

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF FLORIDA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DADE

SPRING TERM A.D. 1978

FINAL REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY

FILED
NOVEMBER 14, 1978

Circuit Judge Presiding

EDWARD S. KLEIN

Officers and Members of the Grand Jury

GARY OWASKI, Foreman

ROOSEVELT JOHNSON, Vice Foreman

MARIBEL MAXWELL, Clerk

SHIRLEY B. WOODWARD, Assistant Clerk

MATTHEW Y. CHENG, Treasurer

RAYMOND BITTAR

JOSEPH G. CHARLES

SABRINA KAY CHASE

PAUL G. DIXON

ANN MARIE DUSCHEN

JIMMIE DALE FOX

DAVID E. KELLY

ROBERTA S. KUTTLER

SYLVIA LUNN

WILLIE J. MANNS

ROBERT PAKULA

SOPHIE M. PLONA

DOROTHY E. ROSSANO

CLAIRE S. SHIPPEN

MARIO A. TAPANES

MIRIAM E. TORRENT

MARIA Von METZGER

CHESTER A. WOISH

State Attorney

JANET RENO

Chief Assistant State Attorneys

THOMAS K. PETERSEN

WILLIAM RICHEY

Assistant State Attorney

GEORGE YOSS

Clerk of the Circuit Court

RICHARD P. BRINKER

Administrative Assistant

MADELINE CAMP

Official Court Reporter

FRIEDMAN & LOMBARDI

Bailiff

SAM KARLIN

I N D E X

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PAGES</u>
INTRODUCTION	1-2
THE CETA TITLE VI INVESTIGATION	3-21
THE HRS FOSTER CARE INVESTIGATION	22-45
THE LITTLE HUD INVESTIGATION	46-53
CAPITAL CASES AND HANDGUNS	54
CONCLUSION	55-56
APPENDIX: CAPITAL CASES	57-60
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	61

I

INTRODUCTION

The Spring Term 1978 Grand Jury was impaneled on May 9. As Dade County's first randomly selected Grand Jury, we have developed an appreciation for our role as an historical precedent, and we brought to our tasks a diversity of backgrounds and experiences which, we believe, served us well as we addressed issues of importance to our community.

Issues raised by previous Grand Juries should be looked at anew in the context of our new composition. These issues will have to be addressed if the Grand Jury is to remain a viable institution. They are the subject of the Sixth and final section of this Report.

This Grand Jury has heard testimony and received evidence relating to the three investigations which constitute the principal sections of this Report. While each of these investigations emanate from unrelated origins, and while they deal with a variety of functions of government in Dade County, we detect here a theme which we feel unites these endeavors. And we perceive added significance in the fact that we have served at a time when the expenditure of government monies for government programs is being looked upon more critically than at any point in time in our recent past.

The CETA Title VI investigation attempts to measure the impact here of the federal government's public employment program. The HRS Foster Care investigation endeavors to assess the accomplishments of the State of Florida's effort to deal sensibly and sensitively with the status, and futures, of abandoned or neglected children.

The Little Hud investigation deals with federally funded public housing in Dade County.

Collectively, and separately, these investigations teach that should government programs fail, their failure will most acutely affect those among us who are most powerless, in these instances the poor and the very young.

Unless such programs are closely monitored, failures to address such social concerns will inevitably cause a crisis of confidence among those of us who suffer the financial burdens of governmental taxation during a period of inflation. This will cause us to contemplate the dismantling of the programs involved. And this, in turn, will result in the perpetuation of the social ills which the programs may have failed to abate.

The Grand Jury believes that our community must persevere in its attempts to address the issues dealt with in this report. We do believe that the community must increase its vigilance over government expenditure of funds as well as its sensitivity to the problems being addressed. This is, of course, a principal role of the Grand Jury within local government.

Finally, this Grand Jury has heard testimony resulting in indictments in 43 capital cases. The Appendix to this Report includes a list of these cases. The Fifth section of the Report presents observations deemed of importance by the Grand Jury which relate to these capital indictments.

II

THE CETA TITLE VI INVESTIGATION

A. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, Title VI: Cyclical and Structural Unemployment

The Final Report of the Fall Term 1977 Grand Jury included a history of the evolution of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA), including definitions of its various Titles. Also presented in that Report was a chronicle of the development of CETA in South Florida and a description of the structure and operation of the South Florida CETA Consortium (SFCC). The reader is referred to that Report for this background material, which was presented in the context of the previous Grand Jury's evaluation of CETA Title I training programs in Dade County.

This Grand Jury elected to extend the CETA Investigation of Title I Programs to the operation of the Title VI Public Employment Program and this Report presents our conclusions and our recommendations. Our decision to extend the investigation was based upon our recognition of the importance of the CETA Title VI Program to our economy and levels of unemployment, in the context of repeated media reports of abuses within the Title VI Program.

A brief history of the evolution and objectives of Title VI is a prerequisite to any attempt to evaluate its implementation. This, in turn, requires a rudimentary understanding of the nature of unemployment in our economy.

In 1974, when the public employment concept was originally integrated into CETA's various approaches to unemployment, our national economy was characterized by a recession which had caused

a rise in the unemployment rate from approximately 5% to an unprecedented 8%. Those rendered jobless by the recession included not only the poor and unskilled, who had historically represented a predominance of the unemployed, but rather included the skilled and semi-skilled as well. The ranks of the unemployed, to a greater extent than at any time since the beginning of the Second World War, were swelled by those who were unable to obtain employment due to the effect of a recessionary cycle of the economy rather than to their own vocational limitations. These otherwise employable jobless are defined as the cyclically unemployed, as opposed to the structurally, or chronically, unemployed. The latter, structural, category of unemployed are characterized by educational and skill level disabilities which transcend the cycles of the economy. They represent a chronic stratum of jobless whose existence has been of continuing concern to national policy makers, irrespective of the temporary state of the economy.

The original CETA Public Employment Program, designed to address the immediate crisis of the cyclically unemployed, was first enacted under Title II of the Act. Title II defined eligibility for CETA public employment jobs without reference to previous income levels and without requiring more than minimal periods of unemployment in order to qualify. This was, of course, consistent with an effort to reemploy those who had lost their jobs due to the temporary recessionary cycle of the economy. The jobs created under Title II, and under the early Title VI enactment which contained essentially the same criteria, were jobs within existing government agencies. These jobs included a broad range of government employment functions calling for a wide range of skills consistent with the varied abilities of the cyclically unemployed.

Then as now, however, the maximum salary made available by Title II and Title VI was \$10,000 per year. So as to enhance the effort to reemploy those meeting CETA criteria, the regulations permitted the employing units of local government to subsidize the Federal \$10,000 base without a maximum limit.

By late 1976 the recessionary cycle had ended and the national unemployment rate had returned to an acceptable level of approximately 6%. A new Administration and new national economic priorities resulted in a renewed concern over the problem of structural, chronic, unemployment as the numbers of the cyclically unemployed diminished. This concern emanated from data indicating that previous Federal efforts had failed to reduce unemployment among minorities and the young. The unemployment rate among Blacks, for example, rose during 1976-1977 to 14.5%, representing the highest rate since World War II.

While Title II and early Title VI guidelines de-emphasized previous income levels, the new 1977 Title VI eligibility criteria required near poverty level prior income levels as well as fifteen consecutive weeks of unemployment as prerequisite to eligibility for a Title VI job. This redefinition of eligibility criteria was a drastic one and the client population intended to be served by the Carter Administration legislation, and its implementing regulations, was clearly identified as a population characterized by chronic joblessness due to a lack of skill and educational levels which limited access to the job market irrespective of the cycle of the economy.

The public service jobs created by the 1977 Carter CETA Act came to be termed Stimulus jobs, as distinguished from the Sustaining jobs created by the earlier Title II and Title VI provisions.

The Stimulus jobs were defined as temporary, one year, projects designed to achieve finite goals in a finite period of time while providing training in specific skills to the participants. These skills would theoretically enable the participating chronically unemployed to become competitively employable in the private sector or in the non-federally subsidized public sector.

Meanwhile, those who had been previously hired by the Sustaining legislation were perpetuated in their CETA positions and these positions were refunded independently of the new Stimulus jobs. No time limit was placed upon the existence of the Sustaining Title II and Title VI positions, and while in theory even those positions had been originally conceived of as transitional, with the expectation being that those holding the positions would be absorbed into non-CETA employment, no provisions were enacted which would encourage such a process.

In mid-1977 the South Florida CETA Consortium (SFCC) was advised by the Labor Department that it was to become the recipient of \$50,000,000 in Title VI Stimulus Funds. These funds were to be allocated to newly created Stimulus projects by October. The SFCC staff which was to plan for the creation of these projects and the allocation of these funds, which nearly tripled the amount of CETA funding previously administered by the SFCC, was not increased. The result appears to have been the allocation of Stimulus funds without a planning process which should have incorporated the distinction between the objectives of Sustaining and of Stimulus legislation.

This unprecedented increase in CETA funds during 1977, as well as the Title II and Title VI funding levels which preceded it, is presented in the following chart:

	<u>FY 1974</u>	<u>FY 1975</u>	<u>FY 1976</u>
Title I	978,625	9,123,162	13,079,810
Title II	919,273	1,222,397	11,898,810
Title III	108,218	3,127,162	3,796,727
Title VI	<u>0</u>	<u>18,534,569</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	2,006,116	32,007,290	28,775,347

	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Title I	13,783,159	36,964,756
Title II	14,480,789	27,912,269
Title III	737,785	13,191,574
Title VI	<u>63,546,501</u>	<u>82,081,070</u>
Total	92,548,234	160,149,669

The Stimulus Title VI funds which were allocated in Dade County represented more than the combined total of Sustaining Title II and Title VI funds which had been administered by the SFCC during the previous three years.

