance we get for coming. That translates to \$260 for our six-month term. Three of the members of this present Grand Jury were union or hourly employees who were not reimbursed by their employers for the days they sat on the Jury. One of the three Jurors lost income in the amount of \$5,000 for serving. The \$260 compensation he received is scant consolation.

Once again we implore our legislators to address these inequities. If our representatives find our work worthwhile, and we submit that our Final Report is worthwhile, we ask only that future Grand Juries not be impeded by unreasonable quorum requirements and by inadequate compensation.

CAPITAL AND OTHER CRIMINAL CASES PRESENTED TO THE GRAND JURY

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
LEVI WHITEHEAD	First Degree Murder	True Bill
MARIO LARA	First Degree Murder First Degree Murder Sexual Battery	True Bill
FREDDIE CECIL JONES ROBERT LAVARIS HORTON and CARLTON ADDERLY	First Degree Murder Robbery Kidnapping	True Bill
DIAMOND DEREK MONTGOMERY	First Degree Murder	True Bill
SIDNEY GODFREY CROMPTON, ROBERT MATHIS also known as "SMOKE", and GERALD DEMONT PORTER	First Degree Murder Attempted Robbery	True Bill
LAMAR WALKER	First Degree Murder Robbery	True Bill
WILLIAM SAMOSKY and FRANK GILIBERTI	First Degree Murder Robbery Kidnapping Kidnapping	True Bill
ANTONIO HERNANDEZ	First Degree Murder	True Bill
DAVID CALVIN McGILL	Attempted First Degree Murder Robbery Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
JEFFREY ALAN COHEN	Burglary Sexual Battery Armed Robbery	True Bill
MICHAEL KELLY	First Degree Murder Attempted Armed Robbery	True Bill
LEO McKENSIE	First Degree Murder Attempted Robbery Attempted Robbery	True Bill
AMILCAR JOSE RODRIGUEZ- JIMENEZ also known as SELIMO S. GARCIA also known as JAVIER RODRIGUEZ also known as "AMILCAR" also known as "RAFAEL", and AGUEDO BORREGO-ESTRADA also known as "CACHO"	First Degree Murder First Degree Murder	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
ROBERTO ALVAREZ	First Degree Murder Robbery Burglary of Structure	True Bill
RANDALL STEVEN MOE, also known as RANDY BONVILLION, and RODNEY ALAN MOE, also known as RODNEY BONVILLION	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Kidnapping Kidnapping Sexual Battery Robbery	True Bill
THOMAS WININGER	First Degree Murder	True Bill
LUIS ORLANDO CAHUASQUI	Sexual Battery	True Bill
JAMES CRAIG	Attempted Robbery First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder	True Bill
CARL MULLINGS	First Degree Murder Attempted Robbery Possession of Firearm in Commission of a Felony	True Bill
ROOSEVELT JONES	First Degree Murder	True Bill
ROBERT LANGSTON, JR., ANTHONY CAPRICE, and FREDERICK REINHARD	First Degree Murder Kidnapping	True Bill
LOVIE JAMES McKINNEY also known as JAMES REECE, and LORENZO BROWN	First Degree Murder Attempted Armed Robbery	True Bill
ARMANDO R. JUNCO, OSIPIS FERNANDO MOREJON also known as ZAQUIRI, ERNESTO REGUANT ESQUIVEL, and AMERICO GODOLFREDO JUNCO also known as GODITO	First Degree Murder First Degree Murder Robbery Attempted First Degree Murder Trafficking in Cannabis	True Bill
VINCENT E. ROBINS, DARREN BERNARD McGEE and MICHAEL ANTHONY McGEE	Robbery Attempted Robbery Attempted First Degree Murder	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
STEVEN HOLMES	Second Degree Murder	True Bill
THOMAS McCain	First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
BUNNELL LAMAR BLACKMON and HORACE PERNELL CALLINS	Attempted First Degree Murder Attempted Armed Robbery	True Bill
LUIS VILLAFANE, and ENRIQUE BORDONABA	First Degree Murder First Degree Murder First Degree Murder Arson (First Degree)	True Bill
WILFREDO TORRES, also known as FIFE, and EDWIN RODRIGUEZ, also known as EDDIE RODRIGUEZ	First Degree Murder	True Bill
CLAUDIO FERNANDEZ	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder	True Bill