The previous Grand Jury evaluated the state at that time of the SFCC, which was the entity entrusted with planning and allocation, in its Final Report as follows:

During that period the subcommittees, and the Manpower Council, gradually ceased to function. The community input contemplated by CETA legislation came to be delegated to a small group of individuals who staffed the Council's Executive Committee. Furthermore, a significant number of the members of the Executive Committee appeared to have had vested interests in the funding and refunding processes, and often sat simultaneously on the Planning Council and on one or more of its committees. The initial decisions then were made based upon the self interest of at least some of the members of the Executive Committee, as well as those of the SFCC Administration, which appears to have made funding decisions based largely upon political considerations. The Grand Jury also received testimony that the SFCC Administration felt itself politically obligated to respond favorably to numerous requests from officials of County Government to place acquaintances of these officials in positions with the SFCC. Funding recommendations made by the SFCC Administration and the Executive Council were then transmitted to the Consortium members, who, it would appear, routinely ratified these decisions.

The remainder of this Report chronicles what ensued. In retrospect this chronicle appears to have been inevitable. For a community to become the recipient of \$50,000,000, without the time or resources to plan for the rational allocation of these funds, is to invite failure. But likewise, this Grand Jury questions the wisdom of a federal agency which disburses \$50,000,000 to a local entity without assuring the monitoring of the capability of that agency's implementation of the objectives of the funding legislation. While it is not difficult to appreciate the enthusiasm of local government at the prospect of receiving and disbursing \$50,000,000 in public employment monies, it is difficult to condone the manner in which the funds were allocated.

B. CETA Title VI: The Grand Jury Study.

In order to attempt to assess the impact of Title VI, this Grand Jury selected a random sample of Title VI job holders for interview. This sample was chosen and a total of 394 interviews were conducted. Of these, 219 persons held Sustaining Title VI jobs and 175 occupied Stimulus positions.

The following three tables present the sex, age and race of those interviewed:

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Sustaining</u>	<u>Stimulus</u>
M	133 (61%)	99 (57%)
F	86 (39%)	76 (43%)
<u>Age</u>		
18-25	50)	52)
25-30	38)	29)
30-35	27) -(66%)	31) -(73%)
36-40	28)	16)
41-45	17	14
46-50	16	9
51-55	18	11
56-60	16	9
61-65	5	2
65-70	3	1
70 and over		1
<u>Race</u>		
White	64 (31%)	42 (24%)
Black	70 (34%)	94 (53%)
Latin	69 (33%)	34 (19%)
Other	3	7

(1) Findings: The Eligibility Issue.

The questionnaire which was administered to the interview sample included questions relating to the eligibility, based upon length of unemployment and previous family income, of the Title VI job holders at the time they became CETA employees.

The interviews revealed consistently that approximately 15% of those interviewed did not appear to meet the criteria which should have been prerequisite to their placement in Title VI positions. While generally based upon the interviewee's own admission as to ineligibility during the course of the interview, eligibility of the sample was further verified by use of a computer technique developed by the State Attorney's Office. This technique involves a rather simple procedure which utilizes income and employment data maintained on-line by the Florida State Employment Service, Unemployment Compensation Division. Of the 394 persons interviewed, 63 (16%) were determined ineligible. The names of these persons were transmitted to the SFCC which confirmed ineligibility in 43 of the cases and subsequently discharged these Title VI employees.

The sizeable number of ineligible Title VI job holders in the sample, coupled with the relatively simple procedure available to verify conformity to Title VI eligibility guidelines, led the State Attorney's Office to inquire into the existing verification procedures for Title VI applicants. It was discovered that no such procedures existed. While the SFCC believed that the Florida State Employment Service (FSES) was verifying applicant eligibility (a responsibility it had assumed at the outset of Title VI funding), the FSES had, in fact, altogether ceased this function, for reasons that are unclear, in 1976. Since that time the eligibility representations of Title VI job applicants had been taken at face value and without verification.

Once having been made aware of these facts the SFCC, to its credit, undertook the tedious process of reverification of all 6,000 Title VI job holders by means of the same computer technique. This process is now underway as the result of a joint effort on the part of the State Attorney's Office and the SFCC. The Grand Jury urges that the process be completed as expeditiously as possible. The Grand Jury also leaves to the State Attorney the question as to whether misrepresentations as to original eligibility should give rise to criminal prosecution in those cases of abuses to be revealed by the recertification procedure.

Also as a result of the revelations with respect to eligibility in the Grand Jury Study, the computer verification procedure used has now been incorporated into the certification process for all new Title VI job applicants.

The importance of a credible procedure for assuring applicant eligibility for Title VI employment positions cannot be overemphasized. Even a ten percent rate of ineligibility for Title VI job holders, when projected to the six thousand CETA public service employees in Dade County, represents six million dollars in CETA funds each year. And since most Title VI employees hold their CETA jobs for a number of years, the effect of the wastage becomes cumulative.

II. Findings: Title VI Stimulus and the Participation of the Chronic Unemployed.

The ultimate objective of the Title VI Stimulus Program is to create employment opportunities for the chronic unemployed, and the ultimate test of the effectiveness of Dade County's CETA Stimulus Program would therefore require a measure of that program's success in serving those in our community who are structurally

unemployed, and in placing them in positions designed to provide them with marketable job skills. An analysis of the data emanating from the Grand Jury Study, and a comparison of the Stimulus job holders to the Sustaining employees (who would not be expected to exhibit characteristics associated with chronic unemployment, such as poverty, and the lack of educational attainment and vocational skills), raises a serious question as to whether the SFCC Stimulus Program, to date, has achieved this objective.

The racial composition of the Stimulus population indicates that while the Sustaining interview population is quite equally divided with respect to race, the Stimulus population is characterized by a significantly higher percentage of Blacks (53%), and that the number of Whites interviewed is considerably lower. Also, the Stimulus group is characterized by a higher percentage of job holders between the ages of 18 and 25 (30%) as compared to the Sustaining population (23%).

These differences would appear to indicate that the Stimulus Title VI jobs were filled by a significant percentage of persons in the age and race groupings which contain the highest incidence of structural unemployment. However, other data pertaining to the Stimulus interview group were not consistent with the profile of the structurally unemployed.

The following table presents the highest attained educational level of the interview population:

<u>Education</u>	<u>Sustaining</u>	<u>Stimulus</u>
Less than H.S. graduate	46 (21%)	37 (21%)
H.S. graduate	83 (38%)	49 (28%)
Some college	27	26
A.A. Degree	20	21
4 Year Degree	24	33
Graduate or Profes.School	17	9
	-(41%)	-(51%)
	-(19%)	-(24%)

The percentage of high school drop-outs is the same in both the Sustaining and Stimulus populations. Yet what is surprising is that the percentage of persons having college educations is higher in the Stimulus population (51%) than in the Sustaining population (41%). That the percentage of persons having advanced educational levels is high in the Sustaining population is not unexpected. Sustaining jobs may be expected to be occupied by persons of advanced educational levels. The fact that the educational levels in the Stimulus group are as high, and even higher, indicates an apparent failure to reach the structurally unemployed population in the community, which one would expect to be characterized by a considerably higher percentage of drop-outs and a considerably lower percentage of persons of advanced education.

The following tables present the Title VI jobs now held by those interviewed as well as the last, non-CETA, jobs held by them:

<u>Present Employment (CETA)</u>	<u>Sustaining</u>	<u>Stimulus</u>
Secretary/Clerk Typist	43 (21%)	19 (12%)
Maintenance	26 (13%)	6 (4%)
Interviewers	11 (5%)	17 (9%)
Social Workers	16 (8%)	27 (16%)
Parks Workers	18 (9%)	10 (6%)
Construction (Skilled)	10 (5%)	10 (6%)
Labor (Unskilled)	10 (5%)	11 (7%)
Sanitation	6 (3%)	3 (2%)
Driver	13 (6%)	6 (4%)
Recreation Work	2 (1%)	15 (9%)
Supervisors	4 (2%)	8 (5%)
Administrators	7 (3%)	8 (5%)
Mechanics	3 (1%)	2 (1%)
Graphic Workers	7 (2%)	2 (12%)
Accountants	17 (8%)	4 (2%)
Miscellaneous	16	19

<u>Prior Employment (non-CETA)</u>	<u>Sustaining</u>	<u>Stimulus</u>
Secretary/Clerk Typist	33 (15%)	21 (12%)
Maintenance	9 (4%)	11 (6%)
Interviewers	6 (3%)	5 (3%)
Social Workers	7 (3%)	8 (5%)
Parks Workers	0	5 (3%)
Construction (Skilled)	22 (10%)	10 (6%)
Labor (Unskilled)	32 (15%)	29 (17%)
Sanitation	4 (2%)	2 (1%)
Driver	10 (5%)	7 (4%)
Recreation	3 (1%)	1
Management (Sales, Agent)	38 (17%)	25 (14%)
Teacher	6 (3%)	8 (5%)
Miscellaneous	39 (18%)	26 (15%)
None (unknown)	10 (5%)	15 (9%)

The data presented in the tables would seem to be consistent with the educational level data presented previously. In particular, it should be noted that the percentage of jobs calling for advanced education or previously developed skills (Interviewers, Social Workers, skilled Construction Workers, Supervisors, Administrators, Accountants) among CETA job holders represents 32% of the Sustaining population and 43% of the Stimulus population.

This data would again appear to be inconsistent with the overall objective of Stimulus Programs of creating positions for the structurally unemployed.

The interview population, and in particular the Stimulus interview population, seems to indicate the existence of an over-abundance of jobs which call for pre-existing skills.

It is also apparently significant that the percentage of persons (33%) in the Stimulus population who previously held jobs associated with the cyclically unemployed (Interviewers, Social Workers, skilled Construction Workers, Managerial jobs and Teachers) is nearly the same percentage as in the Sustaining population (36%). The fact that the prior employment profile of the Sustaining and Stimulus populations is quite similar would seem to indicate that the backgrounds of persons in the Stimulus

positions are quite similar to those in the Sustaining positions. This would again appear to indicate that the Stimulus positions are occupied by significant numbers of the cyclically, and not the structurally, unemployed.

Thus, notwithstanding the reorientation of Title VI in mid-1977, this data suggests that the profile of CETA Stimulus job holders continues to be more consistent with the cyclically unemployed than with the hard-core unemployed. One salient reason for this appears to be the fact that the Stimulus Programs created since mid-1977 in a great many instances are designed to employ persons already possessing marketable skills. There appears to be an insufficiency of programs designed for those without such skills.

III. Findings: Title VI Sustaining and the Rotation and Supplementation Issues.

While Title VI Stimulus Programs appear to exhibit shortcomings in their effort to serve the chronic unemployed, Title VI Sustaining positions also raise issues which must be recognized, and addressed, if the SFCC program is to succeed. Specifically, these issues involve, first, the original CETA legislation's implicit assumption that public service jobs were intended as temporary positions for those individuals in those jobs, designed to provide employment until the recessionary cycle ended or until the job holder could be integrated into the private sector or the non federally subsidized public sector. A second, and related, issue involves the right of the employing agency to supplement the maximum Federal salary of \$10,000 per year.

The following chart presents the time periods during which the Grand Jury Study interviewees obtained their CETA Title VI jobs:

<u>Date of CETA Employment</u>	<u>Sustaining</u>
1/1/78 - Present	20
7/1/77 - 12/31/77	24
1/1/77 - 6/30/77	44
7/1/76 - 12/31/76	14
1/1/76 - 6/30/76	19
7/1/75 - 12/31/75	41
1/1/75 - 6/30/75	32
Prior to 1/ 1/75	13

The fact that 42% of the Sustaining sample were employed in their present Title VI jobs prior to July of 1975 indicates that the same persons have remained in these jobs for considerable periods of time. This would appear to be inconsistent with the concept of CETA public service employment as temporary in nature. Although Title VI Sustaining jobs are themselves no longer contemplated by CETA legislation as temporary, their permanent occupancy by particular individuals is not now, nor was it ever, contemplated. For local government to retain the same individuals year after year in Title VI positions, without attempts to place them in locally funded positions, contradicts CETA's intent and prohibits access to these positions by other unemployed individuals who meet Title VI criteria.

The five units of government which compose the SFCC do not appear to have instituted mechanisms for the rotation of Title VI Sustaining job holders into non-subsidized employment. This is not surprising since it is in the self interest of local government agencies to maintain stability in their staffing patterns. This is one example of how the interests of local government are at odds with the intent of CETA legislation.

A related issue, also symptomatic of the inconsistency between CETA's intent and the interests of the employing local unit of government, involves the right of the employing agency to supplement the basic federal CETA salary.

Forty-one Dade County CETA Title VI employees, and forty-two of their City of Miami counterparts, earn in excess of \$15,000 per year. Eighteen County CETA employees, and twelve in the City of Miami, earn in excess of \$17,000 per year. Many of these individuals hold Stimulus positions and it is difficult to conceptualize such highly paid employees as conforming to the profile of the chronic unemployed described earlier in this Report. The remainder occupy Sustaining positions. In these cases it seems almost equally difficult to understand why skill levels which attract such generous salaries fail to result in the employees' absorption into non-subsidized positions.

The CETA legislation recently enacted by Congress addresses each of these problem areas with respect to future Title VI job holders. The legislation limits the maximum level of a local supplement to a CETA employee's salary to \$13,200 and limits a length of time a person may hold a public service job to 18 months out of any five year period. It will remain for local units of government to institute corresponding retroactive measures designed to enhance the conformity of local programs to CETA's philosophy.

IV. Findings: The Nepotism and Outreach Issues.

CETA regulations provide that no employing agency may hire a person under Title VI "if a member of his or her immediate family is engaged in an administrative capacity for the same grantee or its sub-grantees, contractors, or employing agencies." "Person in an administrative capacity" is defined so as to include program or agency administrators as well as any elected or appointed officials possessing any responsibility for obtaining CETA funding. "Member of the immediate family" includes in-laws as well as blood relative.

The Labor Department interpretation of these provisions is an extremely broad one, treating the five governmental units comprising the SFCC as one entity. This interpretation prohibits, to use an example, the niece of a Monroe County Councilman from obtaining a CETA Title VI job with the City of Hialeah, irrespective of the fact that the applicant fully qualifies under Title VI guidelines, and despite the fact that the Councilman had absolutely no knowledge of the fact his niece applied for a job with CETA. The SFCC has taken issue with the Labor Department's interpretation of these provisions.

In the context of this Labor Department interpretation, many technical violations of its terms may occur which do not involve wrongdoing on the part of the applicant or the related official.

The media's attention to the nepotism question is fully justified in cases in which an official's relative obtains a job as a result of the familial relationship, and particularly when the applicant does not legitimately meet CETA guidelines. The SFCC has redesigned its application forms to include an attestation by the applicant to the effect that he or she is aware, and in conformity with, the nepotism regulations. This is one of a number of positive steps taken by the SFCC staff in recent months.

In fact, the nepotism issue represents but one facet of a larger issue which involves CETA's efforts at identifying and recruiting the unemployed in our community.

The following table presents data reflecting the manner by which the CETA job holders in the sample were referred to their present CETA jobs:

<u>Referral Source</u>	<u>Sustaining</u>	<u>Stimulus</u>
Fla. State Employment	45 (21%)	73 (42%)
Media	15 (7%)	5 (3%)
Friend	40	17
Relative	5 } -(21%)	1 } -(10%)
Manpower Office	72 (33%)	48 (27%)
Other	32	27
None (Unknown)	9	4

As might be expected, Florida State Employment and Dade County Manpower Offices are the principle referral sources to CETA jobs.

What appears significant, however, is the fact that 21% of the Sustaining job holders, and 10% of the Stimulus job holders, were referred to their CETA jobs by friends or relatives. At the same time, only 7% of Sustaining job holders, and 3% of Stimulus job holders, learned of the existence of their jobs through the media. Since much of the data in this Report suggests that CETA Stimulus Programs have failed to reach the structurally unemployed, a possible solution may be the increased use of the media or other outreach methods in communicating CETA job information. To fail to create an equitable system for the dissemination of CETA job information will perpetuate an advantage accruing to those who have access to the employing agency staffing needs, to the detriment of the hardcore unemployed who lack such access.

For CETA, and particularly Title VI Stimulus, to succeed will require a new attention to outreach. It is not enough that the existence of CETA jobs is communicated by display in traditional government offices. The structurally unemployed often do not have access to this information and the SFCC has an obligation to disseminate job information into the community and in particular to those parts of the community in which chronic employment is most prevalent.

C. Conclusions and Recommendations.

Dade County's Title VI Public Employment Program has had a beneficial impact upon unemployment in our community. There is also no question but that the continued existence of Title VI funding is an imperative. Yet while Title VI has had a positive impact, this Grand Jury observes that the Program's history here has been characterized by a lack of planning, poor management and a failure on the part of local government to implement the Program in a manner consistent with the CETA's legislation objectives.

This Grand Jury has found strong indications that the Title VI Stimulus Program has not impacted upon the structurally unemployed. The Title VI Sustaining Program, for its part, has failed to provide a means or an incentive to move participants into unsubsidized employment. Both programs are characterized by substantial numbers of actually ineligible participants occupying CETA jobs, to the detriment of those unemployed who in fact do meet program criteria.

To attribute responsibility for these failures is no small task. To some extent the fault lies with the CETA legislation itself. Its failure to have earlier provided for a ceiling on local supplements to Title VI salaries or a maximum length of time one may remain in a Title VI job have contributed to the problems discussed in this Report.

The SFCC, and the voting members of the Consortium, are at fault for not having planned and implemented 1977-1978 Stimulus Programs better adapted to the needs of the chronic unemployed and for having failed to create a procedure for the identification of ineligible participants.

But in the final analysis, liability rests with those officials of government whose responsibility it should have been

to address the issues touched upon in this Report, and who should have bridged the sizeable gap separating the objectives of CETA legislation from the interests of those local units of government employing Title VI participants.

It is the objective of Title VI to employ the poor and the unskilled, to provide them with skills and to cycle them into unsubsidized unemployment. It is a conflicting interest of local government, on the other hand, to staff its agencies with persons possessing respectable work histories and to maintain staff stability by minimizing employee turnover. It should come as no surprise, then, that the employing agencies of government will in practice tend to implement Title VI programs in a manner which will not be consistent with CETA's goals and with the interests of the unskilled unemployed. For this not to occur will require both an acknowledgment of the inconsistent objectives as well as the creation of the means for reconciling them.

This Grand Jury, as did the last, considers the new administrative staff at the South Florida CETA Consortium competent and dedicated to positive change within the agency. The County Manager is likewise to be commended for his personal commitment to reform.

Yet in recent weeks, the Grand Jury notes, funding decisions for the 1978-1979 year have been made by the Consortium members which continue to conflict with the goals of Title VI. On the very day this Report is written, for example, a scanning of the FSES listing of currently available new CETA Title VI jobs offers positions for creative writers, ceramicists, weavers, social workers, violinists, pianists and poetry and dance instructors. One wonders what impact those monies will have

upon those without job skills or education in our community. One also wonders where responsibility for such poor planning lies.

Finally, the Grand Jury would make the following specific recommendations:

(1) In the future, no Title VI Programs should be funded which call for experiential or educational backgrounds that are not consistent with the experiential and educational levels of the chronically unemployed. SFCC staff should not recommend the Consortium fund Programs unless they conform to this profile and Consortium members should heed staff recommendations and should fund only these types of programs.