JAMES WALKER	First Degree Murder	True Bill
ROBERTO MENDOZA	Sexual Battery	True Bill
ROBERT PEAVY	Burglary Robbery First Degree Murder	True Bill
REGINALD EUGENE DOBSON and MARVIN HOWARD TAYLOR also known as PAUL LEE HENDERSON	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery	True Bill
ALEXANDER MARINO DURRIVE	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery Armed Robbery Armed Robbery Armed Robbery Armed Robbery Armed Robbery	True Bill
FRANCISCO GARCIA	First Degree Murder First Degree Murder	True Bill
JUAN PENA SALAZAR, JOSE C. DAVILA, LUIS MIGUEL CHARLES and JUAN FRANCISCO BORGES	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery	True Bill
ALBERT POLLACK	First Degree Murder	True Bill
JOSEPH EDWARD MILSON	First Degree Murder	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
DAVID DOUGLAS MARTIN	Armed Robbery Kidnapping	True Bill
RICHARD EDWARD STONE	First Degree Murder Robbery Burglary of Dwelling	True Bill
IRA LEE PICKETT and JASPER FERGUSON	First Degree Murder First Degree Arson Burglary	True Bill
JAMES WILLIAM MEADE	First Degree Murder	True Bill
JOHN HENRY ALBURY also known as "BO"	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder	True Bill
LEON MANKER, JR.	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Armed Burglary Armed Robbery	True Bill
TYRONE ALEXANDER	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery	True Bill
ANGEL de JESUS ORTEGA- TORRES	First Degree Murder	True Bill
DAVID GUS WILLIAMS	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder	True Bill
JULIO RODRIGUEZ	Kidnapping Sexual Battery	True Bill
JULIO RODRIGUEZ	Kidnapping Sexual Battery	True Bill
HAROLD HINES	First Degree Murder Robbery Robbery	True Bill
CHARLIE COBB	First Degree Murder Burglary of a Dwelling	True Bill
SANTOS TORRES and RADAME MORA	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery Armed Robbery Aggravated Assault Aggravated Assault	True Bill
FRANK GRIFFIN	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery	True Bill
FRANK GRIFFIN	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery	True Bill
FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ- SUAREZ	First Degree Murder	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
EDUARDO CABRERA also known as "EDUARDITO" and GUILLERMO PEREZ MONTERO also known as "MALANGA"	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery Armed Robbery Armed Robbery	True Bill
CURTIS FEIMSTER	First Degree Murder First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder	True Bill
FRANCISCO HERRERA	First Degree Murder	True Bill
FELICIANO LeBRON	First Degree Murder	True Bill
MANUEL SANTANA	First Degree Murder	True Bill
DANIEL HEALEY	First Degree Murder Grand Theft	True Bill
LAZARO MACIAS also known as LAZARO MACIAS POMBART, also known as PEDRO ALVAREZ	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder	True Bill
MARIO HERRAN	First Degree Murder Burglary of a Structure	True Bill
GERALD LADERMAN	First Degree Murder	True Bill
ROBERT LANGSTON, JR., ANTHONY CAPRICE, FREDERICK REINHARD, and MICHAEL CULP, also known as "TRIP"	First Degree Murder Kidnapping	True Bill
RICHARD M. HOOLAHAN	First Degree Murder	True Bill
JEFFREY STEWART	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery	True Bill
MANUEL RODRIGUEZ	Sexual Battery	True Bill
MOSES HARDEN	First Degree Murder	True Bill
GERALD RUSSELL	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder	True Bill
STEVE LORENZO SHAW	First Degree Murder Shooting into an Occupied Building	True Bill
EMMIT DE LEON MALLARD	Sexual Battery Sexual Battery Kidnapping	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
JAMES GUZMAN	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Armed Kidnapping Armed Kidnapping Sexual Battery Armed Robbery Armed Robbery	True Bill
RAYMOND CUMMINGS	First Degree Murder	True Bill
ALBERT RUSSELL FRANCIS	Armed Robbery Carrying a Concealed Firearm	True Bill