(2) In making decisions regarding cutbacks in programs due to reduced funding in the 1978-1979 funding year, cutbacks should occur in those Title VI positions which call for experiential or educational levels which are not consistent with the profile of the chronically unemployed.

(3) Local regulations should be adopted to apply to the present occupants of Title VI Sustaining positions which are consistent with the new federal legislation. The new legislation provides that anyone who has held their present Sustaining Title VI positions for in excess of eighteen months should not be retained in that position beyond September 30, 1979. We also recommend that no present occupant of any Title VI job locally supplemented to in excess of \$13,200 should be retained in that position beyond the same date.

(4) The recertification process for all present Title VI employees should be completed by no later than February 1, 1979.

III

THE HRS FOSTER CARE INVESTIGATION

A. Foster Care in Dade County: A Background

Dade County's Foster Care Program, administered by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, is the product of an evolutionary process which parallels changing perceptions nationally as to how best to care for abandoned or neglected children. In the great majority of foster care cases the natural parents of the children are alive, but unable to perform parental roles. Nearly half of the children in foster care have been placed there because of the neglect, abuse or exploitation of the natural parents. The remainder have been removed from their biological parents for a variety of reasons which have rendered those parents unable, or unwilling, to care for their offspring.

Historically such children, those orphaned and deserted, were placed in institutions, or asylums. A reaction to conditions in those institutions, several decades ago, resulted in de-emphasizing institutionalization and the emergence of foster care programs. Nationally, by 1933, more than 100,000 homeless children were living with foster parents as compared to 145,000 living in institutions. And by 1965 the trend toward foster family care had become irreversible. More than 200,000 children were living with foster parents, compared with less than 100,000 in institutions.

In theory the foster care concept affords a more humane environment for a child to live in than did the institutional method of care it replaced. Yet the foster care programs present a variety of problems which must be addressed in order for the

children in such programs to be provided the care and nurturing that they deserve and should expect. This Grand Jury Report attempts to assess Dade County's foster care program so that its particular weaknesses might be candidly identified and addressed.

In Dade County the number of children in foster care has increased dramatically in recent years. Children who in the past had been characterized as "in need of supervision" (CINS), and regarded as delinquent rather than dependent, since 1976, have been redefined as dependent and thus eligible for foster care. And institutions such as Kendall and Parkway, which housed dependent children, have been phased out of existence, resulting in an increased demand for foster homes.

Yet our foster care program has, ironically, experienced the same lack of attention and of commitment as the children it serves. The result is a program which has been, at best, static in its procedures and in its ability to carry out its responsibility to the children in foster care.

B. The Grand Jury Investigation

The Grand Jury's interest in Dade County's Foster Care Program initially arose in the context of manifestly inappropriate placements of foster care children.

Initial, and publicized, instances of improper foster placements involved the placing of male foster children in the homes of single homosexual parents and of subsequent sexual assaults upon these foster children. In one tragic such case, a sixteen year old foster child, who had been involved in several such incidents, committed suicide by placing an electrical cord to his heart during an early phase of this investigation.

Other incidents surfaced which reflected adversely upon HRS's diligence in the selection and screening of foster homes and in the supervision of foster children once they had been placed. One three year old child was entrusted to the care of nineteen year old foster parents. This child's arms and legs were fractured as the result of physical abuse by the foster parents and the child was encased in a body cast. The child was not immediately removed from the home and the investigation of the incident was entrusted to a student intern who responded by preparing a one-half page report. In other instances foster children were placed in homes despite repeated reports of suspected child abuse in those homes.

It would be unjust to generally condemn an entire program based upon isolated, albeit serious, reported abuses. Yet these reports made it quite apparent that the need for a comprehensive evaluation of Dade County's Foster Care Program exists. This Grand Jury Report attempts to initiate such an assessment.

C. The Grand Jury Investigation: The Foster Home Study.

(1) Foster Care in Dade County

An examination of all current HRS foster care placements in Dade County reveals the following characteristics:

<u>RACE</u>			<u>SEX</u>		
WHITE	272	(30%)	MALE	499	(55%)
BLACK	569	(63%)	FEMALE	413	(45%)
LATIN	68	(7%)			

<u>AGE</u>						
		<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>		<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Less than	1	32	4%	10	43	5%
	1	53	6%	11	46	6%
	2	55	6%	12	57	6%
	3	36	5%	13	62	7%
	4	31	3%	14	68	7%
	5	33	4%	15	64	7%
	6	43	5%	16	62	7%
	7	34	4%	17	54	6%
	8	34	4%	18	40	4%
	9	60	7%			

The low number of Latin foster children is at least in part attributable to the existence of a separate Cuban Refugee Assistant Foster Care Program, also administered by HRS.

The next chart presents the number of children in the various foster homes:

Number of Children (FC) per Foster Home (FH)

No. FC in FH	No. FH	%FH	Total FC	%FC
1	103	34%	103	11%
2	57	19%	118	13%
3	39	13%	117	13%
4	41	13%	164	18%
5	28	9%	140	16%
6	27	8%	162	18%
7	5	2%	35	5%
8	6	2%	48	5%
9	1	-	9	1%
	307	100%	903	100%

What appears to be of significance in the above table is the large number of foster children placed in foster homes housing five or more foster children. While HRS guidelines attempt to limit placements of foster children to homes of five or more, the data reveals that 45% of all foster children are placed in such homes. These numbers are exclusive of natural children already in the foster homes.

The following table presents the numbers of foster children, by race and by number of foster children in the foster homes. This table includes all foster children in mixed homes, as well as in anglo, black or latin homes:

No. FC in FH	Total % All FC	WH. NO. (%)	BK. NO. (1%)	SP. NO. (%)
1	11%	40 (15%)	47 (8%)	16 (22%)
2	13%	45 (17%)	69 (12%)	12 (17%)
3	13%	34 (12%)	68 (12%)	6 (8%)
4	18%	51 (19%)	103 (18%)	9 (13%)
5	16%	32 (12%)	96 (17%)	7 (10%)
6	18%	51 (19%)	85 (16%)	14 (20%)
7	5%	2 (1%)	32 (6%)	1 (1%)
8	5%	13 (5%)	55 (10%)	4 (6%)
9	1%	1 -	6 (1%)	2 (3%)
		269	561	71

It is apparent that many more foster children are crowded into larger homes than HRS intends. This phenomenon is particularly apparent in the case of Black foster children, of whom half are in placements with five or more children. The data appears to indicate clearly the need for larger numbers of smaller foster homes, with particular emphasis upon the needs of Black foster children.

(2) The Grand Jury Study: Methodology.

So as to better comprehend the effectiveness of the HRS Foster Care Program, the Grand Jury selected a random sample of seventy foster homes and a total of 146 foster children in those homes for analysis.

Ten students from the Barry College and Florida International University Schools of Social Work were recruited for the purpose of extracting objective data from the files of the sample, and for the purpose of conducting personal interviews of foster parents and their foster children in fifty of these homes. Questionnaires were designed for this purpose and the files were researched and interviews conducted during the month of October.

The following sections of this report present the study findings in the respective contexts of the foster children, the foster parents, and the HRS caseworkers assigned to supervise these placements.

(3) Study Findings: The Foster Children.

The principal observations derived from the data, relative to the children in foster care, are observations not readily translated to charts and tables.

What emerges, first of all, is a collective portrait of children who have experienced physical and mental deprivation and

abuse at the hands of their natural parents. These are children who often must bear the emotional, and physical, scars of mistreatment for the remainder of their lives. As one might expect, foster children collectively exhibit a significantly greater incidence of behavioral problems and emotional maladjustment than do their more fortunate peers who have had the benefit of stable childhoods in the homes of natural parents. One girl among the sample, for example, was born with normal intelligence and without physical defects. She is now blind and permanently retarded due to brain damage inflicted by a natural parent who beat her head against a wall while she was an infant.

In addition to mental and physical damage suffered at the hands of natural parents, this collective portrait of children in foster care also reveals a much higher incidence of mental retardation and of other mental and physical defects with which these children were born. Such children, as might be expected, are more likely to be discarded by natural parents than would be children without defects.

The following table presents the original reasons for the commitment to foster care of the 146 children in the study sample:

	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Physical Abuse by Natural Parents	18	12%
Abandoned by Natural Parents	31	21%
Neglect by Natural Parents	58	40%
Mental Illness of Natural Parents	10	7%
Incarceration of Natural Parents	6	4%
Miscellaneous	<u>23</u>	<u>16%</u>
	146	100%

The tables below present various characteristics of these
146 children:

<u>Age</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Sex</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Less than 1	3	Male	69	47%
1	6	Female	77	53%
2	10			
3	7			
4	5			
5	8			
6	5	<u>Race</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
7	3	Black	87	60%
8	5	White	58	39%
9	7	Other	1	1%
10	10			
11	6			
12	8			
13	10			
14	14			
15	9			
16	11			
17	8			
18	6			
Over 18	7			

Mental or Physical Disability

<u>Type</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
None	80	55%
Mental Retardation	17	12%
Physical Handicaps	10	6%
Slow Learners	4	3%
Emotional Disorders	35	24%

Length of Time in Foster Care

	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Less than 1 year	43	30%
1-2 years	18	12%
2-3 years	14	10%
3-4 years	6	4%
4-5 years	13	9%
5-6 years	3	2%
6-7 years	9	6%
7-8 years	2	1%
8-9 years	8	5%
9-10 years	3	2%
More than 10 years	27	19%
	<u>146</u>	<u>100%</u>

Number of Foster Placements, Including Present Home

	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
1	80	56%
2	38	27%
3	12	8%
4	6	4%
5	3	2%
6	3	2%
7 or more	2	1%

26%

17%

The data describes a group of children with turbulent personal histories as well as with a high incidence of genetic or acquired mental or physical disorders. The special problems of this group obviously require specialized care and treatment. This, in turn, is the responsibility of the foster parents to whom the children are entrusted as well as of those social workers who are responsible for the placements and the supervision of those placements.

A second dimension which emerges from the data is indicative of a dichotomy within the foster care program. For many children foster care is merely a temporary condition, and at that a relatively stable one. In theory this is the intended purpose of foster care, the providing of a temporary placement intended to bridge a gap in time until the child may be returned to its natural parents or until a suitable adoption can be arranged. And of the sample, 61 children, or 42%, had been in foster care for less than two years.

Yet for many other children the theory did not work. Fifty-two children, or 36% of the sample, have been in foster care for more than five years. Twenty-six children, representing 17% of the sample, have been in three or more different foster homes while in foster care. One boy in the sample has been in 18 different foster homes in a period of six years. A girl has been in seven homes in seven years.

Thus while for some children the theory of foster care as a temporary expedient proves to be reality, for a great many others it does not. And for those children foster care is a permanent status and spans literally all of childhood and adolescence. And too often this period is characterized by a troubling rotation of foster placements and foster parents.

(4) Study Findings: The Foster Parents

There are 339 foster homes in Dade County presently licensed by HRS. As indicated earlier in this Report, the homes range in the number of foster children within them from one child to nine. Twenty-one percent of the homes, housing 45% of the foster children, have within them five or more foster children.

The process by which one becomes a foster parent involves an initial application followed by the applicant's attendance at a series of three group meetings. The purpose of these meetings appears to be a dual one. On the one hand the responsibilities of foster parenthood are explained. At the same time, HRS staff ostensibly make observations relative to the suitability of the applicants. This, in turn, is followed by an inspection visit to the applicants' home and interviews of the family.

The process has been, by HRS's own acknowledgement, excessively lax and this laxity must be blamed for the approval of inappropriate persons as foster parents with the unfortunate, and even tragic, results which precipitated this investigation. The selection process for those wishing to become foster parents has recently come to include police record checks. Neighborhood canvasses, which would elicit the observations of the applicant family's neighbors are now being introduced. Credit checks which would be indicative of financial responsibility, are still not part of the selection process. The Grand Jury considers it essential that these measures be integrated into the screening process as rapidly as possible.

The data below presents a profile of the 27 foster homes visited as part of the Grand Jury study:

<u>Foster Parent Marital Status:</u>		
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Married Couple	22	81%
Single Male	0	0
Single Female	5	19%

Age of Head of Household:

	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
20-30	0	0
30-40	2	7%
40-50	5	19%
50-60	7	26%
60-70	6	22%
Over 70	3	11%
Unknown	4	15%

Length of Time a Foster Parent

	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Less than 1 year	1	5%
1-2 years	2	7%
2-3 years	4	15%
3-4 years	2	7%
4-5 years	2	7%
5-10 years	3	11%
10-15 years	6	22%
Over 15 years	7	26%

The foster parents were asked for the principal reasons why they became foster parents. This interview data, as would be expected, minimizes the economic incentive and should be looked accordingly:

<u>Reason</u>	<u>No.</u>
Affection for Children	19
Not working, to stay occupied	2
Suggested by Friend or Acquaintance	4
Asked by Foster Child or Relative of child	2

The foster parents were asked whether the foster care program had proved to be essentially as they had expected it to be. Their principal responses were:

<u>Response</u>	<u>No.</u>
Yes	20
No	
Expected F/C to stay longer	1
Expected more help from HRS	3
Unprepared for disability	1
Various aspects	1
No Response	1

When asked how the program could be improved, the foster parents responses were:

<u>Response</u>	<u>No.</u>
More visits by caseworkers	1
More communication with HRS	5
Timely delivery of checks	4
Visits by natural parents upset children	3
More history of child before placement	2
Assignment of worker by home, not child	2
More money	3
Miscellaneous	5

When asked what they perceived to be the best and worst aspects of the HRS Foster Care Program, the following responses were elicited:

<u>Best</u>	<u>No.</u>
Provides Good Home for Foster Child	14
Foster children themselves	3
Agency tries its best	1
Respondent enjoys parent role	2
No response	7

<u>Worst</u>	<u>No.</u>
Insufficient contacts with case-workers	6
Too much Foster Child movement	4
Some Foster Children came with too many problems	2
No Foster Child history prior to placement	1
Difficulty getting therapy	2
Insufficient home investigations	1
Not enough Foster Parents	1
No contact with natural parents	1
Child leaves after attachment formed	2
No response	7

The data relating to the high incidence of special problems among foster children strongly indicates a need for special resources to address these problems as well as for training of foster parents in dealing with such problems. The foster parents were queried as to whether they had been provided with training

by HRS. Their responses were as follows:

	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Received no training	12	44%
Received some training	15	56%
Would like more training	12	44%
Would like no training	10	38%
Undecided	2	7%
No response	3	11%

It should be noted that of the 15 families who related that they received some training, nearly all were referring to the initial three orientation meetings.

Those desiring more training specified the needs for training in the areas of handling teenagers and problem children, utilization of community resources, new methods of child rearing and preparation of child for return to natural parents.

(5) Study Findings: The Caseworkers.

A third, and most critical, role in the foster care dynamic is that of the HRS Caseworker. It is the responsibility of the Caseworker to monitor the placement and to deal with the special problems which characterize the particular foster child. And, most importantly, it is the function of the Caseworker to move the foster child toward one of the two objectives of the foster placement. These are, again, the return of the child to its natural parents, or in the alternative the arrangement of a suitable adoption.

The ideal of an expeditious adoption is in fact in many instances unrealistic. It is an oft-repeated axiom among Caseworkers that large numbers of foster children are unadoptable due to their age, their race, their physical or mental limitations or a combination of these factors. There is some validity to this axiom, yet it would appear that the axiom itself often functions

as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The scarcity of adoptions in Dade County, and the number of foster children who persist in long term foster care without attempts at adoptive placements may be the result of its validity. Yet it would appear to the Grand Jury that the effort to return foster children to their natural parents and the efforts to place them in adoptive homes is inadequate.

The following chart presents the number of Caseworkers assigned to each of the 146 foster children in the study sample since January of 1975.

<u>Number of Caseworkers</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
1	45	31%
2	22	15%
3	20	14%
4	35	24%
5	18	12%
Over 5	<u>6</u>	<u>4%</u>
	146	100%

That 40% of foster children have had four or more Caseworkers in less than four years is indicative of a staff, or assignment, turnover that may be beyond the control of the HRS Foster Care Program. What it does indicate, however, is one more aspect of the dreary cycle of the long term foster care placement. This cycle, again, consists of a de facto permanent foster care placement in a revolving cycle of foster homes with a revolving cast of Caseworkers.

HRS staff guidelines call for one Caseworker-Foster Child contact per month until such time as a stable placement emerges. Then and after, one contact every two to three months is called for.

The following table indicates the number of contacts recorded in the case files of the 146 foster children in the

sample during the ten month period beginning January 1, 1978,
until the Grand Jury study commenced:

<u>Number of Contacts</u>	<u>No. Cases</u>	<u>%</u>
None recorded	75	51%
1	14	10%
2	17	12%
3	14	10%
4	12	8%
5	2	1%
6	3	2%
7	4	3%
8 or more	5	3%

According to the files half of the foster children in the sample had had no contact with their Caseworkers, and less than one-third had had the number of contacts (between three and eight) that the guidelines call for. This may, in fairness, be attributable to failures on the part of Caseworkers to record contacts in their case files or of the Study researchers to correctly identify contacts in case files. Yet the absence of Foster Child-Caseworker contacts would appear to represent a cause for concern.

When asked by interviewers how often Caseworkers had had contact with foster children in their homes during the 60-day period preceding their interviews by study personnel, the following responses were elicited from the foster parents who were interviewed:

<u>Number of Contacts</u>	<u>No.</u>
None	10
One	6
Two	3
Three	1
Four	1
More than Four	3
Does not know	3

The numbers of Caseworker-Foster Child contacts are meaningful, of course, only in the context of the nature of these contacts and their effectiveness in achieving defined goals. As mentioned earlier, the two cardinal objectives of foster care are, first, to return the child to its natural parents and, second, when such a return is not feasible to place the child in a suitable adoptive home.

The sample case files were examined with particular reference to the definition of such a plan and the steps taken toward implementation of such plans, designed to achieve these two objectives. The following tables present the data gathered:

Plan to Return Child to Natural Parents:

	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Articulated in Case File	12	8%
Not articulated in Case File	116	79%
Not applicable	18	13%
	<u>146</u>	<u>100%</u>

Adoption Plan

	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Adoption ever attempted	36	25%
Adoption never attempted	100	68%
Child defined as non-adoptable	10	7%
	<u>146</u>	<u>100%</u>

It must be emphasized that this data may be influenced by the failure of the Caseworkers to properly record their intentions and their efforts. And good reasons may well exist for decisions not to place particular children in adoption. Also, the absence of a plan to return a child to its natural parents may be the result of the impossibility of such an objective due, for example, to either death or other reason.

Of the 146 children studied, only 16 had been permanently committed to HRS and only these 16 were technically eligible to be even considered for adoption. Yet 52 children, or 36% of the sample, had been in foster care for more than five years.

The axiom regarding the unadoptability of many foster children may, again, be accurate. Yet the fact that only 16 of the 146 children in the sample had even reached a stage in which they might be considered for adoption is, to say the least, troubling. This may be the fault of a judiciary reluctant to permanently sever ties with natural parents. Or it may be another effect of the self-fulfilling prophecy aspect of the unadoptability definition. Or it may be evidence of Caseworker lethargy. It may be a combination of several causes. In any event, the data indicates cause for concern, notwithstanding the fact that in particular cases there may be valid reasons for not seeking permanent commitment, such as a decision to maintain parental ties.