RICKY RICARDO BOYKIN	Sexual Battery Robbery Burglary	True Bill
RICKY RICARDO BOYKIN	Sexual Battery Robbery Burglary	True Bill
BERNARD LAKIN	Second Degree Murder	True Bill
SILVINO HURTADO	First Degree Murder	True Bill
MANUEL IGNACIO GOMEZ	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder	True Bill
DIANNA PATTERSON	First Degree Murder	True Bill
ARNOLD CLARK and LARRY RICKS	First Degree Murder Robbery Robbery	True Bill
CHRISTOPHER M. DABOUL	First Degree Murder	True Bill
EDWIN BROWN	First Degree Murder	True Bill
JAMES WALKER	First Degree Murder	True Bill
CHARLES D. MOODY	Armed Burglary Aggravated Battery Grand Theft	True Bill
HARRY OWENS	Attempted First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder	True Bill
JUAN LAUREANO GONZALEZ and EUGENIO MARTINEZ, also known as MUNE	First Degree Murder First Degree Murder Robbery Attempted First Degree Murder Trafficking in Cannabis Carrying a Concealed Firearm	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
VENSON SANFORD PACE	Manslaughter	True Bill
GONZALO MANUEL ANDREU	First Degree Murder	True Bill
JOHN HENRY and TERRY LEE TAYLOR	First Degree Murder Robbery Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer ("A" Deft.) Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer ("A" Deft.) Resisting Officer with Violence to his Person ("A" Deft.)	True Bill
JUAN CARLOS PEREZ	First Degree Murder	True Bill
GREGORY WILLIAMS ALBERT RUSSELL FRANCIS	Armed Robbery ("A" & "B" Defts.) Carrying a Concealed Firearm ("B" Deft.)	True Bill
HECTOR CARBALLO, also known as HECTOR CARBALLO CAMPOS	First Degree Murder Attempted Kidnapping Attempted First Degree Murder	True Bill
MIGUEL MACIAS also known as COCO	Attempted Burglary of Structure First Degree Murder	True Bill
RAUL MARTIN	First Degree Murder Attempted Kidnapping Burglary of Structure Falsely Personating Officer	True Bill
JOHN J. CARROLL	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery First Degree Murder Burglary Armed Robbery	True Bill
ELIADES HIDALGO GARCIA	First Degree Murder	True Bill
REGINALD ISAAC	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Carrying a Concealed Firearm	True Bill
VICTOR FEIMSTER	First Degree Murder	True Bill
THOMAS JOSEPH HEFFERNAN	Sexual Battery	True Bill
ORESTES S. MARTELL SERGIO ARMANDO BACALLAO ROMELIO MENESES	First Degree Murder ("A" & "B" Defts.) Robbery ("A" & "B" Defts.) Accessory After the Fact ("C" Deft. Only)	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
KENYA WILLIAMS	Attempted First Degree Murder Aggravated Assault	True Bill
ELAINE ROSENTHAL	First Degree Murder	True Bill
JOSE CARRION-VISCAY	First Degree Murder First Degree Murder	True Bill
BENJAMIN McFADDEN, JESSIE LEE JACKSON and VALANCE TERRALL HICKS	Armed Robbery Armed Robbery Burglary of Structure Carrying a Concealed Firearm	True Bill
JOHNNIE RIVER and REGINALD VERNON BROWN	Robbery Kidnapping Assault	True Bill
JESUS DIAZ	First Degree Murder	True Bill
EUGENE McFARLIN	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Aggravated Assault	True Bill
SEGUNDO CESAR MADRIGAL	First Degree Murder	True Bill
JAMES B. HEARD	Sexual Battery	True Bill
JAMES WILLIAM MEADE	First Degree Murder Sexual Battery	True Bill
JOHN EDWARD BIRD	First Degree Murder	True Bill
ARTURO LA ROSA and REINALDO RENE CUXART	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Shooting into an Occupied Dwelling or Building	True Bill
CATHERINE JOHNSON	First Degree Murder	True Bill
WINSTON JACK HENRY, also known as JUNIOR SKULL	First Degree Murder	True Bill
HECTOR JULIO MIGUELEZ also known as ISAIAS SANTIAGO FALERO	First Degree Murder Robbery	True Bill
MARIO PEREZ	Perjury	True Bill
DAVID LEE HARRIS	First Degree Murder	True Bill
EDDIE LEE ELLIS, JR.	First Degree Murder Robbery	True Bill
ROBERT LEE WHITCHARD	First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of Firearm by Convicted Felon	True Bill