An additional sample of 54 of the 82 presently permanently committed, and therefore adoptable, foster children was selected for analysis. Some of the characteristics of this group are presented below:

<u>Health</u>	<u>No.</u>
No apparent Problems	29
Mental, Physical or Emotional Problems Noted	25
<u>Length of Time in Foster Care Prior to Permanent Commitment</u>	
	<u>No.</u>
Less than 1 year	8
1-2 years	8
2-3 years	15
3-4 years	5
4-5 years	2
5 or more years	16
<u>Length of Time from Permanent Commitment to Present</u>	
	<u>No.</u>
Less than 1 year	11
1-2 years	6
2-3 years	13
3-4 years	0
4-5 years	5
5 or more years	19

D. Conclusions and Recommendations

The Grand Jury's investigation and study of Dade County's Foster Care Program indicate the need for reform in a number of areas within that program. The HRS District Administrator has candidly acknowledged this need and has accurately identified many of the areas needing reform. Measures have been taken which are constructive and which permit optimism for the program's future.

But for the Foster Care Program to achieve its objectives, and for the foster children to receive the care with which they should be provided, will require substantial commitments and fresh perspectives. The Grand Jury makes the following observations and suggestions, based upon the evidence that has been received, again in the separate contexts of the children, the foster parents, and the HRS Caseworkers.

(a) The Foster Children

(1) The Grand Jury has found that foster children are characterized by a significantly higher incidence of physical, mental and emotional problems than their more fortunate peers. Sufficient resources, designed to assist in addressing these problems, have not been identified or committed.

The Grand Jury recommends that increased emphasis be given to developing Caseworkers trained in the needs of children afflicted with the various special problems alluded to earlier. These Caseworkers must develop a working knowledge of the community agencies and resources which treat these various disorders and must assist foster parents in the utilization of such resources.

The Grand Jury study also found evidence that Caseworkers often fail to adequately take into account the special needs of

special problem children when placements in foster homes are made. A greater attempt should be made to insure that foster children with specific problems are placed in homes that have demonstrated an ability to deal effectively with such problems.

(2) The Grand Jury study reveals unacceptable numbers of overcrowded homes and, generally, a lack of adequate numbers of foster homes. A substantial effort must be made to increase the numbers of smaller homes for the placement of foster children. This will in turn necessitate a fresh look at the foster parent recruitment process. There does not appear to exist any concerted planning for the use of the media, speakers, or other forms of community outreach designed to elicit public interest in the foster care program and to encourage participation in the program as foster parents.

The Grand Jury, in this regard, notes the existence of a foster parents organization which is a resource that should be tapped by HRS and which should be integrated into planning a foster parent recruitment effort, as well as foster parent planning generally. Over the past several months positive steps have been taken in this regard.

(3) While the problem of overcrowded homes should be partially alleviated by the recruitment of an increased number of smaller homes, this study has strongly indicated a need for the giving of serious consideration to the use of group homes, particularly for adolescent foster children.

The Grand Jury notes a growing trend in the field of foster care away from the nuclear foster home concept, particularly where foster children have reached adolescence. Considerations of cost and efficiency would appear to favor the introduction of professionally staffed group homes for adolescents. While a nuclear

family setting may be desirable for an infant, the need of the older long term foster child would appear to be better met by a permanent group setting than by the pattern of shifting foster families that so often is the alternative. Also, the logistic advantage inherent in the presence of professional staff on the premises of group homes would be of distinct advantage in dealing with the special problems of the resident foster children.

In this regard the Grand Jury notes the closing of numbers of public schools in Dade County and suggests that these buildings be looked to as potential group foster homes.

The Grand Jury also strongly recommends the creation of a central, professionally staffed, diagnostic facility to which all neglected, abandoned, or abused children would be referred for examination, treatment and referral. This receiving center would centralize the presently decentralized system which so often permits child abuse to go unrecognized. This reception center would also replace the ill-functioning system of emergency shelter homes, which do not have professional staff, to which dependent children are now sent pending foster placements. The reception center would be available for intake, diagnosis, and referral on a twenty-four hour basis.

(4) The Grand Jury is troubled by the apparent drift of many foster children, particularly those in long term placement, from home to home. There may, of course, be adequate reasons for particular changes in foster placements for particular children. In many cases, however, the case files fail to indicate such reasons. HRS must make every effort to promote stability in placements by giving careful consideration to the appropriateness of a particular placement at the outset as well as by providing

training and support designed to assist foster parents in maintaining stable and permanent placements.

(5) At some point in time, foster children attain the age of eighteen and their cases are closed. Too often there is no indication of any planning for that child's future years. No data was gathered as to what becomes of former foster children in our community, and perhaps no such data exists. But what is apparent in the files is a consistent lack of any definition of goals, let alone steps taken toward a realization of those goals, for those older foster children who will soon reach their majority. While it is understandable that Caseworkers must devote their already overburdened resources to immediate concerns, there must exist some concerted planning for the future course of the lives of present foster children. This long term planning process should be made an integral part of the training of both Caseworkers and foster parents.

(6) A final, and perhaps the most important recommendation with respect to the children, deals with the need to pay more than lip service to the two objectives of foster care generally, which are to return the child to its natural parents or to place the child, in the alternative, in a suitable adoptive home.

The Grand Jury appreciates the reasons why neither objective may be feasible or realistic in a given case. But at the same time we have received repeated indications that efforts to achieve these objectives are inadequate in particular cases as well as in general. Too often the case files make no allusion to the existence of such plans. And the adoption process appears to have been mired for over a year in personal and institutional

bickering between those responsible for referring foster children for adoption and those responsible for the identification of appropriate adoptive parents. A recent reorganization may, hopefully, alleviate this particular problem.

Even without this unfortunate impasse in the adoption process, the number of adoptions is meager and indicative of a need for a new commitment to locating suitable adoptive parents, with the increased use of subsidies as incentive to the adoption of children with special problems.

(b) Foster Parents

(7) This investigation began as the result of the discovery of a variety of unfortunate incidents which clearly could have been avoided had the foster parents involved been adequately screened and their shortcomings detected. While some progress as been made, steps must be taken to improve the recruitment and screening processes, and, of course, those two processes are closely interrelated. A strong recruitment effort will enlarge the pool of potential applicants and will thereby permit the selection of more qualified foster parents.

As has been noted, HRS administration has taken steps to tighten applicant screening. The Grand Jury strongly recommends, however, that HRS enhance its capability for the identification of inappropriate placements, by insuring thorough neighborhood canvasses and by introducing credit checks.

No single observation had emerged more saliently prior to the inception of the Grand Jury's investigation than the laxity of foster parent screening and monitoring which had existed in the past. The costs in mental and physical abuse to the children who suffered as a result of inappropriate placements have been intolerable and such situations must not recur.

(8) Again, foster children have a high incidence of special problems of physical, mental and emotional natures which require special handling. Yet foster parents are not provided with the resources or the training they should have so as to equip themselves to deal with these special needs.

The case files and the field interviews reveal a need for the creation of a parent training capability within the Foster Care Program. Such a program is apparently planned by HRS and is to be implemented in conjunction with Florida International University. This capability would provide guidance to foster parents as to how to deal, for example, with the slow learner, the emotionally disturbed or the mental retard. Such a capability would ideally elicit the participation of community experts in such fields and should be integrated into the foster parent communication network which has been created by the foster parent themselves.

(9) Foster care placements, as has been documented earlier, are the end results of the troubled and broken homes of natural parents. Increased attention needs to be paid to preventive measures, initiated by HRS as well as by community mental health agencies generally, to make available counseling and other help to families who have shown signs of needing such help. Such measures might avert the abandonment and neglect of natural children in many cases.

The Grand Jury also sees the need for parenthood training, designed to prepare families for parenthood and child rearing. This, again, is a preventive measure which is not the responsibility of HRS alone, but also is the responsibility of our educational system.

(c) The Caseworkers

Each of the preceding recommendations in some way affects the foster care Caseworkers and in many instances reflects adversely upon their tasks as they now perform them.

The Grand Jury appreciates the fact that some problems are beyond the control of HRS, at least at this geographic level. Low pay, high turnover, large caseloads and inadequate case contacts are interrelated aspects of a problem not peculiar to the HRS Foster Care Program alone. Most government social service agencies are forced to face these problems, and the Foster Care Program is certainly no exception. HRS Caseworkers salaries are apparently the lowest of any public or private service agency in this community. The Grand Jury recognizes that inadequate appropriations may well doom many of the recommendations made in this Report and that is, to say the least, unfortunate.

Yet the lot of the Caseworker is neither inevitably a hopeless one, nor is it one doomed to mediocrity or failure. The Grand Jury study reveals that many Caseworkers do impressive, even admirable, jobs. The names of several Caseworkers, with an apparent predominance in Special Units, recur in files which reflect frequent Caseworker contacts, well articulated goals and impressive successes in dealing with particular problems. These Caseworkers are to be praised and congratulated.

Yet at the other extreme are those dreary case files reflecting no contacts, no plans and no progress. The Caseworker's Supervisors ultimately must bear the responsibility of seeing to it that contacts are made, that plans are articulated, and that special problems are identified and dealt with. And it is the responsibility of HRS, to the extent possible, to see that

the foster care program is staffed by trained and motivated Caseworkers. This will, in turn, depend greatly upon HRS's success at revitalizing foster care so as to attract and retain quality personnel.