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As we come to the close of our Term as Grand Jurors, the members of the Fall Term of the 1981 Dade County Grand Jury would like to express our sincere thanks to his Honor Judge Leonard Rivkind and State Attorney Janet Reno.

We are grateful to Chief Assistant State Attorney Tom Petersen. We were very fortunate to have the expert guidance and the benefit of his experience. We thank him for his expert presentations and understanding and dedication in working with the Grand Jury.

We would also like to acknowledge all of the investigative agencies for their help provided to us.

The Grand Jury was very fortunate to have the continued services of our Administrative Assistant Madeline Camp, who is highly qualified and very competent. Words cannot express our appreciation for her unfailing cooperation and thoughtfulness for us. Madeline, thanks for your ever present smile.

Our special thanks go to our Bailiff Sam Karlin for his ever necessary support and services. Sam, we will miss the refreshments.

We are pleased to have served our community. It is our belief that this work has served the best interest of all the citizens of Dade County.

During our deliberations dealing with Immigration and Narcotic Interdiction we heard from more than twenty witnesses from government and the academic community. We have been extremely impressed with the quality and commitment of the government officials we heard from. We are similarly impressed by the knowledge that is available in our academic community and we see an unlimited potential benefit in a dialogue between these two groups.

In the government sector we wish to thank Silvia Unzueta, Dade's Coordinator of Refugee Affairs, for introducing us to an overview of local and national issues. And we are similarly grateful to Linda Berkowitz, of the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and to Paul Bell of the Dade School System for their assessments of the impact of refugees upon social service and educational systems. In the area of narcotic interdiction and crime we are equally grateful to Sergeant Skip Pearson and Officer June Hawkins of the Metro-Dade Police Department. We applaud their commitment and we empathize with their frustrations. We also thank Assistant Dade Medical Examiner Dr. Charles Wetli and, particularly, Dr. David Bernstein, Director of the Public Health Trust's Trauma Services Division for his work in estimating the cost of handgun injuries.


We also express our special thanks to Robert Battard, Regional Administrator of United States Customs and to Lieutenant Ben Scott of the United States Coast Guard. These federal officials testified before a local Grand Jury without any requirement that they do so. They were of inestimable help to us and we are fortunate to have such competent individuals involved in our narcotic interdiction efforts. We also thank the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration and local law enforcement agencies for their cooperation and their input.

Academicians from both the University of Miami and Florida International University were of great help to us. We particularly thank Dr. Geoffrey Alpert for his assistance in conceptualizing and implementing our criminal justice impact study. From the University of Miami we also thank Dr. Clyde McCoy, Dr. Duane McBride and Diana Gonzalez, whose testimony and whose articles contributed greatly to our Final Report. We also thank Dr. Bruce Winick of the Law School and Dr. Howard Gitlow of the School of Business.

Florida International has clearly developed, and continues to develop, a significant body of knowledge concerning immigration and refugee issues. We are particularly grateful to Antonio Fernandez, Director of the Department of Continuing Hispanic Education, for his assistance in the implementation of the interview phase of our criminal justice impact study. We also thank Dr. Jan Luytjes for his truly impressive insights and Dr. Alex Stepick for the information regarding Haitian immigration which he provided. And we thank Dr. William Wilbanks for sharing with us the results of his work.

And last, but not least, we thank the interns and interviewers who worked in the preparation of the criminal justice impact study, specifically Rafael Martinez, Yvonne Ewers and Wilson Rodriguez. And we thank Douglas Brown for his fine work in the study of handgun proliferation.

Respectfully submitted,



James W. Bobbitt, Jr., Foreman
Dade County Grand Jury
Fall Term 1981

ATTEST:


Geraldine L. Morris
Clerk

Dated: May 11, 1982