Some positive steps have been taken. Fourteen new positions have been created to staff two new adoption units. The Homefinding Unit is scheduled to have its staff increased. HRS has been participating in an interagency Child Abuse Task Force, along with the State Attorney's Office and police agencies. It is the objective of this Task Force to institute new and system-wide procedure for reporting and dealing with abuse, as well as to initiate interagency training in child abuse.

But much more needs to be done, as this Report should make clear. Unless more is done, the foster care program will continue to exist on the periphery of our attention, functioning as it has in the past and perpetuating its own shortcomings, only to come to our attention when the media once again tells of another abused foster child or another blatant instance of inappropriate placement. These children have the right to expect more. And we must see that they receive it.

IV

THE LITTLE HUD INVESTIGATION

A. Background

On August 27 and 28, 1978, the Miami Herald published articles implicitly critical of aspects of Dade County's Department of Housing and Urban Development, which is popularly known as Little HUD. The agency was created in 1967, when Dade County's Housing Authority and Urban Renewal Agency were merged. Among its several functions, Little HUD purchases property in order to convert these properties to public housing or other public facilities.

The principal implied allegations of wrongdoing in the agency were twofold. On the one hand, the articles implied that the Little HUD property acquisition process had been manipulated to the monetary advantage of two private property owners who had sold \$2.6 million dollars in property to Little HUD over the course of the last decade. The articles further implied that the person at Little HUD responsible for the manipulation was its chief land acquisition officer, Joseph Stokes.

The second, and closely related, series of allegations implied that Mr. Stokes had himself benefitted financially from his relationship with these two owners and their agents. Mr. Stokes' personal financial condition was alluded to, including his recent purchase of a home valued at over ninety thousand dollars. The existence of a relationship between Mr. Stokes and the property owners which transcended an arm's length business relationship was documented. In particular the articles revealed that Mr. Stokes had in 1972 received a \$3,000 loan from the attorney for one of the owners. Furthermore it was revealed that the attorney for the

second owner had represented Mr. Stokes in a divorce action and in two private real estate purchases.

The Director of Little HUD, for his part, requested an investigation of the allegations and provided the State Attorney and the County Manager with a detailed rebuttal of the implications in the articles. The Grand Jury was provided copies of this rebuttal and all documents referred to in it.

In addition to reviewing all pertinent documents and the chronologies of each land purchase mentioned in the articles, the Grand Jury heard testimony from Little HUD officials, the property appraisers who had appraised the particular properties, the County Attorneys who had participated in litigation relating to the acquisitions and private citizens who had participated in the neighborhood public meetings which, according to Little HUD, initiated the acquisition processes for the particular pieces of property.

The Grand Jury also heard testimony from the two attorneys for the property owners named in the articles as well as from Joseph Stokes who, in addition to waiving immunity in order to testify, voluntarily submitted to an extensive polygraph examination with respect to the implied allegations of wrongdoing contained in the articles.

B. Findings: Allegations Relating to Little HUD's Acquisition Process

The properties purchased from the first of the two owners, who is now deceased, included parcels in Goulds, South Miami and a building on Douglas Road in Coconut Grove, known as the Barbarosa Apartments. The properties purchased from the second owner include other properties on Douglas Road as well as a building located at 1060 N. W. 62 Street.

In that the Little HUD acquisition process is similar with respect to each of the properties, this Report will present its findings in the respective contexts of the stages by which HUD acquisition occurs.

(1) The Planning Stage and the Role of Community Participation

The development of plans for neighborhood rehabilitation, as required by federal legislation, emanates from decisions and priorities defined by neighborhood groups of community residents. Once these decisions are made, and are communicated to Little HUD, the decisions are implemented by the agency's land acquisition officials.

The Herald articles implied that the contemplated community input was either ignored or manipulated by Little HUD and that the failure of community groups to perform an autonomous role worked to the advantage of the two property owners who then sold their properties to Little HUD. The article, in this regard, carried a headline reading, "Goals of Neighborhood Groups Ignored by Top Sellers to HUD," and pointed out that "The most successful broker of property to Little HUD has never attended a neighborhood public hearing." In fact the neighborhood meetings occur for the purpose of dialogue between Little HUD and community residents, and those wishing to sell property, or their agents, have no role at such meetings and their presence at them is neither expected or desired.

The Grand Jury heard testimony from community residents who were present when purchases of the Douglas Road and 1060 N. W. 62 Street properties were adopted by the groups as priorities. These witnesses confirmed that the residents had themselves decided to purchase these properties, which were among the most

offensive and poorly maintained "concrete monsters" in the two communities in which they stood. Besides convincing the Grand Jury that the neighborhood plan process had not been manipulated by either Little HUD or Joseph Stokes (who, to the best of anyone's recollection, never attended a neighborhood meeting), the living conditions within these properties and the owner-landlords' failure to ameliorate those conditions, led the Grand Jury to request that the State Attorney's Office inspect the present condition of other ghetto-located properties owned by these two owners and to report back to the next Grand Jury relative to their compliance to building codes. This process is now underway.

The Grand Jury finds absolutely no evidence that the neighborhood planning process was in any way manipulated. In fact the witnesses who testified indicated that the participants were active and knowledgeable.

One article pointed out that a priority list, which included upon it the Douglas Road properties, was mysteriously "revised" subsequent to a meeting, affecting the priority assigned to this owner's property. The Grand Jury received testimony from those who prepared the lists mentioned and finds no evidence to contradict the witnesses' recollection that the "revised" list of priorities corrected errors made in recording priorities upon the first list. In fact this "revision" lowered the prioritization of the owner's Douglas Road apartment buildings.

(2) The Appraisal Stage and the Acquisition Process

Once a development plan has been prepared by a designated community, assuming the existence of adequate funding, the acquisition process begins and it is here, and not earlier, that Joseph Stokes assumes a role in the process.

Once approval to purchase has been given by the City or County Commissions affected, appraisals are obtained from at least two appraisers for each parcel. At present, the selection of the appraisers is made by a committee consisting of representatives of the County Manager's Office, the County Attorney's Office, and Little HUD. Yet at the time of the appraisals of the properties which were the subject of the articles, Mr. Stokes himself made these choices. This, in retrospect, was a process which could have lent itself to abuse and one that probably never should have been permitted to exist.

Yet testimony elicited from all of the appraisers involved in appraisals of each of the properties named in the articles fails to indicate any evidence of attempts by Mr. Stokes, or anyone else, to imply in any way that a particular appraisal was sought or desired. Each appraiser consistently maintains that they had not ever known Mr. Stokes to have attempted to influence them or their colleagues at any time.

Once appraisals are received an acquisition price is automatically set at the higher of the appraisals and a written offer is then communicated by Mr. Stokes to the property owner. This communication notes that the offer by Little HUD is not negotiable and is final. In the event this offer is not accepted by the owner, the case is referred to the County Attorney's Office.

These processes were followed in the case of each of the purchases discussed in the articles.

The Goulds properties involved re-assessments ordered by Mr. Stokes. The increased appraisals, however, were apparently not the result of questionable "sales" made by the owner to his tenants in order to artificially inflate property values.

In the case of the South Miami properties, the examination of the process leading up to the sale to Little HUD indicates that the property which was sold to Little HUD had been purchased by the owner shortly before, and evidently with knowledge that Little HUD was contemplating purchase of the property. Mr. Stokes played no role in the decision to purchase this property and the purchase by Little HUD had been discussed prior to the time it was sold by the original owner to the owner who then sold the HUD at a profit.

The price which Little HUD paid for the South Miami properties was apparently inflated by Little HUD staff's failure to note that the seller had added state tax stamps to the property deed in order to make it appear that the price that he had paid was \$45,000 instead of the \$20,000 actually paid to the original owner. The affixation of excess tax stamps to deeds for the purpose of misleading subsequent potential buyers is certainly a devious one, but this practice is apparently not unlawful, nor unusual in the real estate business. The Little HUD staff who relied upon the tax stamps instead of verifying the actual price with both the buyer and seller of the property were certainly gullible and a change in procedure has been implemented designed to prevent a recurrence of this costly omission. There is no evidence, however, to indicate that Mr. Stokes was in any way involved or that the Little HUD staff involved were culpable of any intentional act designed to increase the profit to the seller.

C. Findings: Allegations Relating to the Personal Transactions of Joseph Stokes.

Although no evidence was found to indicate that the Little HUD acquisition process was manipulated, by Mr. Stokes or anyone else, to the benefit of the two property owners named in the articles, the Grand Jury also examined the implications that

Mr. Stokes' relationship with the owners, or with their attorneys, included the acceptance of gratuities from them or the provision to them of "inside" information in connection with the properties which they sold to Little HUD.

It is unquestionable that Mr. Stokes formed relationships with one of the two property owners, and with the attorney for the other, which transcended their business relationship. In that their interests in Little HUD property acquisitions were often adversary with respect to the selling price of property to Little HUD, Mr. Stokes exercised questionable judgment in entering these relationships with private property owners and their attorneys. With the monetary stakes involved in the negotiations between owners and Little HUD, and in the context of Mr. Stokes' primary role in the acquisition process, it is less than surprising that his objectivity, indeed his integrity, were eventually questioned.

Mr. Stokes' judgment in accepting a \$3,000 loan from the attorney for one of the owners, and his retaining the attorney of the other for his own personal matters was particularly poor. While there is no evidence that he granted favors in exchange for these services, and while he repaid the loans at a going rate of interest and paid standard legal fees in his private proceedings, Mr. Stokes has unquestionably paid a personal price in recent weeks for his excessively close relationships with those who sold to Little HUD. This price, and the appearances of impropriety, could easily have been avoided.

Joseph Stokes twice waived immunity and voluntarily gave full statements, once in the State Attorney's Office and once before the Grand Jury. In each instance he denied ever receiving a gratuity, or providing inside information, with respect to any

of the transactions, or any of the individuals referred to in this article. No evidence has been found to refute these statements.

Following his testimony Mr. Stokes was asked whether he would submit to a full polygraph examination with respect to the veracity of his denials. This polygraph examination was administered, on October 30, 1978, by one of Dade County's most skilled polygraphers, George Slattery. The five hours of examination revealed, in Mr. Slattery's professional judgment, no evidence of deception on the part of Mr. Stokes.

CAPITAL CASES AND HANDGUNS

This Grand Jury heard testimony which resulted in thirty-two Indictments for First Degree Murder during its term. It is not our function to detect characteristics or themes which emerge from these cases. Yet it was our experience that one such theme became so obvious as to warrant special mention in our report.

In twenty-one, or two-thirds, of the thirty-two cases, the murder weapon was a handgun. This relationship, of handguns and homicides, is of course not a recently observed phenomenon. Nationally, in 1976, forty-nine percent of murders were attributable to handguns and it is of interest that Dade County's rate is significantly in excess of that figure. Many of these homicides would, of course, have occurred irrespective of the ready accessibility of the handguns involved. Yet in fifty-nine percent of the murders we considered, the victim and perpetrator were relatives or acquaintances and the precipitating incident was generally a domestic incident or an argument which escalated to a point in time when an available handgun was acquired by one of the adversaries. In fourteen of the thirty-two cases the homicides were the result of robbery attempts involving handguns.

The need for handgun controls, and legislative action at the local, state and federal levels, is clear. Studies indicate that there will be 250,000 more victims of handgun crimes in the United States just one year from now, that at least fifty million handguns are in circulation in the United States and that thefts supply twenty to thirty percent of all handguns used in crimes. At the current rate of production and importation there will be some 100 million handguns in civilian hands by the year 2000.

This Grand Jury appeals to our elected officials, in Dade County and in Tallahassee, to institute and support legislation designed to curb the accessibility of handguns in our community.

VI

CONCLUSION

Past Grand Juries have regularly called attention to the blatant inadequacy of the ten dollars per day reimbursement permitted Jurors by Florida law. That this Grand Jury echoes its predecessors will come as no surprise. Yet we make our own appeal in the unprecedented context of our role as Dade County's first non-blue ribbon panel.

This Grand Jury was asked to become conversant with subject matter ranging from cyclical unemployment to the relative advantages of group homes and nuclear family homes for adolescents to methods of appraising real property. The documents presented to each Grand Juror, by the State Attorney, as essential background material to be studied weigh collectively nearly thirty pounds. The time required to master these by far exceeds the one day a week that the Jury meets.

In the past, the members of the blue ribbon panels undoubtedly possessed greater flexibility in their work and leisure schedules, which more readily permitted time for attention to Grand Jury matters, than will our successors on future randomly selected Grand Juries. Financial incentive for service is not, of course, the sole reason one should serve, nor will it assure diligent Jurors. But adequate compensation, particularly when many Grand Jurors are not paid by their employers for the hours they serve, is essential. It is simply unfair of government to ask its citizens to make responsible decisions having important community impact in complex subject areas, at financial detriment to themselves.

The complexity of investigation subject matter, and the limited time available in which to study the subject matter raises other issues as well.

The State Attorney's Office bears a heavy burden in the planning and execution of Grand Jury investigations. That office has served us well and we acknowledge the importance of its role and the effort expended in its performance. In order for future Grand Juries to adequately meet their large responsibility we suggest to the next Grand Jury that it expend the funds necessary in order to employ one or more full or part-time staff to assist the State Attorney, and consequently the Jury, with investigations such as we have conducted during our term. The person or persons so employed should have a background enabling study and research of social and economic issues related to government such as the ones dealt with in this Report.

CAPITAL AND OTHER CRIMINAL CASES PRESENTED TO THE GRAND JURY

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
RICHARD HENRY MARLOWE, and MARVIN LeROY WHIPPLE	First Degree Murder Robbery with a Firearm Possession of a Firearm while Committing a Felony	True Bill
EDWARD CLAY and MARVIN JOHNSON	First Degree Murder Armed Robbery Armed Robbery	True Bill
LEONARD OTIS JOHNSON, also known as APOLLO DeHAYSIS	Second Degree Murder Robbery	True Bill
SENEEN FRANCISCO BRITO, DIEGO VICTORIANO CABRERA and ALEJANDRO JOSE GONZALEZ	First Degree Murder	True Bill
DOUGLAS BROWNER	First Degree Murder	True Bill
SMILIE BENTON	First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of Firearm while Engaged in Criminal Offense	True Bill
CHARLES H. JOHNSON	First Degree Murder Robbery	True Bill
JOHNNY TIPTON STRAUGHTER, also known as JOHNNY TIPTON, also known as JOHNNY WILLIAMS	First Degree Murder Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony	True Bill
JIMMY LEE ASHLEY	First Degree Murder Robbery Burglary	True Bill
JIMMY LEE ASHLEY and ELTON EDWARDS	First Degree Murder Robbery Burglary Use of Firearm while Engaged in a Felony	True Bill
JUAN ANTONIO FALLADA	First Degree Murder Robbery	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
OLIVER COCHRAN and EDWARD DEAN KENNEDY	First Degree Murder Attempted Armed Robbery Possession of Firearm by Convicted Felon (A) Possession of Firearm by Convicted Felon (B)	True Bill
GREGORY STANLEY	First Degree Murder Attempted Armed Robbery	True Bill
TAMMY SUE McCOWAN	First Degree Murder Robbery Kidnapping	True Bill
STEPHEN WILLIAM BEATTIE	First Degree Murder First Degree Murder First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of Firearm while Engaged in Criminal Offense	True Bill
IVERSON LEON WALKER	First Degree Murder Attempted Robbery	True Bill
ALFREDO MONTANEZ RAMOS	First Degree Murder First Degree Murder Possession of a Firearm in the Commission of a Felony	True Bill
FRANK MONROE	First Degree Murder	True Bill
LEON CHARLES SCOTT	First Degree Murder	True Bill
CARRIE HENDERSON, JOHNNY PINSON, HERBERT MURRAY, RICKY GODFREY, and RONALD GRANT	Conspiracy to Commit a Felony Robbery First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
MARY LAWSON	First Degree Murder Kidnapping	True Bill
LIVINGSTON C. RITCHIE	First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of Firearm while Engaged in Criminal Offense	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
LESTER ENRIQUEZ	First Degree Murder First Degree Murder Robbery	True Bill
DANIEL HILBERT	First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of Firearm while Engaged in Criminal Offense	True Bill
ALLEN MICHAEL BOCHARSKI	First Degree Murder Burglary Grand Theft Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in Criminal Offense	True Bill
DEWEY HICKS, ALEJANDRO RIOS and HENRY PAGE	First Degree Murder Kidnapping Robbery Grand Theft - Second Degree	True Bill
KEVIN EARNEST WALKER	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder	True Bill
WAYNE ANTHONY STRAPP	First Degree Murder	True Bill
GUSTAV WALTER KLOSZEWSKI, JR.	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Aggravated Battery	True Bill
DEBORAH WILLIS also known as DEBORAH RILEY	First Degree Murder	True Bill
FAUSTO LAZARO PADRON	Involuntary Sexual Battery Involuntary Sexual Battery Involuntary Sexual Battery	True Bill
EARL CLAUDE NAVE	First Degree Murder Shooting into an Occupied Dwelling Unlawful Possession of Firearm while Engaged in Criminal Offense	True Bill

<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
JOHN LANE and JOHN JOHNSON	First Degree Murder	True Bill
JEFFERY WARREN WIMBERLY, and JEFFERY TORRENCE	First Degree Murder Attempted Armed Robbery Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in Criminal Offense	True Bill
CAL TAYLOR	First Degree Murder	True Bill
ROBERT LEE DOUGLAS	First Degree Murder Burglary Armed Robbery	True Bill
ROBERT LEE DOUGLAS	Attempted First Degree Murder Burglary Robbery Involuntary Sexual Battery	True Bill
ROBERT LEE DOUGLAS	Breaking & Entering and Assaulting a Person Therein Armed Robbery Use of a Firearm in the Commission of a Felony	True Bill
WALTER PERRY MYERS and FRONNIE ALICE GRUNDY	First Degree Murder Robbery	True Bill
KENNETH FLEMMING, also known as, "KENNY BEE"	First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while Engaged in a Criminal Offense	True Bill
EDGAR EUGENE OLIVER	First Degree Murder	True Bill
DAVID JOHN ATKINSON and WILLIAM RALPH RUSSO	First Degree Murder Attempted Robbery	True Bill
ELADIO JAIME	First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Attempted First Degree Murder Unlawful Possession of a Firearm while in the Commission of a Felony	True Bill

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to Judge Edward S. Klein for his guidance during the first term of a Grand Jury selected from the voters registration.

We are proud to have had the services and legal advice of the State Attorney, Janet Reno. We found her to be dedicated, forthright, understanding, extremely capable and interested in improving the living conditions in Dade County by energetically fighting crime and corruption.

We especially commend Tom Petersen, Chief Assistant for Administration to the State Attorney. He is patient, verbal and presents extremely well prepared, in-depth studies of what is being investigated. And George Yoss, Assistant State Attorney, who presents his cases clearly and makes them easily understood to all.

Our special thanks to Madeline Camp, Administrative Assistant who is pleasant, efficient and very patient.

We feel very fortunate to have enjoyed the services of Sam Karlin as Bailiff for this term. Our thanks to him for his concern and thoughtfulness.

Grand Jury service is a public duty which each of us has found enlightening and a memorable experience.

Respectfully submitted,

Gary Owaski

Gary Owaski, Foreman
Dade County Grand Jury
Spring Term 1978

Attest:

Maribel Maxwell
Maribel Maxwell, Clerk

Dated: November 14, 1978